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WORK AND LEISURE
Summary
A Priori Economic Theory is unable to predict whether the supply of 
labour will increase or decrease as the wage rate changes. Political 
interest in the effect of income maintenance schemes on the incentive 
to work has stimulated a spate of empirical research into labour supply 
based on the simple text-book theory of labour supply. Unfortunately 
the empirical work to date has produced an unacceptably wide range of 
labour supply estimates. One reason for the poor results is that the 
assumptions of the simple text-book model of labour supply don't take 
account of important variables in the real world. However even if we 
assume the simple text-book theory of labour supply to be theoretically 
adequate, the conventional procedures used to estimate labour supply 
based on the simple text-book model are theoretically invalid, 
econometrically unsound and suffer grave measurement problems with one 
of the key variables required by the method. Furthermore the functional 
form normally used has been highly restrictive therebye reducing the 
tax policy relevance of this research, most of which has been undertaken 
with a view to estimating the effect of income maintenance schemes on 
labour supply.
A new procedure is discussed to estimate labour supply in which hours 
worked is regressed on perceived net marginal wage rate, net average 
wage rate and non-employment income. The new model represents a marked 
improvement over the conventional procedure which regresses hours worked 
on the average wage rate and non-employment income, because unlike the 
conventional procedure it is theoretically^ correct in a world with 
non-linear budget lines, and because price income and substitution
effects can be estimated independently of the (dubious) non-employment 
income coefficient therebye avoiding theoretical econometric 
and data measurement problems associated with non-employment
income. The new average/marginal procedure is also 
superior because it employs a functional form which is not highly 
restrictive such that it allows the labour supply estimates to vary 
more freely over the income distribution and should therefore be 
more relevant for tax policy. Furthermore the average/marginal 
procedure overcomes the problem of spurious correlation between 
hours worked and the average wage rate arising' from error in the 
measurement of hours worked. There is however one remaining 
econometric problem intrinsic to the conventional procedure which 
is not resolved by the new average/marginal procedure, namely that 
the average wage rate is endogenous where average and marginal wage 
rates are unequal.
The new averagq/marginal procedure is used to obtain labour supply 
estimates for a cross section sample of British weekly paid married 
men. Price income and substitution effects are calculated at different 
points over the sample distribution of wage rates to.ascertain the effect 
of the flexible functional form used, and this is found to have a 
profound effect insofar as the magnitude of the substitution effect 
decreases as a function of the average wage rate. The regression 
estimates are also used to derive the implied (skeleton) indifference 
map for income and leisure. Finally the implications of the estimated 
labour supply function with respect to income maintenance schemes are 
discussed, using alternative negative income tax schemes on a hypothetical 
population to illustrate the issues.
CHAPTER 1
ECONOMIC THEORY AND RESEARCH
Introduction
A priori Economic Theory is unable to predict whetj'ier the supply of labour 
will increase or decrease as the wage rate changes. Because a priori 
theoretical analysis can provide no solution to this question, a substantial 
body of empirical research has been undertaken attempting to estimate- labour 
supply. Historically, this empirical research was generated out of academic 
interest, but more recently political interest in the effect of income 
maintenance schemes on the incentive to work has stimulated a spate of 
empirical research into labour supply based on the simple text-book theory 
of labour supply. Unfortunately the empirical research to date has produced 
an unaccepfably wide range of estimated labour supply functions. It is 
very likely that one reason for the poor results is that the assumptions of 
the simple text-book model of labour supply don't take account of important 
variables in the real world. However it is argued in this chapter that even 
if we assume the simple text-book theory to labour supply to be theoretically 
adequate, the conventional procedures used to estimate the labour supply 
function based on the simple text-book model are theoretically invalid, 
econometrically unsound, and suffer grave measurement problems with one of 
the key variables required by the method.
General Economic Theory of Labour Supply
The formal economic viewpoint first set out by Robbins^ is that an individual 
has twenty-four hours each day which he allocates between work and leisure.
In order to gain income he must work and thereby sacrifice leisure. The
1. Lionel Robbins, "On the Elasticity of Demand for Income in Terms of Effort" 
Economica, Vol. 10, No, 29, June 1930 , pp 123-124: for a more recent treat­
ment see Richard A Musgrave, "The Theory of Public Finance", McGraw-Hill 
Book Co. Inc., Tokyo 1959, Chap. 11.
rational man will tend towards an optimum level of satisfaction, by working 
that number of hours at which he- values his leisure time at the going wage 
rate. If he works longer hours than this, the leisure he foregoes is
more valuable to him than the income he receives for this extra work. If
he works fewer hours than this the extra leisure is worth less to him than
the extra income he could earn by working longer.
Fig, I Fig II Fig. Ill
C
A
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This position can be represented diagrammatically. In Fig.l, AB is the 
wage line which indicates the different combinations of income and leisure 
open to the individual at a given wage rate. Thus the individual could 
choose OA income with no leisure, or OB leisure with no income, or differing 
combinations of income and leisure in between A and B on the wageline AB. 
Point B is fixed since there are 24 hours in each day, which are allocated 
between leisure and income (via work).
Point A ip determined by the wage rate and a rise in the wage rate would 
result in a new level of income being theoretically attainable. If the 
individual worked for 24 hours at the new wage rate, his income would rise 
from A to C and a new wage line BC would be operative.
Fig. II shows the individual's preference map where an indifference curve
shows different combinations of income and leisure between which the 
individual is indifferent. Although the individual is indifferent between 
different points on the indifference curve, he will increase his satisfaction 
by moving to the highest indifference curve possible.
Fig. Ill indicates that the individual reaches his highest level of 
satisfaction (i.e. the highest indifference curve) at the point of tangency 
between the wage line AB and indifference curve 1^. Hence if the individual 
has income OJ and OH hours of leisure, he would increase his leisure to OF 
and reduce his income to OG, thereby moving to the highest indifference 
curve possible at the going wage rate. As there are a fixed 24 hours each 
day, he necessarily reduces his hours of work from BH to BF as his leisure
time increases from OH to OF.
In order to avoid confusion between the commodity "income", and the level of 
overall income expressed by the wage line, henceforth the commodities income 
and leisure will be referred to as Y and L respectively.
At a level of income given by the wage line AB the individual is, in 
equilibrium at OH of Y and OG of L in Fig. IV.
Fig. IV
O L
If the individual’s hourly rate is increased he moves onto a higher
indifference curve from P to Q. This price effect consists, of an income.
2
and a substitution effect. In other words the new combination of Y and L 
chosen is partly the result of a change in the overall level of income 
whereby the person can now choose more of both Y and L at the higher level 
of income 3 i.e. the income effect. The new combination of Y and b chosen 
is also partly the result of a change in the relative prices of the two 
commodities Y and L. i.e. the substitution effect.
Fig. V
6Û L
2. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price, Revised edition, The Macmillan Co, 
New York, 1953, pp. 75-80.
The substitution and income effects for the change in the wage rate from 
BA to BC are graphically demonstrated in Fig', V. The substitution effect 
is the change in behaviour for a fall in the price of Y relative to L while 
holding the individual’s level of income unchanged such that he may still 
consume his original bundle of goods. This situation is represented by a 
new price line FE drawn parallel to BC giving the new relative price of Y 
in terms of L, and holding income constant so that the individual is still 
able to consume OH of Y and OG of L. This compensated change in relative 
prices would lead to a new equilibrium level where the person maximises 
his satisfaction by substituting Y for L from P to R, and this change in 
behaviour is the substitution effect.
The income effect occurs when the individual’s income level rises with no 
change in the relative prices of Y and L. The change in the wage line 
from FE to BC represents this situation and the income effect would be a 
movement from R to Q in Fig. V. In other words, as the income level rises, 
the individual takes more L as well as more Y. As the individual takes more 
leisure time he necessarily works fewer hours because there are only 24 
hours in each day. Thus the income effect in the Y/L choice is called a 
negative income effect because as income rises, the number of hours per 
day worked falls, unless leisure is an inferior good.
If the wage rate increases there will therefore be a price effect which 
consists of a negative income effect (decreasing hours of work) and a 
positive substitution effect (increasing hours of-work). As it is a priori 
impossible to say whether the positive substitution effect will outweigh 
the negative income effect or not, the effect of an increase in the wage 
rate on the number of hours worked cannot be predicted. Two examples are 
given below in Fig. VI to illustrate this conclusion.
Fig. VI
Person W Person Z
L
After a rise in the wage rate causing the wage line to move from BA to BC, 
the substitution effect increases hours of work from EG to BK while the 
income effect reduces hours of work from BK to BM. In Fig. VI we can see 
that for person W the effect of the increased wage rate is an increase in 
the number of hours worked, i.e. the positive substitution effect outweighs 
the negative income effect. Person Z on the other hand works fewer hours: 
as the negative income effect outweighs the positive substitution effect 
after an increase in the hourly wage rate. A similar analysis could 
demonstrate that a fall in the wage rate could increase or decrease hours 
of work depending on the magnitude of the opposing income and substitution 
effects.
It is evident that economic theory cannot predict the direction of the change 
in hours of labour supplied after an increase (or decrease) in the wage rate
because a priori we do not know which is stronger, the negative income 
effect or the positive substitution effect.
The problem has been defined, namely, that economic theory cannot predict 
what happens to the quantity of labour supplied after a change in the wage 
rate. The reason that the problem has arisen has also been stated, namely, 
that a priori we do not know the relative strengths of the income and 
substitution effects. At this stage of the argument it is normal to conclude 
that a priori theoretical analysis can provide no solution to the problem 
and that one must resort to empiricism in order to reach an answer.
Empirical Research into Labour Supply
One rather obvious empirical approach would be to estimate a labour supply 
curve with hours worked as a function of the wage rate, using cross-section 
data or'aggregate time series data. Such a relationship would yield the 
price consumption curve for leisure, it would be possible to observe whether 
or not the labour supply curve was backward bending, and we would know 
whether or not the income effect was greater than the substitution effect 
as hours of work increase or decrease as a function of the wage rate. 
Unfortunately, this approach would give the price effect only and could 
not separate out the income and substitution effects. This is a very serious 
drawback because it would be impossible to estimate the effect of an income 
maintenance or negative income tax scheme on labour supply, and so this 
approach loses much policy relevance. An example is given below in Fig. VII
The person has a gross wage rate AB working AX hours on the labour supply 
curve given by PCC. The government then introduces a negative income, tax 
which gives the individual a tax credit of AC and imposes a marginal tax 
rate such that the individual's wage rate is now CD. We do not know from the 
knowledge of the Price Consumption Curve PCC alo^e whether he works rnore or 
less hours after the imposition of the negative income tax
Fig. VII
cï'iviT
PCC
X
X fl ’ L
because the individual will not be in equilibrium anywhere on the price 
consumption curve PCC.
This problem was tackled by adopting a different procedure and over the 
last ten years there have been a number of empirical studies which have 
regressed hours worked on wage rate and non-employment income in order to 
measure the price and income effects respectively, and by subtraction the 
substitution effect. Before discussing these studies, the basic model 
they all use to estimate income and substitution effects will be examined 
in detail. This model will be subsequently referred to as the Kosters
3
model.
A change in the wage rate, 6W, for a worker supplying L units of labour 
causes a change in income 6Y = L6W. The total effect of a wage rate 
change is the partial derivative and the component which is due to the
associated change in income is ÔY
£Y
ÔW The derivative represents the
effect of a change in income with no change in wage rates, such as the
3. Marvin Kosters, Income and Substitution Effects in a Family Labor Supply 
Model, p 3339 Santa Monica, Calif. The Rand Corporation, 1965.
ÔY
receipt of an annuity, and L can be substituted for the derivative ^  
Hence, an expansion for the substitution effect S or compensated wage, 
rate effect is
S
ÔL
ÔW
This model is illustrated in Fig. VIII
. ÔY
\y
E
a
%
Fig. VIII
\
V
\
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The person has a wage rate AB and is in equilibrium consuming OR of Y and 
CM of L. An increase in the wage rate from AB to AC leads to a new equil­
ibrium position where the individual consumes OQ of Y and ON of L. Hours 
worked fall by MN and this change in hours worked for the change in the 
wage rate AB to AC holding non-employment income constant gives the price 
effect. If instead of the increase in the wage rate, the individual had 
received AD non-employment income, his income would have risen by the 
same amount in the sense that he could still consume OQ of Y and ON of L. 
In this situation the wage line would be given by DE parallel to AB and 
passing through the point OQ of Y and ON of L. The increase in non­
employment income AD holding the wage rate constant leads to a new
10
equilibrium position where the individual consumes OZ of Y and OP of L.
Hours worked fall by MP and this change in hours worked for the change in 
non-employment income holding the wage rate constant gives the income 
effect.
Insofar as non-employment income has altered to allow the individual to 
consume the same combination of goods (OQ of Y and ON of L) the substitution 
effect is equal to the difference between the negative income effect MP 
and the price effect MN, i.e. the substitution effect is equal to PN.
Marvin Kosters^ presented the first empirical evidence based on this model
using a one in a thousand sample of the 1960 United States Bureau of the
Census. He defined non-employment income as all income coming in to the
family excluding that earned by the member whose labour supply is being
studied, and assumed that the wife would not alter her labour supply for
a change in the husband’s wage rate. Regressing hours worked on wage rate
and non-employment income to estimate price and income effects respectively,
he found that total wage rate elasticities for older males, aged 50 to 6M-,
were usually in the range from -0.07 to -0.09. These results support the
backward bending labour supply curve hypothesis, with the income effect
outweighing the substitution effect. A priori economic theory predicts
that the substitution effect will always be positive but Kosters found that
the compensated wage rate elasticity (the substitution effect) was positive
in only four out of the eleven regression results shown. The t statistic
for the non-employment income term was significant at 5% in only one
2
regression out of the eleven and in that case R was only equal to 0.10
T. Marvin Kosters, "Effects of an Income Tax on Labor Supply", in the 
Taxation of Income from Capital ed. A C  Harberger & Martin in Bailey 
Brookings Institution, 1969, National Committee on Government Finance.
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even when 15 additional control variables were included in the regression.
Current interest in income-maintenance programs has resulted in a spate of
studies attempting to measure income and substitution effects, with a view
to estimating the effects of redistributing income on labour supply. Glen
5Cain and Harold Watts have published eight studies all of which are broadly 
based on the Kosters model, using the wage rate and non-employment income.
To quote Cain and Watts in their summary of the current state of the 
empirical evidence largely based on the Kosters theoretical model 
" .... it makes a major difference whether the overall net reduction in 
labor supply on the part of the working poor (as a result of income- 
maintenance legislation) is, say, or 40%. Estimated responses that
span at least this range are implicit in these (empirical) results, ....
  But the basic reason the range of estimates must be considered
unacceptably large is that the range of reductions in the labor supply 
implied is too large to be useful to the policymaker."
Thus a priori analysis could provide no unambiguous answer to the effect of 
tax on labour supply and the Cain and Watts quotation above suggests that 
the empirical work to date has produced equally ambiguous answers. This 
raises the question as to why empirical analyses based on the Kosters 
model have not been successful. One approach to this would take the view 
that the Kosters model is too simple insofar as it does not provide an 
adequate representation of the real world.
Glen C. Cain and Harold W. Watts (ed.) Income Maintenance and Labor 
Supply, 1973 Rand McNally Co, Chicago.
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First, the definition of labour supply is incomplete. The simple text-book 
model assumes that the individual is endowed with 168 hours of leisure time 
per week which he can convert into income at a competitive wage rate, but 
many individuals are on piece-work schemes in which, holding leisure constant 
they can vary the intensity of their effort and therefore convert effort into 
income. This implies that in reality the initial endowment consists of time 
(168 hours each week) and energy with a transformation function whereby the 
individual converts time and energy into income.
Second, a correctly specified model of labour supply must recognise intra­
household substitution whereby the amount of labour supplied by one member 
of the household may depend not only on his own wage rate but also on the 
wage rate of the spouse.
Third, the actual wage rate may not be accurately perceived by the individual 
because of misconceptions about the marginal rate of tax. C. V. Brown^ 
asked 179 workers and 53 managers "If you were to earn one extra pound next 
week how much of it would be taken off in tax? His results are shown 
below.
Workers Managers
0 to 3/11 10% nil
4/- to 5/11 15% 8%
6/- to 6/11 20% 23%
7/- to 9/11 31% 63%
10/- and over 16% 6%
don't know 6% nil
The sample was chosen to ensure that the correct answer was 6/5 in every 
case, yet not one worker gave this answer.
6. C. V. Brown, "Misconceptions about Income Tax and Incentives", Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 15, Feb., 1968, pp 1-21.
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Fourth, traditional indifference curve analysis assumes that people can
choose the number of hours they wish to work each day. However, many peopJ.e
work a standard working week and may not have sufficient freedom of choice
to make marginal adjustments in hours worked in order to reach their optimum
7position. Thus there will be constrained income preferrers who would work 
longer hours at the going wage rate if they could, and constrained leisure 
preferrers who cannot secure as much leisure as they would be prepared to 
pay for at the going rate. Moreover, the presence of constraints could imply 
that labour participation is extremely important as a measure .of labour 
supply, rather than hours worked.
Fifth, the simple text-book model says that the wage line indicates the 
trade-off rate between leisure and income, but this ignores the nature of 
the work itself.
M. Bruce Johnson^ explains that the normal theoretical prediction that an - 
individual values his leisure time at the going wage rate involves the 
assumption that work is neither pleasant nor unpleasant. This assumption 
implies that the individual sacrifices leisure in order to gain income to 
the point where the individual values leisure at the going wage rate , but 
that apart from the income thus earned, the work itself and the working 
situation have no effect on the individual's decision as to how. many hours 
he will work. It is therefore evident that there could be three possibilities
7. L.N. Moses, "Income, Leisure and Wage Pressure", Economic Journal, Vol. 72 
June 1962, pp.320-334.
8. M. Bruce Johnson, "Travel Time and the Price of Leisure", Western Economic 
Journal, Spring 1966 , p.138
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1) A man who enjoys his work will work to a point where his valuation-
of leisure > wage rate.
2) A man who neither likes nor dislikes his work will work to a point
where his valuation of leisure = wage rate.
3) A man who dislikes his work will work to a point where his valuation
of leisure < wage rate,
"The decision to supply an additional hour of work at the margin involves 
balancing the utility of the increment to money income against the marginal 
disutility of sacrificing an additional hour of desirable leisure plus- 
the marginal disutility of providing an extra hour of odious work."
The importance of the utility (or disutility) of work was recognised by
9
devons' theory of the supply of labour.
Fig. IX
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9, W S devons, The Theory of Political Economy, 2nd Edition, Macmillan. 
London, 1879,'pp 187-188.
"At the moment of commencing labour it' is usually more irksome than when 
the mind and body are well bent to the work. Thus at first, pain is 
measured by OA. At B there is neither pain nor pleasure. Between B and 
C an excess of pleasure is represented as due to the exertion itself.
But after C the energy begins to be rapidly exhausted and the resulting 
pain is shown by the down-ward tendency of the line CD." At DM the 
marginal utility of income just equals the marginal disutility of vjork.
It is therefore clearly important that job satisfaction should not be 
ignored in the determination of labour supply.
It is almost certainly true that all of the problems mentioned above have 
contributed to the poor empirical results obtained from analyses using 
the Kosters model. However, even if we assume that these problems did 
not exist, the poor empirical results should come as no surprise, because 
the conventional procedures based on the Kosters model are intrinsically 
wrong and this is discussed in detail in the next section.
Problems associated with empirical research based on the Kosters Model 
There are four major defects associated with the conventional procedures 
used to estimate labour supply based on the Kosters model.
First, the conventional procedure is theoretically invalid because there 
is in general no functional relationship between hours worked, average 
wage rate and non-employment income.
Second, the conventional procedure is econometrically unsound because 
hours are regressed on the average wage rate defined as total income 
divided by hours worked. This introduces two sources of bias:-
a) Any error in the measurement of hours worked will produce a spurious 
negative correlation between hours worked and the average wage rate.
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b) Whenever average and marginal wage rates differ (which is the norm 
under a progressive tax system): the average wage rate itself will 
depend on hours worked and this results in statistical bias in the 
estimates through endogeneity.
Third, the conventional procedure has grave measurement difficulties 
associated with non-employment income, which must be used to estimate 
income and substitution effects.
Fourth, the functional form employed by almost all researchers using the 
Kosters model imposes severe constraints and this has seriously restricted 
the relationship between price income and substitution effects for different 
income groups in the population as to make any estimated function unsuitable 
for discussing important policy issues such as the impact of income maintenance 
schemes,
Each of these four problems is discussed in detail below.
Theoretical Inadequacy of the Conventional Procedures
A correct application of the Kosters model requires empirical data in which 
the marginal wage rate is equal to the average wage rate i.e. the wage 
opportunity line is a straight line, but this is seldom true in the real 
world for several reasons.
First, under a progressive tax system such as exists in most developed 
countries the marginal rate of income tax is not equal to the average rate 
of income tax. Thus in Fig. X, the first few pounds of income OG is 
exempt from income tax, and income in excess of OG is taxed at some marginal 
rate of income tax. In the diagram, the net wage lines ACÜ and AEF are 
shown for two individuals. Note that both individuals have the same level 
of non-employment income (zero) and the same average wage rate AB. The
conventional procedure which regresses hours worked on average wage rate
V Fig. X
L
and non-employment income would be unable to explain why these two 
individuals work different hours (AS and AT).
Seconds hours worked in excess of the standard working week are often 
paid at premium rates i.e. the overtime wage rate may differ from the 
basic wage rate. Thus in Fig. XI, one individual has a wage opportunity, 
line AB , while the other is paid at a wage rate AC for the standard 
working week of AZ hours and CD for overtime hours worked thereafter. 
Once again the conventional procedure which regresses hours worked on 
average wage rate and non-employment income would be unable to explain 
why these two individuals work different hours (AV and AW), because
Fig. XI
?
8
AVw0
both individuals have the same level of non-employment income (zero) and 
the same average wage rate AB.
It is evident from these two examples above that the conventional, procedure 
of regressing hours worked on the average wage rate and non-employment 
income is theoretically invalid insofar as there is no functional relation­
ship between hours worked, average wage rate and non-employment income in 
a world in which the wage line is non-linear. Finally, to the extent that 
misconceptions about the marginal rate of income tax exist, even if average 
and marginal wage rates were objectively the same, it is extremely unlikely 
that the perceived net marginal wage rate could be measured by the average 
wage r’ate.* A diagrammatic example is given in Fig. XII. M and N are two
Fig. XII
/
B
W  V ' L
men who have the same indifference map and net wage opportunity line AB , 
and are identical in every respect except that man M has a misconception 
about the marginal rate of tax such that he believes the net marginal wage 
rate is EF, while man N has no misconceptions and believes the net marginal 
wage rate to be AB. Given their respective perceptions of the world it 
would be quite rational for man M to work AV hours and man N to work AW 
hours as both will believe they are maximising their level of satisfaction.
* op. cit. see p. \'L
ly
Once again the conventional procedure of regressing hours on average wage 
rate and non-employment income could not explain the difference in hours 
worked for these two men when both have the same average wage rate (AB) 
and the same level of non-employment income (zero).
Econometric Inadequacy of the Conventional Procedures
There are two conceptually distinct sources of statistical bias associated 
with the conventional procedures based on the Kosters model which regresses 
hours worked on average wage rate and non-employment income.
The first source of statistical bias results from any error in the measure­
ment of hours worked which will result in a spurious negative correlation 
between the dependent variable hours worked and the independent variable 
average wage rate. If hours worked was too high (low) because of error 
on the part of respondent, interviewer, coder or card punch operator, the aver­
age wage rate which is defined as income divided by hours worked will be too 
lov7 (high) i.e. any error in the measurement of hours worked will result 
in a spurious negative correlation between hours worked and average' wage 
rate. The effect of such a spurious negative correlation would be to 
depress the average wage rate coefficient when hours worked is regressed 
on average wage rate and non-employment income , and this will not only 
bias the estimated price effect downwards , but will also depress the 
estimated substitution effect which is obtained by subtracting the Income 
effect from the (biased) price effect. This may well explain why Kosters 
found that in the majority of his regressions the substitution effect was 
negative, contrary to the prediction of a priori economic theory.*
* Op. cit. see page 10
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Subsequent researchers using the conventional procedures were aware of this 
problem and made various attempts to get round the problem. Rosen and 
Welch’s study’^^ based on the Kosters model which used a one in one thousand 
sample of the U.S.A. Census of Population freely admits to "built-in” 
spurious correlations between the wage rate term and the dependent variable 
hours worked. They defined wage rate as employment income in 1959 divided 
by weeks worked in 1959 multiplied by hours worked "last week". But if 
hours last week were greater than average this understated the hourly wage, 
while if hours last week were less than average this over-stated the hourly 
wage, hence the "built-in" spurious negative correlation. To get around this 
problem they also used the weekly wage rate instead of the hourly rate.
Weekly wage was defined as employment income in 19 59 divided by weeks 
worked in 1959 but this assumes that there is no correlation between the 
number of weeks worked per year and the number of hours worked per week. 
These problems combine to cast some doubt on the validity of the findings 
that the elasticity of substitution at the sample means for the urban sample 
lay between +.17 and +.35. The estimated partial elasticity of hours 
with respect to income for the same sample lay between -.000051 and 
-.000071.
E. D. Kalachek and F. Q. Raines^^ using Current Population, Survey (CPS) 
data found that actual wage rate in the regression resulted in most of the 
derived substitution effects having patently absurd negative signs , and they 
attributed this to the spurious correlation between actual wage rate and 
hours worked. Actual wage rate was defined as annual income divided by
10. S Rosen and F Welch, "Labour Supply and Incoim Redistribution". The 
Review of Economics and Statistics , Vol. 53, No. 3, August 1971 pp 278-28:
11. E. D. Kalachek and F . Q. Raines, "Labour Supply of Lower Income Workers", 
The President’s Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, Technical 
Studies, (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1970).
hours worked during the week prior to-the survey, tines weeks worked during 
the prior year. This definition yieO.ds an accurate measure of the wage rate 
only when weekly hours during the survey period are representative of weekly 
hours during the preceding year. In order to get around this problem they 
calculated a "potential wage rate" based on age, education and region, and 
they used potential wage rates instead of actual wage rates. This resulted 
in the expected signs for men but not for women. The elasticity of substi­
tution with respect to hours worked was found to be between .121 and .343 
for men (-.133 and .084 for women) and the income elasticity was between 
-.040 and -.049 for men (+.020 and -.068 for women).
The technique of estimating a potential wage rate became quite a popular
12
method of dealing with the problem. R. E. Hall’s study also tackled the 
problem of spurious negative correlation between hours worked and the wage 
rate by estimating a "potential wage rate" (based on age, education, sex, 
colour, region, etc.) in a first stage estimation which was then used as dhe 
price variable in the subsequent analysis. This method of dealing with the 
problem of spurious negative correlation is unsatisfactory because
" ..... the predicted wage rate in fact accounts for rather little of the total
variation in wages, so that the use of the imputed wage not only suppresses
a good deal of the variation observed in actual wages but also in effect
assigns the same wage to all persons with the same value for the "predictor"
variables (even though they may have very different values for other variables
which influence wages - hours of work, experience, quality of education etc. -
13but are not used as "predictors")."
12 In G. C. Cain and H. Watts. Op. cit. p. 1/
13 Mark R Killingsworth "Neo-classical Labour Supply Models: A survey of
Recent Literature on Determinants of Labour Supply at the Micro Level."
Mirneo.
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This first source of statistical bias (spurious correlation arising from 
error in the measurement of hours worked) would therefore be a problem 
with the Kosters model even if the procedures used were theoretically 
correct where average and marginal wage rates were equal.
The second source of statistical bias would arise even if there was no 
error in the measurement of hours worked. If the marginal wage rate is 
not equal to the average wage rate, the average wage rate will itself be 
determined by hours worked. This means that the average wage rate is endo- ■ 
genous and is not a truly independent variable. This endogeneity is 
likely to bias the average wage rate coefficient and therefore once again 
estimated price and substitution effects. This problem is best illustrated 
by an example. Hours worked is determined by many variables some of which are 
not included in the regression analysis. Suppose hours worked is positively 
related to temperature and the variable "temperature" has not been included 
in the regression analysis. Those respondents working in a higher 
temperature will work longer hours and if the marginal wage rate is greater 
than the average wage rate, ceteris paribus their average wage rate would 
be higher, resulting in a spurious positive correlation between hours 
worked and the average wage rate. If on the other hand the marginal wage 
rate is less than the average wage rate, there would be a spurious negative 
correlation between hours worked and the average wage rate. In short, 
where average and marginal wage rates are not equal because of an overtime 
premium or a progressive income tax system, hours worked will determine 
the average wage rate as well as the average wage rate determining hours 
worked.
Thus in a world where the wage opportunity line is non-linear the 
conventional procedure for estimating labour supply is econometrically 
unsound as well as being theoretically invalid.
Measurement Prob1ems associated with the Conventional Procedure-■
The conventional procedure uses the derivative of hours with respect to 
non-employment income to measure the income effect, and the substitution 
effect is given by subtracting this income effect from the price effect.
Thus both the estimation of income and substitution effects depend on the 
non-employment income coefficient and it is evident that non-employment 
income is a critical and necessary variable in the conventional procedure 
for estimating labour supply.
What is in principle required is income which a person receives which is 
wholly independent of hours worked. There are however severe difficulties 
in obtaining such a measure of non-employment income.
First, a large proportion of the population has little or no non-employment 
income. For example, Rosen and Welch’s study^^ more than seventy-five per 
cent of individuals reported no non-wage income.
Second, for most people such non-employment income as does exist is not 
independent of hours worked. Unemployment compensation, means tested 
benefits, Family Income Supplement etc. are inversely related to hours 
worked (holding wage rate constant). The non-employment income coefficient in 
a regression using this measure of non-employment income will overstate the true 
income effect because of the tautological nature of the variable. Thus the 
estimated income effect in the Kosters model given by the derivative of hours 
with respect to non-employment income is biased because non-employment income is 
also a function of hours worked. In addition to this problem, non-employment 
income in the form of means tested benefits. Family Income Supplement, etc. is 
directly related to the number of dependents in the household (holding wage
rate constant)___   . ___________________
14. Op. cit. See page 10
and because hours worked will be positively related to the number of 
dependents, these two relationships will result in an understatement of the 
true income effect.
The original Kosters analysis defined non-employment income as all income
coming in to the family excluding that earned by the member whose labour
supply was being studied. Kosters had to assume that the wife would not
alter her labour supply for a change in the household's wage rate. This
assumption of zero cross elasticity between income of wife and hours of
husband thus enabled Kosters to count in earnings of other household
members in his measurement of non-employment income. However wife's hours
(and therefore non-employment income) may well be influenced by husband’s
income and hours of work, therefore once again hours worked by the husband
may well determine wife's income and therefore non-employment income. It
is perhaps not surprising that a number of studies using non-employment
income to measure the income effect have yielded an estimated substitution
elasticity with the "wrong" sign after subtracting the estimated income
effect from the estimated price effect in order to measure the substitution
effect. One attempt to overcome problems caused by the large proportion
of the population who have little or no non-employment income independent
of hours worked was to impute a return to equity in the home for a family
who owned their house , and also to count in the negative income stream the
15
represented by consumer debt, but this raises a whole set of new problems. 
It may appear at first sight that the return to capital, imputed rent from 
home ownership, and consumer debt is independent of hours worked, but this 
may not be the case, e.g. the ability to raise a mortgage to buy a house and 
get into debt may depend on income and therefore on hours worked.
15. Greenberg & M. Kosters, Income Guarantees and the Working Poor: The Effect 
of Income Maintenance Programs on the Hours of Work of Kale Far/.lly Heads, 
Rand Corp. Office of Economic Opportunity, December 1970.
25
All of the above arguments lead, to the painful conclusion that it may 
well be impossible to find any empirical measure of the theoreticail construct 
of non-”employment income independent of hours worked which is required by 
the Kosters model to measure both income and substitution effects.
Difficulties associated with the Functional Form
The simple text-book theory of labour supply states that the indifference- 
curves for income and leisure are convex to the origin and do not inter­
sect. The theory says nothing about price income and substitution effects 
remaining constant at different budget levels. Thus there may be asymmetry 
between low and high budget individuals with respect to the magnitude of 
price 5 income and substitution effects for a change in the wage rate. 
Asymmetry could arise because the magnitude of the income effect I.C.C. 
varies as a function of the budget as shown in Fig. XIII and- most studies 
based on the Kosters model have added in squared non-employment income and 
squared wage rate terms into their regressions to allow for this kind of ' 
non-linearity shown in Figs. XIII and XIV.
Fig. XIII Fig. XIV
V
L I
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There is however,another way in which asymmetry could arise, namely if 
the magnitude of the substitution effect is a function of the budget. But
if the magnitude of the substitution effect is a function of the budget,
the magnitude of the income effect is also a function of the marginal wage 
rate.
Let H be hours worked
W be wage rate (relative to the price of leisure 5 1)
U be the maximum attainable utility given the budget constraint
, ... variables on which H may depend, not functions of W or U 
and let H = H(W , U , X^, ..., X^)
then if = c(U, , ..., X^) i.e. not a function of W*
d^H
dWdU
Suppose ~  = b(W, U, X^, ..., X^) i.e. a function of U
d^H db , „ V ,1 •^   ^ 0 ex hypothesi
2 2
But d H _ d H assuming continuous differentiability 
dUdW " dWdU
Therefore b cannot be a function of U if c is not a function of W 
similarly c cannot be a function of W if b is not a function of U
Result proved: either (income effect) depends on wage rate and
“  (substitution effect) depends on budget constraint
or income effect does not depend on wage rate and
substitution effect does not depend on budget constraini
Budget lines can be kinked such that a change in the budget can occur 
independently of W.
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Note: income and.substition effects are here interpreted, as partial
derivatives (as Slutsky).
This kind of asymmetry is shown in Figs. XV and XVI
Fig. XV Fig. XVI
X.
w
where the magnitude of the substitution effect UV for a change in the wage 
rate from AB to AC falls as a function of the budget, and the magnitude of 
the income effect WZ rises (absolute value) as a function of the relative 
prices of Y and L.
This type of asymmetry could of course operate in the opposite direction 
as shown in Figs. XVII and XVIII where the magnitude of the substitution 
effect UV for a change in the wage rate from AB to AC rises as a function 
of the budget, and the magnitude of the income effect WZ falls (absolute 
value) as a function of the relative prices of Y and L.
Fig. XVII Fig. XVIII
\/Ü V'M L
The inadequacy of the empirical work based on the Kosters model in revealing 
this kind of asymmetrical relationship between the higher paid and the lower 
paid is shown below in Fig. XIX and XX.
Fig. XIX
hours of workLet H
Fig. XX
Pec I
W  V r V
rr Y = non employment income
wage rate
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In the regression H = a + b NEY + cWj the coefficient c will show the 
change in hours worked for a change in the wage rate i.e. the price con­
sumption curve 5 and the coefficient b will show the change in hours worked 
for a change in non-employment income. It is evident from the diagrams 
above that the change in hours worked VW for a change in the wage rate from 
AB to AC C=A’B' to A ’O ’) is a function of the level of non-employment income. 
Thus in order to test for asymmetry where the substitution effect, varies 
as a function of the budget and the income effect varies as a function of 
the marginal wage rate, it would be necessary to introduce interaction 
between the wage rate and non-employment income into the model.
R A Musgrave^^ was aware of the significance of such a relationship for 
tax policy ..... "If the marginal rate of substitution for leisure for 
income is high for people with large incomes and low for people with small 
incomes , the substitution of a progressive rate structure will be least 
favorable to work effort ; and it will be most favourable if this relation­
ship is reversed." Nevertheless almost all
researchers* employing the conventional procedures to estimate labour supply 
used a functional form which did not allow the magnitude of the substitution 
effect to be a function of the level of non-employment income, and this 
ommission therefore reduced the tax policy relevance of this research , most 
of which had been undertaken with a view to estimating the. effect of income 
maintenance schemes on labour supply.
16. R. A. Musgrave The Theory of Public Finance p. 2hh, McGraw-Hill 1959.
A notable exception which did interact Price effort with non-employment
income is given in M . Cohen, S Rea and. A . Lerman - A Micro Model of 
Labor Supply, B.L.S. Staff Paper 4. U.S. Dept, of Labor. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 1970.
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Conclusion
A priori economic theory cannot predict the effect of a change in the wage 
rate on hours worked and empirical research based on the Kosters model has 
produced equally unsatisfactory results. It is of course legitimate to argue 
that these unsatisfactory empirical results have arisen because the simple 
text“book theory on which the Kosters model is based is just too simple 
insofar as it does not take account of participation, effort, family labour 
supply, job satisfaction, constraints and misconceptions. Nevertheless even 
if these problems did not exist, the conventional procedures used to estimate 
the labour supply function based on the Kosters model are econometrically 
unsound, and suffer severe measurement difficulties both of a conceptual 
and practical nature associated with non-employment income. It has been 
argued that the estimated price effect given by the non-employment income 
coefficient is biased and this means that the estimated substitution effect 
is obtained by subtracting the biased income effect from the biased price 
effect. Furthermore, in a world with non-linear wage opportunity lines 
arising from overtime premiums and a non-linear tax system, the conventional 
procedure is theoretically incorrect because there is in general no functional 
relationship between hours, average wage rate and non-employment income. 
Finally the functional form used has been too restrictive given the ultimate 
goal of estimating the effects of income maintenance schemes on labour supply.
Clearly some new technique is required to estimate price income and 
substitution effects using procedures which are theoretically correct , 
econometrically sound, measure the income effect without using non-employment 
income, and employ a functional form such that estimated price income and 
substitution effects can vary over the income distribution. An improved 
procedure is discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER II
A NEW PROCEDURE FOR ESTIMATING LABOUR SUPPLY 
Introduction
In this chapter a new procedure to estimate labour supply is discussed 
in which hours worked is regressed on marginal wage rate, average wage rate 
and non-employment income. The new model proposed represents a significant 
improvement over the conventional procedure based on the Kosters model which 
regresses hours worked on the average wage rate and non-employment income., 
because it is theoretically correct in a world with non-linear wage lines. 
Furthermore 3 the new method can be used to estimate price income, and 
substitution effects independently of the non-employment income coefficient 
and can employ a functional form which is not highly restrictive, but only 
one of the two econometric problems associated with the endogenous average 
wage rate can be overcome.
Theoretical Validity of the Average Marginal Procedure 
The theoretical difficulty associated with the conventional procedure 
based on the Kosters model which regresses hours worked on the average wage 
rate and non-employment income is that in a world of non-linear wage lines 
there is in general no functional relationship between hours worked, average 
wage rate and non-employment income. The first problem to be overcome is 
therefore to define a functional relationship between the dependent variable 
hours worked and the non-linear wage opportunity lines which prevail in the
real world empirical data available. In the last chapter it was argued that
a given average wage rate AB and non-employment income (zero) does not uniquely 
define hours worked shown in Fig. I below.
Note however that -^  given net average wage rate, a vfven net marginal
wao;e rate and non-emoloyment income (zero) does uniquely define 
hours worked, except where leisure is an inferior good. Thus in
Fig. 1 5 average wage rateY
Fig. I
6
F
?
0 L
Fig. II
r L
AB, non-employment income (zero) and the slope of the marginal wage rates 
CD and EF uniquely define hours worked AT and AS respectively, i.e. there 
is a unique value for hours worked associated with any particular values 
of average wage rate, marginal wage rate and non-employment income. The only 
case in which average wage rate, marginal wage rate and non-employment income 
would not uniquely define hours worked is where leisure is an inferior good.
An example of this is shown in Fig. II where the average wage rate AB, 
non-employment income (zero) and the slope of the marginal wage rate CD = CCD' 
is consistent with more than one value for hours worked, hut this cannot 
occur if Y and L are normal goods. This if we assume that Y and L are 
normal goods there is an underlying functional relationship between hours 
worked (H) and the average wage rate (A), the marginal wage rate (M) and 
non-employment income (HEY), and it is therefore theoretically correct to 
regress H on A, M and NEY, because H = f(A, M, NEY). Henceforth this 
procedure will be referred to as the average/marginal procedure.
Measurement of Income and Substitution Effects in the Avera g e MarginaI 
Procedure.
In a simple world in which the wage line is linear, price income and 
substitution effects can be clearly defined. For example in Fig.Ill
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Fig. Ill
L
dHthe price effect AB is given b y  , the income effect AC is given
dAVfR
by and the substitution effect DC bydNEY dAWR
H dH
dNEY*
In a world with non-linear wage lines any particular average wage rate 
and non-employment income levels is consistent with many different 
combinations of hours worked and marginal wage rates , and as a result 
the definitions of price income and substitution effects become somewhat 
obscure. For example in Fig. IV there are two individuals, with wage 
opportunity lines EJ and EPG respectively. Both have zero non-employment 
income and both have the same average wage rate in equilibrium at A and S 
respectively. It is not clear whether the income effect increases
leisure by AC or ST where AC i- ST.
There are essentially two different ways of dealing with this problem. 
One approach would be to abandon the concepts of price income and 
substitution effects as being ambiguous in a world in which the wage 
opportunity line is non-linear, and to argue that the labour supply 
function and the effects of taxation on labour supply can be adequately 
defined in terms of average and marginal wage rate effects without using
3'4
Fig. IV
/
A 'c
the non-employment income coefficient,thereby avoiding the problems 
associated with this variable. The essence of this approach is that 
holding non-employment income constant any change in the tax transfer 
system will alter net income , hours worked and the net marginal wage 
rate, therefore the change in the tax system will alter average and 
marginal wage rates. If the derivatives of hours with respect to averp.ge 
and marginal wage rates are known, the effect of the change in the tax 
system on hours worked could also be estimated.
The second approach^removes ambiguity associated with the concepts of 
price income and substitution effects by linearising the non-linear wage 
opportunity line. The crux of this approach is that "however the individual 
might in practice have chosen a certain combination of leisure and income 
we can always find some value for non-employment income and competitive 
wage rate such that the individual’s choice could be described as being made 
as if he were maximising utility subject to a simple budget constraint
1. The author wishes to thank David Ulph for both the idea and the formulae 
of the second approach, a response to the author's concern at the 
apparently ambiguous nature of price income and substitution effects
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defined by these "as if" values of non-employment, income and wage rate." 
Thus ST shows the income effect for an individual with a linear wage
rate PG and "as if" non-employment income EF while AC shows the income
dH 
dNEYeffect for an individual with linear wage rate EJ and zero non-employment
income.
The price income and substitution effects can be calculated using the. 
average marginal procedure' from the formulae
^^/dAWIncome Effect - Y
(H + (AW-MW)-^) dAW
Substitution Effect ~ S ” “ -r-( 1 - (AW-MW)Y)
dMw
Price Effect = P - S t BY 
where - hours worked
AW = average wage rate 
MW = marginal wage rate 
These formulae are derived in the following way. Suppose
H = a(o). I)
represents the supply function of the simple text-book model for an
individual with non-employment income I and competitive wage rate w ,
and
H = f(AW, m-J, NEY)
represents the relationship between hours worked and an average employment 
wage rate AW, a marginal wage rate ffW and non-employment income NEY which 
prevails in a more complex world. Then the "as if" wage rate and
This idea has been used as the basis for another method of correcting 
invalid conventional procedures based on the Kosters model. Full details 
are given in C. V. Brown, E. Levin and D. T. Ulph "On Taxation and Labour 
Supply", University of Stirling Discussion Paper No. 30, October 1974, 
and "On Estimating Labour Supply" University of Stirling Discussion Paper 
No. 31, December 1974.
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non-employment income corresponding to a given AW, MW, HEY are respectively 
W - MW, I z (AW - MW)H t NEY and hence
f(AW, MW, NEY) = o(MW,(AW - MW)H t NEY) U )
Differentiating (1) with respect to AW gives
~  = cr^  (h + (AW - Mf) '^^/dAW)
i.e. Y = 0- -
2 dH
H t (AW - MW)dAW ■ 
while differentiating with respect to MW gives
d w  = A  - « V
and so S - o'^  - = dMW ^^ ~ ~
(from Slutsky/Hicks equation, P ~ S + HY)
Note that when using the average marginal procedure the income effect can 
be estimated independently of non-employment income unlike the conventional 
procedure which is forced to rely on the non-employment income coefficient 
in order to estimate the income effect. This represents a significant 
improvement insofar as the insurmountable problems associated with the 
measurement of the non-employment income discussed in the last chapter are 
no longer of central importance because this variable is no longer 
essential to the measurement of the income effect.
A Non-Restrictive Functional Form using the Average Marginal Freeedure 
It has been demonstrated that
H = f(AW, MW, NEY)
where H = hours worked
AW = average wage rate
Î-W - marginal wage rate
NEY - non-employment income
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is theoretically valid and that price income and substitution effects can 
be estimated from this functional relationship using the derivatives of 
hours with respect to AW and MVJ. It would of course be possible to run 
the regression
H = a t bMW t cAW t dNEY 
but this imposes intolerable restrictions on the underlying utility 
function for income and leisure. There is no reason to believe that the 
partial derivative is linear and examples of non-linearity are given 
in Figs. V and VI in which rises (Fig. V) and falls (Fig. VI) as a 
function of the AW level.
Fig. V. Fig. VI
L L
In these examples the AW coefficient is itself a function of AW, i.e.
H = a t bMW t cAW t dNEY (1)
But c = e + fAW (2)
Substituting (2) into (1)
- a t bMW + cAW + fAW t dNEY (3)
There is also no reason to believe that the partial derivative dH
dD-M
is linear and examples of non-linearity are given in Figs. VII and 
dHVIII in which
of the MW level.
rises (Fig. VII) and falls (Fig. VIII) as a function
Fig. VII Fig. VITI
L L
In these examples the MW coefficient is itself a function of ÎW level, 
i.e. in Equation (3)
b = j + k MWR (4)
Substituting (4) into (3)
H = a t jMW t kMW^ + cAW t fAW^ t dNEY (5)
It was pointed out in the last chapter that any empirical derivation of 
a labour supply function which is going to be useful for tax policy must 
establish the presence and direction of any systematic relationship
3between the budget level and the magnitude of the substitution effect.
It was also proved that any such relationship would necessarily imply 
that the magnitude of the income effect would be a function of the
marginal wage rate level. The partial derivative measures the income
dAW
3. See page 2.A
4. See page
effect as shown in Fig. IX.
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Fig. IX
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If, in Equation (5)
c = h + jMW 
Substituting (6) into (5)
■ L
(6)
H = a •+ hMW + cMW^ + dAW + cAW^ + jMW,AW + fWEY (7)
Thus equation (7) allows hours worked to be regressed on average wage 
rate, marginal wage rate and non-employment income in order to estimate 
a labour supply function using a model which is theoretically correct 
insofar as there is an underlying functional relationship, and employing 
a functional form which is not highly restrictive such that price income 
and substitution effects can vary over the population, and that these 
effects can be estimated without using the non-employment income coefficient
Statistical Bias in the Average Marginal Procedure
Thus far it has been demonstrated that the new average/marginal procedure 
is capable of dealing with a number of basic problems associated with the 
conventional procedures used to estimated labour supply. One problem 
remains, namely statistical bias associated with the average wage rate.
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The first problem of statistical bias arises from any error in the 
measurement of hours worked resulting in a spurious negative correlation 
between the dependent variable hours worked and the independent variable 
average wage rate. If hours worked for a respondent is too high (low) 
because of some error in the data, average wage rate will be too low (high), 
because average wage rate is defined as income divided by hours worked. It 
is important to note that the cause of this spurious negative correlation 
is not simply that there may be some errors in the measurement of hours 
worked, but that for each case in the data set the same error appears in 
the dependent variable hours worked and the denominator of the independent 
variable average wage rate. If errors in the measurement of hours worked 
appearing in the dependent variable were not the same errors as those 
appearing in the denominator of the average wage rate, the problem of 
spurious negative correlation between hours worked and the average wage 
rate would disappear.
One way round this problem would be to collect data yielding two independent
measurements of hours worked, each measure nresuTnall^r having different errors
Such a procedure is adopted in the e^nirical analysis in the next chapter in
which the dependent variable hours worked is defined as total hours 
worked in all paid jobs, but the denominator of the independent variable
average wage rate is defined as main job hours + second job hours.
Although these two definitions of hours worked should in principle be
identical it is very unlikely that they will have the same errors, and
therefore will greatly reduce the risk of spurious negative correlation.
The problem of spurious negative correlation between hours worked and the 
average wage rate arising from error in the measurement of hours worked 
will be largely but not entirely eliminated by this method of dealing with 
the problem because there might still be a relationship between errors in 
the two separate measurements of the same variable for some individuals.
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For example, if an individual wishes to impress an interviewer by his 
ability to work long hours he might deliberately overestimate.his hours 
worked on the two separate measurements' of the same variable and this would 
result in spurious negative correlation between hours worked and average 
wage rate. Thus if errors in the measurement of hours worked arise from people 
telling lies about how many hours they work, the method of using separate 
measurements of hours worked will not solve the problem of spurious 
negative correlation, but if people tell lies about their work behaviour 
there is no way of accurately estimating labour supply using any technique.
If on the other hand errors in the measurement of hours worked arise 
because of genuine error on the part of respondent, interviewer, coder 
or punch operator, the technique, of using two separate, measurements of 
the same variable hours worked should adequately resolve the awkviard 
problem of spurious negative correlation discussed in Chapter I.
The second problem of statistical bias associated with the average wage 
rate arises from the fact that when average and marginal wage rates are 
not equal, the independent variable average wage rate will itself be 
determined by hours worked. Thus the average wage rate will itself be 
an endogenous variable and an example of this problem was presented in 
Chapter I. For this reason the average/marginal procedure for estimating 
labour supply is unable to claim that the independent variable average wage 
rate is truly independent of hours worked.
Of all the criticisms intrinsic to the conventional procedure for estimating 
labour supply, this is the one problem which cannot be overcome* using the 
average/marginal procedure.
New procedures -have recently been devised in response to this remaining 
problem with the average marginal wage rate procedure,^in which all of 
the criticisms intrinsic to the conventional procedure are resolved. For 
details see C. V. Brown, E. Levin and D. T. Ulph "On Estimating Labour . 
Eiinnlv" Universitv of Stirling Discussion Paper No. 31, December 1974.
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Thus far it has been established that a labour supply function can be- 
estimated using the average/marginal procedure from the regression:-
H = a + bMW t cMW^ + dAW + cAW^ + fAW.MW + gNEY
which overcomes all but one of the problems intrinsic to the conventional 
procedures based on the Kosters model. There are a number of other 
problems to be considered before turning to the empirical analysis.
The Effect of Misconceptions on the Marginal Wage Rate and the Average 
Marginal Procedure
It was argued at the beginning of this chapter that there is an underlying- 
functional relationship between hours worked (H) and the average’ wage rate 
AW, the marginal wage rate (M) and non-employment income (NEY), but this 
will only be correct if there are no misconceptions about the marginal rate 
of tax.
Fig. X
c L
For example in Fig. X, A and B are two individuals who are identical in 
every respect with net wage opportunity lines CDE except that person A wrongly 
believes that his marginal tax rate is 50% with a net perceived marginal wage 
rate FG, while person B believes correctly that his marginal tax rate is 
0% with a net perceived marginal wage rate CD. Persons A and B will work
H-J
different hours even though they have the same average wage rate, objective 
marginal wage rate and non-employment income (zero).
There will however be a functional relationship between average wage rate, 
perceived net marginal wage rate and non-employment income. This conclusion 
follows from the basic premise that the rational individua] will equate 
his perceived net marginal wage rate with his marginal rate of substitution 
of income for leisure.
Thus 3 assuming Y and L are normal goods, for any particular levels of the 
average wage rate and perceived marginal wage rate, say JK and PQ 
respectively in Fig. XI, there is a unique value for hours worked JN.
Fig. XI
1
K
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It therefore follows that in a world in which there may be misconceptions 
about the marginal rate of tax, the definition of the marginal wage rate in 
the average marginal procedure is the net perceived marginal wage rate.*
* If there are no misconceptions this definition would still be correct 
insofar as the net perceived and net objective marginal wage rates 
would be identical.
1|.L|
The labour supply estimates derived would give price income and 
substitution effects for perceived changes in the variables, i.e. 
any predictions based on the regression estimates would assume that 
changes in the wage rate variables are in fact, fully perceived.
Constraints
It could be argued that the whole analysis rests on the assumption that 
individuals are free to work as many or as few hours as they wish and 
that constrained respondents should therefore be excluded from any empirical 
analysis of labour supply.
Whether or not constrained workers should be excluded depends on how labour 
supply is to be defined. For policy purposes the main interest lies in 
predicting changes in actual hours worked resulting from a change in the 
tax system, and not hours offered.
There is however another reason for not excluding constrained respondents 
from the analysis. Whether or not constrained workers should be eliminated 
depends on whether constraints are viewed as being exogenous or endogenous. 
In the case of an exogenous constraint, the person cannot adjust his hours 
in either direction, the whole theoretical indifference curve analysis 
becomes irrelevant and that person should be eliminated from the analyst's.
In the case of an endogenous constraint, the person may be constrained by 
his employer to work not less than a certain minimum number of hours and 
not more than a certain maximum number of hours, with freedom to adjust 
his behaviour between these limits. Such a person (with for example a high 
marginal wage rate) may be constrained because he wants to work very long 
hours. In this case the elimination from the analysis of such a person 
would "throw out the baby with the bath water" and distort the results of 
the study. There is no a priori reason for either preferring the exogenous
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or endogenous interpretation of constraints. This study has chosen the 
endogenous interpretation partly because in the long run people can change 
their jobs in order to obtain or avoid overtime, and also because people 
can take second jobs. This implies that very few people who are experiencing 
an exogenous constraint could not if they so wished, take action to move 
nearer their equilibrium position in the long run.
It is for these reasons that the empirical analysis presented in the next 
chapter does not exclude respondents who are constrained. The problem may 
not be as serious as it appears bearing in mind that 30% of the whole sample 
chose their job in order to obtain or avoid overtime , and that 14% of the 
subsample used in the analysis had second jobs.
Cross Section Analysis - holding the indifference map constant 
An analysis using cross section data can only make sense if we assume that 
all of the respondents have approximately the same indifference map or 
utility function for income and leisure.
For example, suppose that respondents with low average wage rates have 
indifference maps for income and leisure as shown in Fig. VII A while those 
with high average wage rates have indifference maps as shown in Figi VII 
Fig. VII A Fig. VII B Fig. VII C
yY
L L
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such that the shape of the map is systeinmatically related to the level 
of the average wage rate. The labour supply function is estimated using 
cross section data in effect by looking at the hours worked by different 
people with different wage lines who are at different points of their 
indifference maps for income and leisure, and the labour supply estimates 
from this analysis would be based on the assumption that everybody had an 
underlying utility function for income and leisure as shovm in Fig. VII C.
To the extent that this assumption is evidently wrong the labour supply 
estimates would be completely misleading.
There are several reasons why the indifference map for income and leisure 
is not likely to be the same for everybody and these are discussed below 
together with proposals for "holding the indifference map constant". Before 
.discussing this it should be emphasised we do not have to assume that 
everybody has exactly the same indifference map for income and leisure when 
using cross section data. We do have to assume that the differences 
between different people's indifference maps are normally distributed 
about a "mean" indifference map and that the variation about this "mean" 
indifference map is unrelated to any of the variables used in the estimation 
The labour supply estimates would hold good with the caveat that the 
coefficients refer only to the behaviour of an average person and not to 
any particular individual.
The first reason why indifference maps may vary is that different people 
have different tastes even when objective circumstances are held constant.
Secondly people with the same tastes are subjected to different objective 
circumstances which will shift the indifference map. Some examples of 
this and the way in which it is proposed to overcome these difficulties are 
set out below. This second reason as to why people's indifference maps
will differ is in effect because other things do not remain equal.
Job Satisfaction (the marginal utility of work)
A man will work to the point where the marginal utility of an extra hour
of leisure time is equal to the marginal utility of income from an extra
hour's work plus the marginal utility (positive or negative) derived from
an extra hour spent working. Therefore if two men have the same tastes
and wage rates but different levels of job satisfaction, they will w'ork
different hours. The point is that we are primarily concerned with the.
indifference map for income and leisure, but leisure can only be traded;
off for income via work, therefore job satisfaction must be held constant
in the analysis otherwise the indifference map will show not income and
leisure, but income t work and leisure. It is therefore evident that the
regression requires a term to hold job satisfaction constant while
investigating the effect of the financial variables on hours worked.
5Robinson, Athanasiou and Head compared the features of a dozen authors' 
scales designed to measure job satisfaction on criteria of statistical 
procedures, freedom from Response Set, cross-validation, reliability, item 
wording and simplicity. They decided that the Job Descriptive Index (JDI) 
by Patricia Cain Smith^ was the best on the above criteria. The instrument 
consists of 72 items - 18 in each of work , supervision and people subscales , 
and nine each in pay and promotion subscales. Each of the 5 subscales, 
consists of a list of adjectives or descriptive phrases.* Each respondent
5. John P. Robinson, Robert Athanasiou & Kendra B. Head, Measures of
Occupational Attitudes and Occupational Characteristics , Survey 
Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of 
Michigan.
6. Patricia C. Smith, et al., Cornell Studies of Job Satisfaction;
I to VI, Mimeo, Cornell University, circa 1955.
See Appendix II p tt»0 for details of JDI Scales.
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was asked to write Y for "Yes" N for "Mo" or ? for "Don't know" 
against each item on the subsca3.es describing the 5 dimensions of work- 
above. The JDI scales for work, supervision, promotion, and people could 
be used to hold the marginal utility for work constant. The empirical 
analysis uses the JDI work subscale to hold the marginal utility of work 
constant.
Need for and Sources of Income 
The more dependents a respondent has , the greater will be his need for 
money income, i.e. his indifference map will alter as his marginal utility 
of money schedule shifts to the right. Likewise if there are several 
members of the family working the respondent would need to contribute 
less of his income to the family budget and his marginal utility of money 
schedule would shift to the left. Because cross-section data is tested, 
it is essential to the analysis that we assume a distribution of indifference 
maps for income and leisure, normally distributed about a "mean" 
indifference map, and that the dispersion about the mean is in no way 
related to objective or subjective differences in needs or sources of 
income. For this reason several variables were put into the regression 
to "hold the indifference map constant".
A (crude) measure of the person's energy level (ENERGY), and whether the 
respondent was off sick or not in the last 4 weeks (SICK) were put into 
the regression to take account of the possibility that low energy or sick 
people might have low wage rates and indifference maps for Y and L 
different from the "mean" indifference map. Other income coming into 
the household (OTHER Y ); perceived need for income (SUBJECTIVE- Y NEED)^ 
job satisfaction (JDI WORK), weekly saving to buy something t weekly rent 
or mortgage t weekly HP commitments t c ost of maintaining family defined 
using Supplementary Benefits levels (OBJECTIVE Y NEED) , and finally the
4U
standard working week (STD. WEEK) were entered into the regression to 
take account of different objective circumstances when tastes are the 
same. As a final step to try to hold the indifference map constant, it 
was thought desirable to include only married men in the analysis, because 
it seems likely (on purely intuitive grounds) that tastes are likely to 
differ between single and married men.
In view of the discussion in this chapter the regression equation deemed 
most suitable given the objects of the exercise is:-
2 2 
H = a t bAW + cAW t dMW 1  eMW t fAW.MW
t^SUBJECTIVE Y NEED + hOTHER Y t jSICK t kENERGY +IJDI WORK 
■h mOBJECTIVE Y NEED.*
Conclusion
In this chapter the average marginal procedure to estimate labour supply 
was explained and justified on the grounds that it is theoretically superior 
to the conventional procedures used and avoids problems associated with 
the measurement of non-employment income in the estimation of income and 
substitution effects. A functional form was derived which is not highly 
restrictive and a solution to one of the tvro econometric problems associated 
with the average wage rate was discussed. Thus all but one of the intrinsic 
difficulties associated with the conventional procedures for estimating 
labour supply have been resolved in the average^marginal regression 
proposed. The average/marginal procedure was enlarged to take account of 
misconceptions about the marginal rate of income tax, and the problem 
of constraints was considered. Finally the importance of "holding the
* Detailed definitions of the variables are given in Appendix I .
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indifference map constant" when using cross-section data was discussed and 
a number of variables were added to the proposed'regression in order to 
deal with this problem.
Thus the regression using the average/marginal procedure represents a 
substantial improvement over the conventional procedures from theoretical, 
econometric and data measurement viewpoints. Nevertheless there are a 
large number of problems which are not tackled, e.g. problems associated 
with payment by results schemes and the intensity of effort, unpaid work, 
intra-household labour substitution, promotion, job mobility, labour supply 
over the life cycle and labour participation are not included in the 
model, and it must therefore be emphasised that the analysis presented 
is not the final solution to the problem of estimating labour supply. 
Nevertheless the proposed regression using the average/marginal procedure 
represents a substantial improvement over the conventional procedures-, 
from theoretical, econometric and data measurement viewpoints and is 
therefore a few small though important steps towards the day when a complete 
labour supply function can be estimated.
CHAPTER III
EMPIRICAL RESULTS USING THE AVERAGE MARGINAL PROCEDURE 
Introduction
In this chapter the averagey/marginal procedure is used to obtain labour 
supply estimates for a cross-section sample of British weekly paid married 
men. Price, income and substitution effects are calculated at nine 
different combinations of average and marginal wage rates to observe the 
effect of the flexible functional form used in allowing price income- and 
substitution effects to vary over the population. This is found to have 
a profound effect on the results. The regression estimates are also used 
to derive the underlying utility function for income and leisure implied 
by the regression and a skeleton indifference map is shovm and discussed.
The Data
The cross-section data used in this study was obtained in 1971 from 2068 
weekly paid workers in Great Britain normally working at least 8 hours 
each week who had been at work sometime in "the last 7 days" and who were 
not self-employed. The survey, financed by the Social Science Research 
Council was carried out by the British Market Research Bureau Ltd. on 
behalf of Professor C. V. Brown who is currently working on a study of 
the alleged disincentive effects of taxation. The method of data collection 
used was a questionnaire schedule devised by Professor Brown and the author 
and administered by professional interviewers. The ssimple was drawn from 
British Market Research Bureau's Master Sample of 200 Constituencies, with 
two areas being randomly selected in each Constituency, giving a total of 
400 areas excluding north of the Caledonian Canal. There were 24 addresses 
to be visited in each of the 400 areas and a procedure was adopted at each 
address to see if there was anyone eligible for interview.* This procedure
* See Appendix II, p ^ for details.
ensured that every person who was paid weekly had an equal chance of being 
selected irrespective of household size and composition. Thus the sample 
was self-weighting. There were 2955 people eligible for interview and a 
total of 2068 interviews were obtained, i.e. a response rate of 69.7%,
Great care was taken to ensure that the data would be of high quality, e.g. 
the author was present at the pilot interviews, interviewer briefings , and 
remained at British Marketing Research Bureau's Head Office checking samples 
of the completed schedules and coding throughout the fieldwork period. The 
data cards were all verified, and several check programs were used on the 
computer to search for errors. These checks showed the data to be of high 
quality.*
Non Response Bias
A major difficulty with any survey is the possibility that the non­
respondents may be in some way different from those of the sample population 
who agree to be interviewed. In fact, the response rate was fairly good, 
about the same as that achieved by the Government Social Survey in the 
Family Expenditure Survey. However, the probability of bias resulting from 
the. non-respondents is increased in an analysis which is attempting to 
explain hours worked as it seems likely that non-response would be 
correlated with hours worked inasmuch as persons who work very long hours 
would be less easy to contact at their homes and might well be less willing 
to give up an hour of their leisure time for the interview.
There is no infallible method of accurately finding out the extent of 
non-response bias, but some crude checks were used to give a guide as to 
the extent that non-respondents differed from the respondents. The first
* Some 80 errors were revealed out of 30,000 cards, each card containing 
about 40 bits of information. Full details of the survey are given in 
Appendix II.
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check for non-response bias consisted of comparing answers to some key 
questions obtained from respondents on the first wave with those obtained 
from respondents on the second wave of the fieldwork. The rationale behind 
this comparison is that the second wave of fieldwork consisted of trying to 
(and in 155 cases succeeding) obtain interviews from those who had 
refused to give interviews or had not been able to be contacted on the first 
wave. Thus the second wave respondents would more closely resemble those 
who never gave any interview at all than would those who agreed to be 
interviewed on the first wave. For example if mean hours worked by second 
wave respondents (i.e. those who had been non-respondents in the first wave) 
was greater than mean hours worked by first wave respondents, then it is 
likely that those who never gave any interview at all worked even'longer 
hours. In fact these comparisons between first and second wave respondents 
revealed no statistically significant differences in mean hours worked, 
gross pay, age, sex or number in the household; indeed the means on all 
of these variables were almost identical in both groups.
The second check for non-response bias consisted of comparing wave 1 
respondents, wave 2 respondents and non-respondents on other variables.
This was possible because if an eligible person refused to be interviewed 
on wave 2 , the interviewers were instructed to complete a substitute 
questionnaire* in which the respondent was asked just two questions on the 
doorstep, and the interviewer had in addition to fill in some nine pieces 
of information,which also appeared in an interviewer section at the end of 
the main questionnaire. This check suggests that households with no 
children may be underrepresented because of non-response bias, this inference 
being drawn from Table I. below. The two questions which the non-respondents
* See Appendix II p. 166
TABLE I
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Interviewer Assessment Wave 1 Wave 9 Non-Res pondent
% Substitute Questionnaire
Neighbourhood - poor
- average
16
70
middle class 1 2
25
55
14
24
50
16
Home Kept - clean
- fair
- untidy
74
20
5
57
30
57
27
16
Prosperity -
expensive furniture, etc. 1 2  
average " " 77
old " " 1 0
14 
68
15
8
75
17
Children yes
no
55
45
60
40
65
35
Number of adults
4
48
26
22
9
46
25
21
6
57
24
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were asked on the doorstep are excluded from Table I on the grounds that
no comparison can be made. The reason, for this is that although wave 1,
wave 2 and non-respondents were all asked these two questions , the stimuli 
are different for these three groups insofar as the non-respondents had not 
been asked preceding questions which the respondents had been asked and 
comparisons are therefore invalid.
The Regression
H = a t bAW + cAW^ + dMW t eMW^ + fAW.MW + g SUBJECTIVE Y NEED
t hOTHER Y + j SICK + k ENERGY -I- bJDI WORK + m OBJECTIVE Y NEED
t n STD, WEEK
was run on married men aged under 55 years, who worked more than; 20 hours 
in all paid jobs last week, whose net income exceeded £ 8 . 0 0  and whose 
main job perceived marginal wage rate and average net wage rate was greater 
than zero.
The dependent variable hours worked "last week" for which the respondent
was paid (H) was regressed on average net wage rate (AW) and net perceived
marginal wage rate (MW) with squared wage rates and an interaction term 
2 2
added in (AW , MW , AW.MW) such that labour supply estimates can be derived 
using a functional form which is not highly restrictive. An attempt was 
made to "hold the indifference map constant" by including variables which 
are intended to hold constant subjective differences in tastes (SUBJECTIVE 
Y NEED) , differences in objective circumstances (OBJECTIVE Y NEED) , job 
satisfaction (JDI WORK), health differences (SICK and ENERGY) , institutional 
conventions (STD. WEEK) and finally sources of income coming in to the 
family other than the respondents' earned income (OTHER Y ). This last 
variable which includes not only any true non-employment income but also 
wife's income, means tested benefits and pensions coming into the household 
is required to hold the respondents ' budget level constant for any particular
values of respondent's average and marginal wage rates. Detailed
definitions are given in Appendix I.
The results for this regression are shown below in the table below.
All Married Men Dependent Variable : Hours worked last week in all paid
jobs
Variable B Beta Std. Error B F
AW -0.66439 -1.12637 0.10711 38.475
2
AW 0.00358 0.86892 0.00113 10.604
MW 0.15432 0.48096 0.05912 4.985
2
MW -0.00015 -0 , 1 0 1 2 2 0.00015 0.998
AW. MW -0 . 0 0 2 0 0 -0.52660 0 . 0 0 1 0 1 3.878
SUBJECTIVE 
Y NEED 0.00370 0.21448 0.00082 20.159
OTHER Y -0.00188 -0.21361 0.00038 24.399
SICK -3.96098 -0.11125 1.48270 7.137
ENERGY 0.86773 0.09595 0.38275 5.140
JDI WORK 0.07674 0.08208 0.03919 3.835
OBJECTIVE 
Y NEED 0.00266 0.17123 0.00071 13.980
STD. WEEK 
(constant)
0.49920
33.62655
0.17309 0.12821 15.160
= 0.37047 N = 382 F = 18 .09585 (Printout Ref 29/4/74
On first inspection the results for the average marginal.procedure are 
very encouraging, insofar as the negative sign on the average wage rate 
coefficient and the positive sign on the marginal wage rate coefficient 
are consistent with economic theory. This is illustrated in Fig. I in 
which, holding OTHER Y constant at zero and the net perceived marginal 
wage rate MW constant, i.e. EB - E'B', hours worked falls from EP to EQ
Fig I
5 /
6
6Q
cnrH E- fiy
as the average wage rate rises from EB to EG because of the pure income
effect where Y and L are normal goods.
In Fig. II holding OTHER Y constant at zero, and the average wage rate
AW constant at EB , hours worked rise with the marginal wage rate FG
shown by heavy short lines.
Fig. II
The signs on the other variables' coefficients are also very plausible. 
Hours worked is positively .related to the subjective need for income, 
general energy level, job satisfaction, objective need for income and 
standard working week, and negatively related to other sources of income 
coming into the family and sickness.
2
The R for the regression is .37, fairly high considering that cross- 
section data was used and the regression as a whole,and all of the 
variable except MW ‘ and JDI WORK are significant at the 5% level.
The object of the squared and interaction wage rate terms was to use 
a functional form which would permit labour supply estimates to vary 
over the population and in Table II price income and substitution 
effects are calculated at the means and one standard deviation above' 
and below mean average and marginal wage rates using the formulae 
derived in Chapter II*:-
Income Effect = Y =
dH
dAW
CH + (AW - t-rw)
dA W
Substitution Effect - S - “ I7  (1 - (AW - MW) Y)
dMW
Price Effect = P = S + HY
where dH _ -0.66439 + 2 x 0.00368xAW - 0.002xMW
dAW
= 0.15432 - 2 x 0.00015xMW - 0.002xAW
d ™
* See pages'
TABLE II
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verage Wage 
Mar gin aï*^--Ra t e 
.wage rate
Mean less one 
standard deviation 
37.35p
Mean
53.85p
Mean plus one 
standard deviation 
70.35p
Mean plus one P-.3412 P-.3247 P-.2951
standard deviation Y-.0058 Y-.0072 Y-.0069
84.04p St.0371 St.0168 S-.0105
H55.630 H 47.43 H 41.24
P-.3755 P-.3473 P-.2 847
Mean Y-.OOBO Y-.0081 Y-.0058
5 3.70p St.0552 St.0305 S-.0028
H 53,84 H 46.64 H 41.M5
Mean less one P".3954 P-.3464 P-.2398
standard deviation Y-.0095 Y-.0087 Y-.0060
23.36p St.0965 St.0501 St.0085
H 51.78 H 45.58 H 41.39
P = Price Effect, Y = Income Effect, S = Substitution Effect
H - Hours worked.
From Table II it can be seen that at the sample means for average and
marginal wage rates the income effect is negative and the substitution effect
is positive as predicted by economic theory.
Secondly, from Table II it can be seen that for any particular value
of the marginal wage rate the magnitude of the substitution effect
decreases as a function of the budget, a consequence of the negative
. coefficient on the AW.MW interaction variable which is significant
at the 5% level in the regression. The magnitude of the income effect
decreases (absolute value) as a function of the marginal wage rate, a
2
consequence of the positive AW term in the regression.
Something has gone wrong in the column of results in Table II where 
average wage rate is equal to mean plus one standard deviation. The
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positive substitution effect which decreases as a function of the average 
wage rate has turned negative above mean average wage but below one 
standard deviation above the average wage rate, while the magnitude of 
the income effect, unlike the other average wage rate columns shown, 
increases in absolute value as a function of the marginal wage rate.
In order to find out exactly what has happened at high average wage rates 
well within the sample range, a skeleton of the underlying
indifference map for income and leisure can be derived from the regression, 
The first step is to produce tables showing hours worked at different 
combinations of net average and perceived net marginal wage rates from 
the regression and this is shown in Table III.
Table III can now be used to construct an "indifference map". We know 
(or assume) that the slope of the perceived net marginal wage rate is 
equal to the slope of an indifference curve at the hours which the person 
chooses to work. The location on the indifference map is uniquely defined 
by hours worked and the net average wage rate, and the slope of the 
indifference curve at that point is given by the net perceived marginal 
wage rate. Thus for example in Fig. I, if we know that at average wage
Fig. I
rate AB^hours worked is AC at a marginal wage rate of MM, AD at a marginal
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wage rate of PQ, and AE at a marginal wage rate of ST, then we know 
both the slope and position of the indifference- curves at points X, W 
and Z. The operation can then be repeated at a different average wage 
rate say AF, and a skeleton indifference map for income and leisure ' 
will emerge. This procedure was used to produce the map shown overleaf 
from the information in Table III which was derived from the regression 
in Table I.
Inspection of this map reveals quite clearly why the labour supply 
estimates in Table II look peculiar at higher budget levels. The 
revealed "indifference map" implied by the average/marginal regression 
estimates of labour supply is consistent with a priori economic, theory 
up to an average wage rate of about lOp above the mean average wage 
rate for the sample, and this is encouraging insofar as labour supply 
estimates based on the conventional Kosters procedures have in many 
cases estimated negative substitution effects at the sample mean. On  ^
the other hand at average wage rates beyond this level the "indifference 
map" looks depressingly wrong insofar as the indifference curves 
intersect and satiation occurs at an implausibly low average wage rate.
These findings raise a number of questions. First, the labour supply 
estimates given in Table II show the magnitude of the substitution 
effect decreasing as a function of the average wage rate, but it is 
not clear exactly what reliance can be placed on this relationship, or 
indeed on any of the estimated income substitution or price effects. 
Second, if it is true that the magnitude of the substitution' effect 
does in fact decrease as a function of the budget level should this 
finding simply be treated as an empirical fact or does this tell us 
something fundamental about the psychological determination of a 
utility function for income and leisure. If the latter were true this
In fj
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would suggest that the relationship is more likely to hold true over 
time. Third 5 if it is true that the magnitude of the substitution 
effect does in fact decrease as a function of the average wage rate 
or budget level, what, if any, policy implications would be implied 
by such a relationship ? The first two of these questions is discussed 
in the remainder of this chapter and the third is treated in the 
final chapter.
Validity of the Estimates
The interaction and squared wage rate terms were included in the 
regression in order that labour supply estimates could vary over the 
population. Thus the functional form used was not highly restrictive 
insofar as the interaction term (AW.MW) allowed the derivative of 
hours worked with respect to the marginal wage rcite to vary as a 
linear function of the average wage rate. A positive coefficient 
on AW.MW would have implied that the substitution effect increases 
as a linear function of the average wage rate, while a negative 
coefficient on AW.MW would have implied that the substitution effect 
decreases as a linear function of the average wage rate.
The regression, in fact, produced a negative coefficient* on AW.MW
See Table I, page
which was significant at the 5% level but it is this coefficient which
is responsible for turning negative at high average wage rates, and
the question must be asked as to why this interaction was so powerful
dhthat it decreased -jr-rr to below zero within one standard deviation abovedMW
the sample mean average wage rate. The regression also produced a negative
2
coefficient* on the MW' term (which was not significant at the 5% level) 
and it appears to be this coefficient which is responsible for inter­
secting indifference curves, and it is important to find out why this 
theoretically impossible result might have occurred.
Mis-specification
The first possibility is that although the average marginal procedure is 
an improvement in comparison with the conventional Kosters procedure , it 
is still a mis-specifled model of labour supply because it is incomplete 
i.e.,it does not deal with participation, effort, family labour supply, 
life cycle effects, etc., and that any results must therefore be viewed 
with extreme caution. While this conclusion is absolutely correct, this 
does not account for the statistical significance of the AW.MW inter­
action term and is therefore a somewhat unsatisfactory explanation , 
particularly as this relationship is significant on different subsamples
and cannot be'treated as a fluke result.
Statistical Bias
A more likely reason for these results may be found with reference to
the econometric problem intrinsic to the Kosters procedure which the 
average marginal procedure is unable to solve , namely that the average
wage rate is an endogenous variable whenever net average and objective
net marginal wage rates differ. In Chapter l**an example demonstrated
* See Table I , page b iy
** See page 'iX-
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that if there was a variable which was positively (negatively) related
to hours worked and was missing from the regression^this would result in
spurious negative (positive) correlation between hours worked and the
net average wage rate if the objective net marginal wage rate is less
than the average wage rate, and vice versa if the objective net marginal
2
wage rate is greater than the average wage rate. Although R in the
regression is high in comparison with other studies using cross-section
data to estimate labour supply, 63% of the variance is unaccounted for,
and there must be many variables both positively and negatively related
to hours worked which are not included in the regression. The possibility
therefore exists that spurious positive or negative correlation exists
between the net average wage rate and hours worked arising from the.
fact that net average and objective net marginal wage rates are not
equal. If a spurious negative correlation exists between hours worked
and the net average wage rate, the net average wage rate coefficient
would be spuriously decreased and the interaction term AV/.MW which includes
the net average wage rate would also be spuriously decreased. It is
therefore possible that the strong negative interaction term in the
regression is greater (absolute value) than the true value of the
coefficient for AW.MVJ. The effect of this would be to depress estimates
of ~ 7 7  as well as to exaggerate the rate at which -r~r decreases as a 
dMW dMW
function of the average wage rate and if there was spurious negative 
correlation between hours worked and the average wage rate, this would 
explain both the intersecting indifference curves and the low satiation 
for income and leisure. It is however impossible to say a priori 
whether statistical bias arising from the inequality of average and 
marginal wage rates will result in a spurious positive or negative 
correlation between hours worked and the average wage rate because the 
sample includes.respondents whose objective net marginal wage rates 
are greater than as well as less than their average wage rates, and
t) /
we do not know whether the variables not included in the regression 
which would explain the unaccounted 63% of the variance are positively 
or negatively correlated with hours worked. It is however possible 
to argue that there should be little or no spurious negative, correlation 
between hours worked and the average wage rate arising from error in 
the measurement of hours worked because separate measurements of the 
same variable hours worked were used for the dependent variable, hours 
worked and the denominator of average wage rate defined as net income 
divided by hours worked.
The Functional Form
The reason that the implausible areas of labour supply estimates and
"indifference map" were able to occur above an average wage of 50p per
hour was that a functional form was used which was not highly restrictive
such that labour supply estimates (and therefore the implied utility
function for income and leisure) could vary fairly freely over the sample
population. Nevertheless the functional form used did have some
restrictions.For example, the derivative of hours worked with respect to
the net perceived marginal wage rate is constrained to be a linear function
of the net average wage rate, and this could explain the obviously wrong
labour supply estimates at higher net average wage rates. If for example
the true utility function for income and leisure was such that '^'^a.s adMW
dH
non-linear function of AH, it is possible that ■^ “ ■rapidly
decreases as a function of AW at low average wage rate levels but that 
this effect diminishes at higher average wage rate levels. The linear 
restriction imposed by the functional form used could conceivably impose 
constraints such that incorrect labour supply estimates are derived from 
the regression. Thus it could be argued that the functional form used 
was sufficiently non-restrictive to reveal that there is a relationship 
between the magnitude of the substitution effect and the average wage
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rate level and to give its sign, but that the functional form was too 
restrictive to give the magnitude of this relationship accurately. It 
would have been possible to run a full scale polynomial regression but 
this would have led to problems of multicollinearity between the wage 
rate variables resulting in insignificant coefficients. The functional 
form which was actually used has five wage rate terras in which both 
average and marginal wage rates appear three times.
There is another way of dealing with the possibility that the functional 
form used is too restrictive. Rather than adopting the rather crude 
blunderbuss empirical approach of running a large polynomial regression, 
it is worth considering on a priori grounds just why the magnitude of 
the substitution effect might decrease as a function of the budget, and 
construct a new functional form which has some theoretical basis, and 
it is this approach which is adopted in the next section.
Weber/Fechner Laws of the Relationship between Objective Stimuli and 
Sensation
A priori economic theory states that indifference curves are convex to 
the origin and do not intersect , but the theory says nothing on the 
question as to whether the magnitude of the substitution effect increases 
decreases or remains unchanged as a function of the budget. Indeed the 
simple linear interaction term AW.MW was used in the empirical analysis 
because a priori theory gives no guidance whatsoever concerning this 
relationship.
The empirical results suggest that this relationship is important in 
the determination of labour supply estimates and that consideration of 
a theoretical reason for this may provide reason to re-estimate labour 
supply using ai theoretically based interaction between AW and MW
Dy
employed in the regression.
The theoretical gap may well be filled by Fechner’s Law^ which was 
derived from Weber's Law. Weber's Law states that equal relative 
increments of stimuli are proportional to equal increments of sensation
i.e. ô-y remains a constant when remains constant where 
Y = sensation
3 = stimulus.
For example it may be possible to tell the difference between the weights 
of two objects when one weighs 1 lb and the other weighs Ig lbs but it is 
impossible to tell-the difference between two objects when one weighs 
10 lbs and "the other weighs 10g lbs. Weber’'s Law emerged from a series 
of experiments in which he found that at the "just noticeable difference" 
between two stimuli (i.e. ôy), was a constant. This "fundamental 
formula" (as it came to be called) did not presuppose the measurement of 
sensation; it simply expressed the relation holding between small relative 
stimulus increments and sensation increments.
Fechner pointed out that the relationship between objective stimulus and 
sensation could be derived from Weber's Law whereby
Y = log 3
2
Boring has subsequently concluded that although this relationship is 
not in fact absolutely correct (especially at very high and very low 
intensities of stimulus), it is more nearly correct to equate the just
1. G.T. Fechner, "Elements of Psychophysics in 1850" translated and- 
reprinted in W. Dennis, Readings in the History of Psychology, 
Appleton -Century-Crofts Inc. pp 206-213.
2. E G  Boring, Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental 
Psychology, D. Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc. 1942.
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noticeable difference in sensation with a proportional difference in 
the stimulus than to equate it to any constant stimulus difference.
Thus "it follows that every given increment of stimulus causes an ever
decreasing increment in sensation in proportion as the stimulus grows
larger and that at high values of the stimulus it is no longer sensed,
while on the other hand, at low values it may appear exceptionally 
,,3
strong."
What then is the relevance of Weber's Lav/ and Fechner's Law- which states 
a more precise relationship between stimulus and sensation than its 
cousin, Marshall's Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility which states a 
relationship between stimulus and satisfaction?
The stimulus could be viewed as the level of activities produced by 
combining income and leisure in a production function. After a compensated 
change in the relative prices of income and leisure the increment to the 
stimulus would be the amount of extra activity the person could enjoy if 
he alters his combination of time and money inputs such that the new 
price line is tangential to a higher isoquant curve. In the real world 
people do not have isoquant maps or indifference maps which they consult 
in their efforts to maximise satisfaction. It follows therefore that 
a different strategy must be adopted by a person choosing between different 
combinations of income and leisure in the production of an activity, and 
between different combinations of different pairs of activities. The 
most reasonable hypothesis is that the extent to which there will be a
3. G.T. Fechner, "Elements of Psychophysics 1860" translated and reprinted 
in VI. Dennis, Readings in the History of Psychology, Appleton-Century- 
Crofts Inc. page 212.
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change in behaviour for a compensated change in price will be a function 
of the likelihood of there being a perceptible increase in the le.vel of 
activities (i.e. a just noticeable difference) as a consequence of the 
changed behaviour.
This "different strategy" together with the Weber/Fechner Laws provides 
a plausible a priori explanation as to why people might become less 
responsive to compensated changes in the marginal price of leisure as 
the budget rises. The "different strategy" plus the Weber/Fechner Laws 
also implies that there is no such thing as an indifference map. in the 
real world. There is a behaviour map which would differ from an indiffer­
ence map in as much as the individual will always "maximise" his 
satisfaction if he knows his indifference map, whereas the individual who 
does not know his indifference map will adopt a different strateg)r in 
which he can only "satisfice" because of the Weber/Fechner Laws. Putting 
it rather crudely, it is not worth the effort making marginal adjustments 
to your behaviour in response to marginal price changes if the increment 
to the level of activities is not noticeable. The probability that such 
an increment will not be noticeable rises with the budget or activities 
level.
This reason as to why the magnitude of the substitution effect might 
be a function of the budget level is rather appealing because it is based 
in Psychological theory which is relevant to the fundamental assumptions 
of Economic Consumer Theory.
The functional form used in the regression constrained -r~ to be a linear
did'/
function of the average wage rate. But the Weber/Fechner laws discussed
dHabove suggest that is a logarithmic function of the budget.
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Thus instead of saying
H - a t bMW + cAW
but b “ d + eAW
therefore by substitution H = a + dMW + eAW.MW t cAW
we now say H = a T bMW + cAW
but b = d t e log AW
therefore by substitution H = a -i- dMW -[- e(log AW).MW 1 cAW
In order to test this hypothesis the regressions were run again using 
the same sub-sample and the same variables except that the(logAW).MW 
was substituted for AW.MW.
The results for this regression are shown below in Table III. The F
value of the interaction term has increased from 3.878 in the earlier
2
regression to 6.515, while R and the F value for the regression as
a whole has increased, lending support to the hypothesis that behaviour
is affected by the Weber/Fechner laws such that decreases as a
dMW
logarithmic function of average wage rate. However becomes negative
at an average wage rate of about 70p per hour and so the hypothesis 
that satiation occurred at an implausibly low budget level because the 
interaction term should have been (log.AW).MW instead of AW.MW based on 
the Weber/Fechner laws is not supported by the evidence.
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All harried Men Dependent Variable : Hours worked last week in all
paid jobs
Variable Beta Std. Error B F'
AW -0.50111 -0.84955 0.10072 24.754
2
AW 0.00257 0.60530 0.00072 12.741
0.60700 1.89177 0.22629 7.195
2
MW' “0.00015 -0.10099 0.00015 1.010
(LOG AW) .Mf -0.32642 -1.88671 0.12788 6.515
Subjective Y 
need 0.00367 0.21308 0.00082 20.255
OTHER Y -0.00185 -0.21141 0.00038 24.045
SICK -3.87590 -0.10887 1.47838 6.873
ENERGY 0.85850 0.09493 0.38143 5.066
JDI WORK 0.07517 0.08040 0.03905 3. 706
Objective Y 
need 0.00263 0.15901 0.00071 13.799
STD. WEEK 0.51130 0.17729 0.12787 15.988
(Constant) 28.04309
R^ = 0.37489 N = 382 F = 18 .44134 (Printout Ref, 29/4/74,
Conclusions
The averagey^marginal procedure was used to estimate price income and 
substitution effects for a sample of 382 British weekly paid married 
men using cross-section survey data collected in 1971. Estimated price 
income and substitution effects have signs consistent with economic theory 
over a substantial range of sample wage rates', and the magnitude of the 
substitution effect was found to decrease as a function of the average
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wage rate. This relationship was so strong that the substitution effect 
became negative at net average wage rates in excess of around 6Op per 
hour i.e. within one standard deviation above the mean net average wage 
rate. An "indifference map" for income and leisure v/as derived from the 
regression estimates to illustrate the utility function for income and 
leisure implied by the regression and also to show how the substitution 
effect decreased as a function of the average wage rate level, changing 
from positive through zero to negative above an average wage rate of 
about 63p per hour.
Possible explanations of this finding were considered and it was concluded 
that endogeneity of the average wage rate could cause positive or negative 
spurious correlation between hours worked and the average wage rate and 
that spurious negative correlation if present could explain this relation­
ship-. A second plausible explanation is that the functional form is 
sufficiently non-restrictive to reveal the presence and direction of the 
relationship between the substitution effect and the average wage rate 
level, but is too restrictive to give the correct magnitude insofar as 
the relationship is constrained to be linear. An alternative functional 
form based on Psychological Theory was tried, but this did not yield 
plausible labour supply estimates over the whole population either, 
although these results implied some improvement. Whichever of these 
explanations is correct, very little reliance can be placed on anybody’s 
estimates of labour supply as long as the problem of endogeneity remains 
unsolved and until all the other factors affecting labour supply (e.g. 
intensity of effort and joint family labour supply determinants) are 
built into a fully specified labour supply model. On the brighter side 
it is encouraging to see that the average/marginal procedure which, after 
all, ought to yield better results insofar as it is superior to the 
conventional procedures from theoretical and econometric points of view,
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does .in fact produce labour supply estimates with the correct, signs 
at the sample means and over a fairly large range- of average and 
marginal wage rates. In the next chapter the possible implications 
of the labour supply estimates are discussed on the assumption that 
they are correct in terms of the directions of the relationships if 
not in terms of the exact magnitudes.
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CHAPTER IV
Income Maintenance Proposals and Labour Supply 
Introduct ion
In this chapter the implications of the estimated labour supply function 
with respect to income maintenance schemes are discussed, using 
alternative negative income tax schemes on a hypothetical population to 
illustrate the issues.
Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of the average/marginal approach 
to the estimation of labour supply are reviewed and some suggestions 
are made for future research.
Taxat1on and..the Listribution o come
Taxation has been used as a tool to achieve a transfer of income from the 
rich to the poor, yet attempts by Government to eliminate poverty through 
transfer using taxation are claimed to have greatly impeded the incentive 
to work because the effect of means tested social benefits to the poor
can be to raise their marginal rate of taxation to well over 100% at low
1 . . 9levels of income. This line of argument has led to several suggestions'
for "guaranteed income" or "negative income tax" schemes which struggle
to achieve simultaneously:
1) a low marginal tax rate (to maintain efficiency)
2) the elimination of poverty by a guaranteed income (to achieve 
a "good" distribution).
Although much of the empirical work based on the Rosters model has been
1. A. R. Prest, Social Benefits and Tax Rates, TEA Research Monograph No. 22, 
1970.
2. A. B. Atkinson, Poverty in Britain and the Reform of Social Security,
Dept, of Applied Economics Occasional Papers 18, Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1969.
/ /
undertaken with a view to helping policymakers estimate the effect of 
introducing an income maintenance or negative income tax scheme on 
labour supply, the net effect of such schemes on the incentive to work 
is unknown. One feature common to all redistributive schemes is that 
there are both net gainers who usually have relatively low incomes and 
net losers who usually have relatively high incomes. The income effect 
would probably result in the net gainers in the scheme working less as 
their incomes rise, but the net losers would work more as their incomes 
fall. The substitution effect could result in the gainers and/or losers, 
working less or more, depending on whether their marginal rates of 
deductions increase or decrease when the scheme is implemented. This 
assumes that such a scheme would be a substitute for rather than an 
addition to the existing tax/transfer system.
The results of the average marginal regressions suggest that the magnitude 
of the substitution effect decreases as a function of the average wage 
rate, while the magnitude of the income effect decreases as a function of 
the marginal wage rate. Little reliance can be placed on either this 
relationship or any other empirical estimate of price income or substitution 
effects until a fully specified labour supply model is evolved which does 
not contain any endogenous variables. Having made this caveat, it is 
nevertheless interesting to note the implications of the empirical 
findings using the average-'marginal procedure. The really interesting 
point is that income and substitution effects are not going to be the 
same for net gainers and net losers in a redistributive negative income 
tax scheme, and that the asymmetry of the magnitudes for income and 
substitution effects as between net gainers and net losers could be 
important in choosing the tax rate schedule.
The notion of asymmetry does implicitly enter the income maintenance
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controversy as those opposed to redistribution will simultaneously argue 
that redistribution from the higher paid to the lower paid will act as a 
disincentive to the higher paid because of high marginal tax rates 
(substitution effect > income effect) and a disincentive to the lower paid 
because if you give them money they don't need to go out to work (income 
effect > substitution effect).
Likewise those in favour of redistribution will simultaneously argue that 
redistribution from the higher paid to the lower paid will not be a 
disincentive to the higher paid because of higher marginal rax rates (income 
effect > substitution effect), and will not be a disincentive to the lower 
paid because the existing high marginal rates of deductions caused by the 
poverty trap will be lowered (substitution effect > income effect).
The question of asymmetry between "donors" and "recipients" is evidently
of considerable importance in any discussion of income maintenance and
labour supply. The significance of these observations can be seen if we
3take a real-world example. The proposed Tax Credit Scheme prompted George
. 4and Priscilla Polanyi to suggest that a higher marginal tax rate be
imposed at the lower end of the income distribution in order to achieve
5an "inexpensive" high minimum income guarantee. Professor Kaldor strongly 
urged precisely the opposite, i.e. he wanted marginal tax rates to rise 
with income. Let us assume that the objective is to minimise the loss of
3. Proposals for a Tax Credit System, Cmnd 5116, H.M.S.O. Oct. 1972
4. George and Priscilla Polanyi, "Tax Credits: A Reverse Income Tax", 
National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, Feb. 1973, p. 31.
5. Professor M. Kaldor, Select Committee on Tax Credit, Minutes of 
Evidence Thursday 29th March 1973, p. 217.
/y
national income for a given level of assistance to the worst off person.
R. A. Musgrave's^ claims that "If the. marginal rate of substitution of 
leisure for income is high for people with large incomes and low for 
people with small incomes , the substitution of a progressive rate structure 
will be least favourable to work effort ; and it will be most favourable 
if this relationship is reversed." Thus it would appear that the labour 
supply estimates which show the magnitude of the substitution effect 
diminishing as a function of the budget, ought to favour the Kaldor 
proposals in which marginal tax rates rise as a function of the level 
of income.
This hypothesis can be tested by assuming a hypothetical population of 
four people A, B, C and D with gross linear wage rates of 30p, 40p, 50p 
and 60p respectively. Estimated hours worked together with price income
and substitution effects at these points are shown :in Table I .
Table I -
Gross wage Hours Gross Price Income Substitution
rate worked Income Effect Effect Effect
A 30 55.75 16.725 -0.4181 -0.0090 0.0853
B 40 51.72 , 20.688 -0.3877 -0,0087 0.0623
C 50 48.00 24.000 -0.3572 -0.0083 0.0393
D 60 44.58 26.748 -0.3265 -0.0077 0.0163
National Income = 88.161
Now suppose this population decided that the distribution of income was
too wide and wished to redistribute income using a self financing negative
income tax system with a tax credit of say £2.00 financed by a tax on
6. R. A, Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, McGraw-Hill, 1959 p.244
earned income. They could simply impose a tax credit and a linear 
income tax schedule on themselves, or the tax schedule could have 
marginal tax rates rising or falling as a function of income.
Two such alternative schemes are considered in Tables II and III in 
which both have the same tax revenue after labour supply adjustment 
of £8 to finance a tax credit of £2, and both systems are self-financing.
The computation of the change in hours worked resulting from the negative 
income tax on person C who faces rising marginal tax rates is illustrated 
in Fig. I.
Fig- I
y
K
L
JK is the gross wage rate before tax, 5Op per hour. JC is the tax 
credit or minimum income guarantee, £2.00. The net wage rate is given 
by ODE i.e. the first £21.05 is taxed at 0% therefore CD is parallel 
to JK. Income earned in excess of the first £21.05 is taxed at 90%, 
therefore the slope of DE is one tenth the slope of CD. The effect of. 
this negative income tax system on hours worked consists of an income 
effect arising from the credit JC, a price effect arising from the change 
in the net wage rate, and another income effect arising from the kink
in the net wage line CDE. Thus the negative income tax changes hours 
worked by (JC t CF) times the income effect, plus the change in the 
slope of JK to DE times the price effect. The income effect of the tax 
and credit and the price effect of the tax are computed for the other 
individuals on the same principle illustrated for person C.
Tables II and III show that the effect of the negative income tax system 
with a minimum income guarantee of £2.00 is to reduce national, income by 
approximately 1% for the hypothetical population using the average marginal 
labour supply estimates. Contrary to R. A. Musgrave's prediction and 
the author’s expectation, the negative income tax system with the 
progressive rate schedule in Table II reduces both national income and 
total hours worked by more than the regressive rate schedule in Table III,
It is however worth noting that although these two schemes both provide 
the same minimum income guarantee of £2.00 and are therefore in some sense 
equivalent schemes , the amount by which the worst off person A is made
better off (assuming no change in his hours of work) is not identical
in both schemes.
In the progressive rate scheme in Téble I person A pays no tax at all
therefore he benefits by the full amount of the £2.00 tax credit, whereas
in the regressive rate scheme in Table II, although person A would also 
receive a £2.00 credit, he would also pay £1.57 tax at his original hours 
therefore reducing the net benefit to 33p.
It is for this reason that the effect of another self-financing income tax 
system is given in Table IV which has a regressive rate structure but which 
yields person A a net gain of £2.00 at his original hours, unlike
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Table III. Once again a comparison between Tables II and IV shows that 
holding constant the net benefit to the worst off person at his original 
hours 5 the progressive rate scheme in Table II reduces national income 
and hours worked by more than the regressive rate scheme in Table IV.
Part of the explanation of these unexpected results lies in the fact that 
although the magnitude of the substitution effect for a compensated change 
in the wage rate is smaller at higher income levels , the actual change 
in the wage rate is much greater under the progressive rate schedule 
compared with the regressive rate schedule. Thus in the progressive 
rate system in Table II:- 
Aw/r
substitution
effect
= AH resulting from sub- Change in National
0
0
45
54
.0853
.0623
.0393
.0163
Stitution effect 
0
0
1.7585
0.8802
Income
*50
*60
reduction in H because of
substitution effect
2.6487
0 . 88 
0, 53 
1.41reduction in
Nat. Income ___ _
because of 
substitution effect.
whereas, in the regressive rate system in Table IV:-
Aw/r
A 16.68 
B 22,24 
C 0
D 0
A substitution 
effect
* .0853
* .0623
* .0393
* .0163
AH resulting from sub- Change in National
reduction in H because of
substitution effect
stitution effect 
1.4228 
1.3856 
0 
0
2.8084
Income 
*30 = 0.43
*40 - 0.55
reduction in ----
Nat. Income 0.98
because of ---- -
substitution effect.
Wb
Hours lost because of the substitution effect are greater under the 
regressive rate system but when these hours lost are valued at their 
gross wage rates^ the reduction in national income because of the 
substitution effect is greater under the progressive rate system.
The main reason for the unexpected results is that the progressive 
tax structure implies an income effect reducing work effort, while 
the regressive tax structure implies an income effect increasing work 
effort, quite apart from the income effect arising from the tax credit
Fig. Ill
Progressive, rate schedule
L
Fig. IV
Regressive fate schedule
In Figs. Ill and IV the gross wage rate is given by JK, the tax credit 
by JC and the net wage rate by CDE. The effect of the tax credit systems 
on hours worked consists of the price effect times the change in the slope 
of the marginal wage rate, plus the income effect times JF. Note^ that 
under the progressive tax schedule the income effect decreases hours worked 
by more than the credit JC times the income effect, while under the 
regressive rate schedule the income effect JF actually increases work 
effort.
Thus the apparently obvious statement by R. A. Musgrave that if the 
magnitude of the substitution effect decreases with income level.,, a 
progressive rate structure will be more favourable to work effort than a 
regressive rate structure is, to say the least, misleading.
Obviously it is not possible to draw any valid conclusions by generalising 
this finding to the Kaldor and Polanyi proposals for a tax credit system 
insofar as the labour supply estimates used data referring to weekly paid 
married men and are therefore unrepresentative of the British population 
as a whole. Furthermore the labour supply model used is too simple to 
deal with all the reIvant relationships in the real world, and in any 
case even if the labour supply estimates were correct they would have to 
be applied to the actual distribution of wage rates in Britain instead of 
a hypothetical population of four people..
Nevertheless, the simple analysis presented here does suggest that when- 
debating the relative merits of alternative negative income tax systems 
such as the Polanyi and Kaldor schemes, the debate ought to consider not 
only whether negative income tax systems in general will affect labour 
supply, but also how different types of tax schedules will 
affect labour supply and national income. It was with this in mind
that the interaction term (average wage rate multiplied by marginal wage 
rate) was included in the regression, thus allowing the substitution 
effect to increase or decrease as a function of the budget level. The 
knowledge that on average the income effect outweighs the substitution 
effect or vice versa or even that there is no net effect is not going to 
help a policymaker faced with this kind of decision- There is in fact 
a strong case for estimating the effects of different tax transfer systems 
using the actual wage rate distribution in Britain and assuming a range of
plausible labour supply estimates, until the day when truly reliable and
valid empirical estimates of labour supply are available, but this 
is moving away from the central theme and is therefore not pursued 
any further in this dissertation.
Conclusions
The estimation of a labour supply function is a matter of considerable 
importance, not only because a priori Economic Theory cannot provide 
unambiguous answers but also because of the policy implications for income 
maintenance schemes.
The conventional procedures used to date to estimate labour supply 
have been shown to be wholly unsatisfactory. The new averages/marginal 
procedure represents a marked improvement insofar as :
a) it is theoretically correct,
b) it avoids theoretical, econometric and data measurement problems 
associated with non-employment income in the measurement of income 
effects,
c) uses a less restrictive functional form to allow the labour supply 
estimates to vary over the income distribution, and
d) ought not to suffer from spurious negative correlation between hours 
worked and the average wage rate arising from error in the measure­
ment of hours worked.
However, the problem of endogenous average wage rates where average and 
marginal wages are unequal remains unsolved in the average marginal 
procedure. Until this problem is properly resolved- the labour supply 
estimates must be viewed with extreme caution.
Discussion of the endogenous average wage rate problem at Stirling 
University after the average marginal analysis was completed has led to 
an alternative and superior procedure which is able to overcome this 
problem. For details see C.V. Brown, E. Levin and D.T. Ulph, "On 
Estimating Labour Supply", University of Stirling Discussion Paper No.31 
December, 1974.
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Furthermore there are a whole range of problems which must be 
incorporated into a fully specified model of labour supply before 
anyone can claim to have estimated a valid labour supply function. 
These problems include intensity of effort under piece-rate schemes-, 
intra-household substitution between family members-, constraints, 
life-cycle effects and labour participation.
Nevertheless it can be claimed that the average/marginal procedure 
does include a number of important improvements over the conventional 
procedure and although there are numerous problems still to be over­
come it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that a truly valid 
labour supply function will be estimated within the next decade.
An attempt to incorporate this into the model when estimating 
labour supply is currently being undertaken at Stirling University.
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Def5nil5.oris o.P the Variuhl.e!-;
AVVJH actual tal:c“hc:iLe nay from nia.in joh -r rior3,ia;i net %%ny fr; 
second job (if any) divided by main job hours -t* second
job hours
SQAVVd^ = AVWP multiplied by AVWR
m R For those who had a second job MWR was defined as the 
net average wage rate for the second job unless the net 
perceived marginal wage rate for the main ,job was greater 
than the net average wage rate for the second job and the 
respondent was unconstrained^' in his main job. In this 
case M'JE was defined as t)ie net perceived marginal wage 
rate for the main job. For those who did not have a 
second job IvFffi was defined as the net perceived marginal 
wage rate for the main job.
SQÎiVJR
AVUR.mm AY\m X MV/R
(^LOGAWI^.ÎWR =
Subjective = 
Y NEED
bOGAVW^tMWB
The subjective need for income - the money "yo^ reckon you 
need to take home in your pocket each week from work",
OTÎIERY normal weelcly family income from all sources mi.nus the 
respondent's net income from his main job for the week 
under review and normal net second job income.
1 . Respondents were defined as unconstrained unless either:-
(a) they did not work overtime and did not have the opportunity 
to work overtime and wou].d work overtime next week if they, 
did have the opportunity, or
(b) they did work overtime but would have worked more overtime 
if it had been left to them to decide.
91
SICK code 0 for not off work because of illness in the last
Ij t^oeVs
code 1 for off work because of illness in the last 
weeks
ENERGY
JDIV70RK
“ Interviewer assessment of respondent energctic/active/ 
bright/alert ~ 1, average - 0, dull/passive/tired/ 
apathetic ~ -1 plus respondent self completion question 
■ I could work harder at my job than I do without making 
myself ill" agree -■ I, neither “ 0, disagree = ~1.
- Job Descriptive Index by Prof, P.O. Smith (work score).
Objective 
Y NEED
Objective need index = for the man and his wife + £3
for each child aged 13 to 1 5 , £2.4f for children aged 
11 to 12, £2 for children aged 5 to 10, £11(0 for children 
aged under 5, + weekly rent or mortgage 4- weekly H.P. + 
weekly saving to buy something.
STD.lffiEK = standard working week.
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1 . 1 n i  t o duc 11 on
Till s docunicnl i)ror.cnis the lechnicel noter, on n roscorcli project 
unrlcr token on be ho IT of I’rofeci.or C.V. Brovai of the Deparlnont of 
rconomics, University of Stirlinc]. '[he project represented tiic do to 
collection stocjes of o rcseorcTt [iro:;ro:r.:,ie desicjrted to study the 
effect of dircct loxotion on the incentive to work.
Rescorch fiosiqn
The universe for study v/os oirployecs v/ho receive their pay 
v/ee.kly who usuoliy v/ork o totol of eight or more liours in a week and 
Y/ho hod been to work at some time in tiie seven days prior to the dote 
of interview:
The sampling of this universe was under token In the following
way;
(i) A representative sample of 200 constituencies was 
selected. These, were in fact the S[jccific 200 
that const itutc BiiRB's 'Hester Sample'. Tiie Mas ter 
Sample is composed of constituencies v/hich have 
been selected with probability proportional to size 
after grouping all constituencies South of the 
Caledonian Canal by descending order of percentage 
labour vote v/ithin star dard region.
(ii) Within each constituency two areas (wards in urban - 
constituencies, parisiiss in rural constituencies) 
were selected with probrbility proportional to 
size of electorate.
(iii) Wi thin each area 2A addresses were selected with 
probability pro[)or t ional to the number of people
- listed in the electoral register using a random 
starting point and fixed sampling f’nterval.
(iv) An address list was prepared for each area listing 
each address, the names of all electors at each 
'address and two numbers for each address. The 
first number was equal to the nunf-er of people 
listed for that address in the electoral register 
and was called the interval number. The second 
number called the startinci number, was a random 
number between 1 and the interval number.
(v) An interviewer called at each address and using
a special contact sheet she listed all the people 
aged 15 or over living there. She then obtained 
va ri Otis occupational details about the people and 
eliminated ail those who did not fulfil the conditions 
of inclusion in the universe (i.e. norrrolly working 
8 iiours a week, \/or!ted sometime in the past 7 days, 
an employee, receives pay weekly).
(vi) Siic tluTi nui'ibercci all the people who had not 
been cl i mi na led on (jiotip.dr. of non-c 1 i 9 i i> i 1 i ly- 
in strict alphabetical order (surnames, then 
Christian names, us i ng 'the person t-diosc 
birthday occurred Iasi' as the criteria for 
brea.king cxiy rcir.a i n i r. j ties),
(vii) She a t tempt ed to interview the person listed 
against the starting nuribcr. She then added 
the interval number to the storting number and 
If there was a person listed against this 
number he or-she was also eligible for interview,
(viiJ)ln cases v/h.cre more than one interview v/ag 
required arrongemcnts were made for the 
interviews to be taken simultaneously by 
interviewers and supervisors to avoid any 
contaminotion effects.
This design represents a metliod of obtaining an entirely self- 
weighting sample of the universe.
2' Tite Pilot Opcrations
1 wo pilot operations were unde r tak.n v/i th the joint purpose of 
testing the contact piocedure and the questionnaire itself. Prior 
to these two pilot operations the questionnaire had been piloted in 
a number of versions.by the client.
Aciynamic piloting procedure was adopted for both operations.
A team of two interviewers plus a client and agency researcher set 
off witli an address list and a di'oft of the qucs t i cnna I re. tach 
interviewer wes accompanied by a researcher and the whole team met 
up after each interviewing session to discuss tliei'r experiences - 
where the questionnaire layout was confusing, where question word i ng 
was ambiguous or confused respon-'onts and so on. The aocu,ments 
v/ere then m-'dI fIcd in the ligni of the discussion and a further 
field session took place. All the field documrnts were subjected 
to considerable modification as a result of the pilot surveys, in 
particular the contact procedure was stream! inet! and the 
questionnaire was reduced in lepgth and simplified.
All of the interviewers working on the pilot surveys were 
fully trained women interviewers from our General Field Force.
The first pilot tool; place in Nottingham on 25Lh/26th August 1971 
and the second pilot in West London on lst/2nd September 1971.
The Main Survey
fi
Having arrived at a viable contact procedure and questionnaire, 
;ld c'ocur.ients were drawn up for the main survey. These coriiprîscd:
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Addi'f’ss Lists 
Con toe I Sheets
Qucs L i onna i res (cofs-;^ r i s ; ng a ir.a i n qiics t ! onna i re 
and five sel f-cor,i;)l at ton siicats)
PronifJl Cards (includinrj a special car toon • promfjt 
card) ■*
Appointment Cards (foi leaving with respondents) 
l.ettcrsof i n t roduct ioi't (explaining the purpose 
of the survey) 
ïliard;"You let ters (gi vcn to respondents after 
li)c interview) 
employer. ‘ s_ l-cl tcrs (for obtaining respondents' 
permission to contact employers regarding ' 
tl'icir income)
Pens stamped 'University of Stirling' (Gifts 
for respondents)
Comprehensive In torvi ewer ! nstruct i or.s .
Copies of each of the documcnIs are to be found in section 8 .
All the interviewers and supervisors v.'oiking on the project 
were fully trained members of our General Field Force who attended a 
personal briefing. The content of the.briefings was as follows:
Session 1: Introduction
Purpose of Survey
Explanation of Contact Procedure
Piactice F.xamples of Cor,tact Procedure
Session 2: ' Detailed explanation of questionnaire
Session 9 : Taped 1ntervi cw as practice
i
1 ' - 
i
I
! ' 
f
: Five briefings were held in Glasgow, Birmingham, Manchester,
! London and Bristol between 29th Scptc-S'hcr and' 5th October 1971 • A1 1
1 the briefings lasted about six hours and we re conducted by the same
I team of throe people (cli ent,agency rcseardier and agency field
I d i r e c t o r ) .
'
The main f 1 e 1 dwork took place between l|th October and 6 th 
November 1971. A total of 1913 'intorvicws '-'as achieved. This was 
a somewhat disappointing, response and after discussion a second wave 
of fieldwork was undertaken between 6idi and 2hth December 1971- In 
this wave of fic1dwork addresses \/crc rc-issued for IO3 constituencies 
Each constituency was worked by an interviewer who had been briefed 
hut had worked In a different area on the main wave of fieldwork.
For this second wave, v,Tie re an interviewer was unable to obtain an 
interview (for reasons other than nc'n-cl i gi bi 1 i ty) she completed a 
“Substitute'' qucs t i onna i re ,. a copy of wh i ch is to be found in section
A list of all U>c constituencies used on the survey witli an 
asterisk against those which were also used on the second wave, 
is given in section 7 -
5 . AnnJ )'j< i 'y  o f  R cs jio n s c
The lluee tables \;hic.li Toîlov; set out the cJe.toilec! analysis of 
response for the suri’cy. The first I ah 1 e shioivs tiie analysis for 
. V.'ave the second for V/avc 2 , an d tiic final table gives the final 
* combined analysis of response.
6. P ro œ s^ ing of Q>.;t [onna i res
V/licrc a respondent had given permission for his cniploycr to be
contacted, a letter was sent to his eisploycr rcc[uesting details about
his income. “ Kmployers who did not reply to the initial letter
were sent a reminder approximately 10 days later, and if a reply 
! was still not received, a second reminder was sent out.
: After the fieldwork all questionnaires wore coded and edited in
1 our ov/n Analysis Department. Coding and editing instructions were
! drawn up by client and agency représentai Î ves J n consultation and a,
I client represcntative was on hand throughout the coding period for
I consultation on any queries that arose.
Punching took place in our own Punching Department and all 
punch ctrds were subjected to a 100% ver Î fi eat ion.
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. V/AVC I
TOTAL t:U!',3EK OF AOORCSSCS ISSUED 9593 1 0 0/,
lUa miser. dcmo1 i shcd/einply * 242 37,
rrc;ni ses not traced 21
REVISED nurSER OF ADDRESSES 3330 100%
No reply at 3 or more calls 208 2%
fî No resnonsible adult at 3 or more, calls 4 Vr
Not t'lva liable dur i ng fieldwork period 37
fj 1 1 1 ness/uca th in family 4 *
Severe 1 onguaxjo problems 4
d Refusal to give iiousehold information 232 2%
Address to be compl eted at V/ave 2 22 *
d Other non-response 2 V:
TOTAL NUMBER OF ADDRESSES CO-Of-'EP.ATl NG AT
CONTACT STAGE 8817 95%
TOTAL NUMBER OF ADDRESSES CO-OPERvMING " ' 0817 100%
Not eligible for interview 6006 68%
Number- of addresses yielding one person eligible
for interview 274 2 3 1 %
Number of addresses yielding 2 people eligible
for interview 68 1%
Nunlier of addresses yieHfing 3 pe_pl e eligible
for interview Î
TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE ELIGIBLE FOR INTERVIEW 2881 1 00%
Out at 3 or more calls 3 4 3%
Not available during f1 eldwork period , 57 1?:
Illness/death in family _ . / 25 1%
Severe language problems 8
Refusal ^ 774 27%
Addresses to be completed at V/ave 2 21 i%
Other non-response 5
TOTAL NUMBER OF ' NTERVI E'./S 1313 65.3 %
ADJUSTED nESPCMGC RATE
£j Gliould have yielded 168 people eligible for 
interview
,\ response rate ~ J_9J,9 = 62.7%
288’i -r 168
less than 0.5%
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W A V E  ! -I V / AVE ?
TOTAL NUMBER OF AOORESàCS ISSUED
Pro-idi ses dcmol i sîied/ci,i;jty 
Prerni ses not traced
REVISED NUMBER OF ADDRESSES
No reply at 3 or more calls 
fj No responsible adult at 3 or more calls 
d Not available during fieldwork per :od 
f5 I 11 ness/dea tlT Î n family 
fi Severe language prob 1 ems 
f) Refusal to give houseliold information
Occupants left address since V.'ave I 
fi Other non-response
TOTAL NUMBER OF ADDRESSES CO-OPERATING AT
CONTACT STAGE
TOTAL NUMBER OF ADDRESSES CO-OPERATING
Not eligible for interview
Number of addresses yielding one person eligible 
for interview
Number of addresses yielding tv.’o pcopIe eligible 
f o I i n L c 1 V i cw
Number of addresses yielding th roe people eligible 
for interview
TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOi’LE ELIGIBLE FOR INTERVIEW
Out at 3 or more calls 
Not available di.ring fieldwork period 
111ness/dea th in family 
Severe 1 anguage problems 
Ref usa 1
Eligible at V/ave 1 but not at Wave 2 
Left address since V/avc 1
Substitute interview only as full interview with 
another member of household
Other non-response 
TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS 
ADJUSTED RESPONSE RATE
fi Should have yielded g8 pcop 1 e eligible for interview
response rate = 2068 = 67.5%
2965 -t 98
" " less than 0.5%
9593 1 00%
245 r%
21
9327 100%
115 1%
4 *
22 *
3 *
4 *
139 1%
6 *
2 ''
9032 ' 97%
9032 100%
6l40 68%
2820 31%
71 i%
1
2965 100%
105 4%
21 1%
20 1%
8
700 ' 24%
18 1%
15 1%
7 *
3
2068 6 9 .7%
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7 , L i s t  o f  C(.X'iS I i I lu:l IC. ! I'S (i| finlpsiLi V/i i l i i t i  G Î > ) riCi. i I" cl ù ijilK j,;)
North.
Co rw i c k - u |ion - Two e d 
flexharn
Tooss i do Slock Lon 
|louC|!ilon“le-Sp!-inq 
'■Tecssido - Middlesbrough 
'•Tccssvidc - Thornaby 
The Ifarllopoois 
'•Dari i ng Lon 
Nev;ca:-/t e^-iipon"Tync East 
Wa 11 send 
"Gateshead East 
Sunderland South
Yorkshiic and Numberside
; *Briçig
Norman ton 
■ "Leeds East
j Bat ley & Mori cy
[ ’Wial i fax
I Shipley
I "Eudsey
I • '"Sheffield Hal lam
York
[ ■ "Kingston-upon-Hul1 East
i . Sheffield Brightside
j ‘ "Dcarne Valley
Don Valley 
] Ripon
I ’■'^ Harrogate
; -"Dewsbury
1 Barnsley
i , Bradford Wcst
East Mlolands
■" Ha r bo rough 
Rutland & Stamford 
*CarI ton 
Bushelr ffe 
Bel per 
*Kcttering 
Mans f i eld 
•"Nottingham North 
Nottingham East 
Nottingham West 
*V/cl 1 i ngliorough 
NorlhamiJlon North 
^Leicester South
" - Rc-issued at Wove 2
1 0 2
[ es A'Wilia
’■-i. Dv.v s t o r I 
Is 1 C' of Ely 
"Sudbury r, ih o d b r i dg c
S.V/. Norfolk 
"11. Norfolk 
'41 .W. Hü'-folk
South l'asL
Brighton Ko ni p town 
'•Hove
"Epsom e. Ewell 
Sfioreham 
Canterbury 
"Rcigate 
Tonbridge & Mailing 
■"Chcrtscy & Wa 1 ton 
Dartford 
Eastlei gh 
^Basingstoke 
*V/yco!iibe 
Reading South 
"Beacons field 
*islc of Wi ght 
Eîourneniouth East 
Pool e
Havant & ’dator loo
"Eton & Slough  _
Spel I no m e  
"Southend East 
"Watford 
HI tcfii n 
Bedford 
■"Hertford & Stevenage 
"'Hctr.cl Hempstead 
We 1wyn & Hatfield 
Harwi ch 
■"Worth i ng 
Horshai" ' Crawley 
Roya 1 Tunbridge We 11s 
"Bra intree 
"'Basildon 
Christchurch & Lymington
Greater London
'Havering, Upninster 
'Bromley, Beckenham 
'Tiromlcy, Ravensbourne 
Hi 11i ngdon , Rui siip-Northwood 
•Ri chmond'-Lipon-Thames , Twi ckcnham 
' S^utton, CarshnI ton 
Barnet, Chipping Carnet
Rc“issued at Wave 2
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"liarrow Ccni ra 1 
■"Morloci, Wi mb 1 cdon 
Hi 11i ngdon, Uxbridgc 
lîcxlcy, Sidcup
Hoiins 1 ow, Brentford & Islcworlh 
Gal iIK] Acton 
"'Kensington L Cl'clsca - Kens ing ton 
"V/andswo r Lh , Too ting 
"\'/a 11 h0n 1 forest, \/o 1 thamstow 
"G reenwicb 
Islington Hortii 
'"Islington Central 
"'Hcwlk'tm South
■"Hoclutcy North & Stoke Newington 
"Southwark Beckham 
"Barking 
Barking, Dagenham 
'"Tower Hamlets, Stepney & Poplar 
"Sutton & Cheam 
"'Croydon South 
Croydon North East 
"'Haringey, Tottenham 
Lambeth - Strcatharn
Soutii-V/est
Bristol S.E. 
Exclur 
•A'Eath 
Bodmi n 
Chi ppcnham
1 , . *Tiverton
! . ■ V/clIs
*Salisbury 
Taun ton 
*Ycovi1
"S. Gloucestershire 
"U. Gloucestershire 
"N. Devon 
Devi zcs
Wales
East Flint 
"Conway 
"Denbigh 
Brecon & Radno: 
Horiraouth 
Cardiff V/est 
Aberavon 
"Ogmorc 
"E b bw Va 1e 
Ba r ry
- Re-Is sued at Wave 2
■101.1
M i d 1 an (15
Wai sa 1 I South 
hi rmlnghom Ladywood 
'■B i riiii ngliofn Nor I ii f i e 1 d 
B i r r:i i : ! r; !'■ o hood i- '.lo r t h 
"Birmingham Noli Green 
" B i r ni i n cj f 1 a m S mo 1 Î h e o t h 
BIrmi nghom Erding ton 
Cannock 
"Nolcsowcn C Stourbridge 
*StoI:c-on-Trent South 
A Co V 0n try Sou t h. /c s t 
The Wrcki n
" l l c i i f i c l d  & T o m w o r t h  
" W o r w i  c k  &  L c o m i  n g  t o n  
S h r e v / s b u r y  
S t r o t f o r d - u p o n " A v o n  
‘"V/cr> t  Br o m w i  ch - W o s  t  
*  C o v e n  t r y  N o r t i i  W e s t  
S t o f r o r d  &  S t o n e
Nor t (i-We S t
! ‘"South Fyldc
i . North Fylde
I . "Runcorn •
I Onnskirk
"Chorley 
i . St. Helens
f , *Barrow-in-Furness
j . Preston South
; Blackpool North
J "Mace 1csf i eld
' ‘"Rochdale
■ "Middleton & P restwi ch
! "'Stockport North
Bolton West 
( "Newton
; M ’stcr Arawick
i *M'ster Gorton
"H'ster Openshow 
; . Crosby \
*LIverpool Wa1 ton 
. ‘"Liverpool Gars ton 
Liverpool Waver tree 
WIrra1 
*01 dhom Has*'
Ci ty of Chester
Scot 1 and
Glasgow Siiettlcston 
■*'G 1 a s gow Queen's Park 
^Coatbridge S Airdrie
Re-i ssuud at Wave 2
io n
Scot 1 and (cont’d)
Bolhwc11 
Han,! 1 ion 
RuLhe rcj 1 an 
*E. DunbarLonshlfe 
V/. Pun!;ar lonsh i rc 
Edi nlHii yi'i South 
*Edinburg!i North 
Dundee V/esl:
Dun fc nil I i no 
Central Fife 
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CARD 1 : 7. ®  8 . 0
Address serial no. Const itnency
Respondent no.
înterv iewer
Area Code
9 10 11 12
Supervisor
Date 1971
i ntervïev/Qrs 
Code Ho.
14 15 16 17
INTRODUCTION
'Number of calls made at this addrcs
18
} am from the University of Stirling. V/e are doing n national study to fine out 
how people feel about their jobs". You know there's a lot of talk about produc­
tivity these days. (V/c'rc trying to find out what they like and whcd: they 
dislike about tlieir jobs; what makes work pleasant or unpleasant: and whet it 
is that makes some people work more than others.) We won 1 d appreciate It if you 
would let me ask you some questions. Thi s study is completely confidential and 
your answers ore wanted for statistical purposes.
CHECK QUESTIONS 
Can I just check:
Yes ■ Ho
(o) Do you normally work a total of 8 hours
or more over a week? A E
i.F ‘No* TO PVIY
(b) Have you been to work some time in the • QUESTION
past 7 days? B 1- RESPONDENT IS
NOT ELIGIBLE
(c) Are you an employee? C G FOR INTERVIEW
(d) Do you receive you pay v/eckly D H
TIME OF STARTING INTERVIEW
STRICTLY CORriDniTlAL
1, How long docs it usually t rikc you 
to get frojii you hcxne to work?
2. Do you enjoy your work or do you 
f i nd it a bit dul1 ?
hours Til ins
Don't know A 19 20
Lnj oy 
Ho Î thcr 
Dul 1
Don't knov/
3(a) What type of firm or organisation 
do you work for?
(STATE TYPE OF FIRM, WHAT FIRM MAKES/ 
DOES, ect.)
(b) Wiiot job do you actually do?
IF IN CIV il SERVICE, FORCES, POLICE, 
etc.
(c) What is your rank or grade?
IF "OTHER"
(d) Do you bold any particular position 
in the organisation? (e.g. foreman, 
typing supervisor, office manage, 
compati y secretary, etc.)
IF FROPIETGR u, BUSINESS OR A
(e)
M A N A G E R
Roughly how many people work at the 
place where you work? ;C
(INCLUDE RESPONDENT)
ASK ALL
(f) Have you any qualifications? (Such 
as apprenticeships, diplomas, etc.)
(STATE WHAT QUALIFICATIONS HELD)
2-5 or more 
10-24 -
Less tban 10 _ 
(STATE NUMBER)
2 1 . 2
3
4 
1
I .)
Everybody has some things they like about their jobs and other 
things they don't like about their jobs, Wliat do you d i s 1 I ke 
most about your present, job? TAKE EXACT ANSWER.
(21) 0
2 2 ,
23
27.
28 .
29.
24
25 26
-U
11
30.
STRICT [.Y co;;nni-:tiT !AL
5 . V/hût clü you \ i Rc rr.ost cibout your prudent job? Ï A K f '  E X A C T  
A N S W E R
3 1 .
3?.
3 3 .
34,
6. Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about your previous 
employment
(a) Have you had a full-time job with another employer in
TbT
Yes
No
Don't know
Why did you leave your last job? 
TAKE EXACT ANSWER
(c) Is there any other reason?
7 . The next few questions are for married employees only. 
May I ask if you arc married? MarriecJ women
Married man
Single woman 
Single man 
Widowed/d i vorccd/ 
Separated
36.
3/.
3 8 .
39.
40. 2-
C O N T -
INUE
3 GO Tt
Q. 10
" J GO TC
(40) 0
STRICTLY COIiFinniTlAl.
rOR KLRRIfD V'OMLÎ! JTMLV 
8(a) Why do you go oui lu wori<?
11
(b) Any other reason?
hi.
42.
43.
44.
Did your mother v/ork after she v/as married?
(c) Any other reason?
Yes 45. 2
No 3 '
Don * t know , 1 _
1]
f 1 
1)
Pîn
G0‘l
CL.J^
(45) 0
FOR HAT'. I ED MEN ONLY 
i 0 (a) Does your v/lfe work? Yes
G0‘
3
GO'
Don't know
%b) Why does she go out to v/o"k?
' 47. 
48.
43.
50,
NOW GO TO Q.13
STRICTLY CONKIRLljTlAl.
GO TOIk)
Don’t know
JF
( b )  V/iiy cl ici she stop work v/h she did?on
(c) Is there any particular reason why she doesn't work now?
HOV,' GO TO Q. 13
52.
53.
54.
55.
! ■ 12.. !s there any special reason v/hy your wife docs not woric?
13. . Old your mother-in-law work after she 
was' marr i.ed?
Yes
No
Don't know
56.
57.
58.
59.
60. 2 
3 
1
(60) 0
STRICTLY COMFinCNTlAL
ASK ALL
14(a) We hear a loi of talk these days about the need for higher
p ro d u c t  ivi Ly, V.'iu;t do y o u  t h i n k  is the ir.osl important t hi ng  
that c o u l d  be done to h el p  p e o p l e  to w o r k  n.ore e f f i c i e n t l y  in 
c o u n t r y  as a v/hole ?
(b) And what could be done to increase efficiency In the work you 
yoursolf do?
115
61.
6?,.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68;
; Î
|]
1]
n
NOW GIVE RESPONDENT SELF-COMPLETION SHEETS 'A' (PlNK) TO FILL 
ÎN, f\ND SPECIAL PEN. EXPLAiN;
Think of your present v/ork. What is it like most of the time. 
Then in the space beside each word, circle 'Y ' for 'yes' if it 
describes your work ; circle ‘N* for 'no' if it does jtoI describe 
your work: and circle *?' if you cannot decide.
HELP RESPONDENT WITH FIRST ITEM.
THEN SAY: We don't v/ant you to think much about each item - put
do'wn your first impression, (If you don’t have a first 
Impression circle 'neither').
15
Now I'd like to ask you a fev/ questions 
about how long you work.
How long is your basic working week at v/ork, 
that is, not counting lunch breaks and v/ith 
no overt Ime?  hours
Don't know A
69 70
STRICTLY COIiriDLHTiAL
116
16('ii) ii yOu WC: c offc;-ccl ü rise which you were ol i owed to tc!;o in 
the form of eitju-r [liqher v/oqcs or shorter hours but not both,
IF 'hiqhcr wftqe/shortor hours' 
(b) Why .... rather than
which would you prefer?
Shorter hours
Don't know
I?(a) If you had a choose, would you prefer higher pay or 1onger
hoiidays?
Higher pay
Longer holidays
GO 10
Don't know
/longer holidays' 
. rather than ...
I one
18.
ST RI CTLY CONriDCNTIAl.
T h e s e  d a y s  m a n y  p c o p l e  c a n  a r f o r d  l o  l a k e  t h e  oc hl  b i t  o f  t i m e  o f f .  
A p a r t  f  t o r n  a n y  b o l i d a y ,  h o v e  y o u  t o k e n  a n y  11  me o f f  w o r k  i n  t h e  
j  a s t  f  o u r  w e e k s ?
Has not taken t htic off _ 18, 2
Taken time off hj.!^ offers 
illness of self or another 
as a reason wi thout prompting 3
f o r c e d  t o  w o r k  s l i o r t  t i m e  4
Taken time off 5
Don't know 1
19 If you did work longer hours than the basic working week v;ould 
you be paid any extra for that week?
Think wou1d be paid extra
Not paid extra
Time off in icu
Don't know
(18)
19.
j
1
J
! \ 
ii
iiI
ii
n
2  -  C O N T I  N u l
3 1  GO T O  
Q.31 5-1 
ON
PAGE: i r ;Î 
i J ]}
(19) 0
2 0  S u p p o s e  y o u  h a d  w o r k e d  o n e  m o r e  h o u r  I c S t  w e e k  t h a n  y o u  a c t u a l l y  
d i d  I n  y o u r  m a i n  e m p l o y m e n t ,  V / h a t  w o u  I d  t h e  w e e k d a y  o v e r t i m e  
r a t e  h a v e  b e e n  -  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  b a s i c  l i m e ,  t i m e  a n d  a  h a l f ,  d o u b l e  
o r  w h a t ?
B a s i c   ^ 2 0 ,
T i m e  a n d  a  q u c ^ r t e r  
T i m e  a n d  a  t h i r d  
T i m e  a n d  a  h a !  f  
' D o u b l e  t  i m e
O t h e r  -  C O D E  A N D  S T A T E  :
Don't know
T 1
(20) 0
J  T
IL'6
STRICTLY COIN'I DENT; AL
2 1 ( a )  T h i n l ' . i n ç ;  o f  y o u r  w c r L m a t c o  w h o  d o  t h . c  s o m e  s o r t  o f  j o b ,  d o  
y o u  p u l  i n  f i i u r e  o r  l o s s  o v e r l i f t i o  h o u r s  I  L a n  l u o s l  o f  11 lorn?
R o s p o n c l o n t  w o r k s  m o r e :  o v e r t i m e
R e s p o n d e n t  ' .••■orks I c  s s o v e r t i m e
'  R e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  t h e  s a m e  a m o u r U
N o b o d y  d o c s  o v e r t  i m c  h e r e
H a s  n o  w o r k m a t e s  w h o  d o  t h e  s a m e  j o b
O t h e r  ( C O D E  A N D  S T A T E )  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
D o n ' t  k n o w
21. 2- A S K  
'  Q . 2 l b , c ;  ^
h J
3 —  ASKCL.  2 1 d , e  
6  —  GO T O  Q .  2 4
E [ -  GO T O  0 . 2 2
1 J
(21) 0
I F  ' m o r e / l e s s  o v e r t i m e '  
' ( b j " '  W h y  i s  t h a t ?
( c )  A n y  o t h e r  r e a s o n ?
I F  ' s o m e  a m o u n t '
( d )  r  w o n d e r  w h y  i t  i s  t h a t  
y o u  a l  1 h a p p e n  t o  w o r k  t h e  
S a m e  a m o u n t  o f  o v e r t i m e ?
( e )  A n y  o t h e r  r e a s o n ?
23.
2.4*
2 6.
2 7 .
28.
29.
22. I n  h o w  m a n y  w e e k s  o f  t h e  last f o u r  y o u  w o r l - . e d . d i d  y o u  p u t  i n  a n y  
o v e r t  i m e ?  E X C L U D E  W E E K S  W H I C H  WE R E  V T I O L L Y  H O L I D A Y  OR W H E R E  
R E P O N D E N T  WAS O F F  WORK F O R  T H E  W H O L E  W E E K .
N o n e
1 , 2  o r  3  w e e k s  
4  V i e e k s  
D o n ' t  k n o w
30. 2 - CONTINUE 
3'
4
1 J
- GO T O  
0.26
(30) 0
STRICTLY CO’irîDLirf !AL
119
THOSE WHO O ID N O T  WORK OVFRTIHL 
23 (a) Dici you huvu the opportunity to v/or!: any overt irr,G in tlie last 
four weeks?
Opportunity of overtime 
No opp'^rtuni ty of overtime 
Don't know
IF 'opportunity of overt iri-e'
Why didn't you work overtime?
31. 2
9
1-1
GO TO
(c) Is there any other reason?
32,
33,
3'i
NOW GO TO Q..2S
2^! (a) if there was the opportunity of overtime next week would you 
work it, or would you turn it down?
V/ou)d work overtime
Turn if down
Don't know
IF ' turn It d o w n / d o n ' t  know' ‘iC—
( b ) W h y  would you not work any overtime?
3 6 , 2 “
GO TO 
Q.3C
[0 6 ), (0 I
(c) Is there any other reason?
3 7 .
38.
39.
40.
25- ’ Would you work overtime if it 
were paid at double time?
Would work overtime 41, 2'
V/ould not '-'ork overtime 3
Don't know 1 -
GO TO
1 . 3 0
[(41) 0
S T R I C T L Y  COÎ- i f - IDLUTIAL
JIlOSE y/ij0_V:'0RKED ANY OVERT 11\F 
2G(a) How many hours over line have you 
worked in the I as I '/ days, that 
is since lost ___ (day of wae!;) ?
(b) A'^ d the 7 days before that?
2 7. If it had been left to you to 
decide, v/ould you have worked 
more or less overtime over the 
tost 2 weeks?
2 8 (a) And would you have worked more
or less overtime than you did if 
all overtime had been pa i1 
single time rote?
________iïours- overt im;
Don’t know A
  hours overtime
Don't know A
Less
About the same 
More
Don't know 
Less
About the same 
More
Don't know ,
'12 43
""1
44 45
46. 4
GO TO 
Q.29
1
2 i-COHTIlHJE
I J
(46) 0
4/. 4 -
3 -  
2 
1 “
GO TO 
CL. 29
IF *same/'more/don' t know' _
Tb) Could you tell me why that is? T^KE EXACT ANSWER.
2 9(c) And v/ould you have worked more
or less overtime than you did if 
all overtime had been paid at 
double time?
More
About the same 
Less
Don't know
IF 'same/less/don't know' ^---- ;----
(b) Could you tell me v/hy that is?
48.
4 9 .
5 0 . 
■51 .
GO TO 
Q . 3 0
y
4
I j
[(5 2 H
5 3.
54.
55.
5 6 .
S T R I C T L Y  C G ü r i D C î r r i A L
SJiOW _Çi^  0 J\ ;
3 0 (a) So su mm i ng up, v/hicfi of the 
St atr.mcnt s on this card 
applies to you?
(b) Can you tel 1 me why?
Always work overtime when 
t iic apport un 11 y ar i ses
Sometimes work overtime wiicn 
* lie opportunity arises
N c v c; r wo r k ov e r t i m e \ /h e n 
tfic opportunity arises
Ho opportunities for overtime
Don't know
57.
3
4
5 
1
(57) 0
58.
53.
6 0 ,
61.
ASK ALL
31 Mow I’d like to ask yciu how you manaae on your income. 
HAND RESPONDENT SELF-COMPLETION SHEET 'B' (BUFF)
Could you look at this siieet and put a tick in the boxes 
which refer to you. You put a tick in each row.
CHECK TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS ONE AND ONLY ONE TICK IN 
EACH ROW.
STRICT!.Y CONnnrMTIAI.
3 2 (a) 'to back to your j nh ^ hpvo
you t hounlit abour Î coving your 
present employer recently?
I r 2 b'li t_] e ov j no^
%b) Is there any special reason
/ ■
Thoi'aht about leo'Mng 6?.. 2'— '
3 4 .
35.
Not t iiOu9 t about le0v i n9 3
GO TO
'(1.33
Don't know 1— 'GO TO
Q . 3 4
(c) What hove you done about 
gott i ng 0 new jiob?
Applied for another 
• job
Looked rcuund/niade 
enquiries
Done nothing
Other - CODE AND STATE
Don’t know
T H O S E  WHO H A V E  MO T T H O U G H T  O F  L E A V I N G  E M P L O Y E R  
3 3. Is there any special reason?
ASK ALL
If you were offered promotion in your job, Is there anything 
special that v/ould v/orry you about it?
Have you been unemployed and 
looking for u'ork for more than 
a month at any one lime in the 
last five years?
Been unemipl qyed longer 
til an a month
Not been unemployed 
longer tiian a month
Don’t know
(62) 0
1
63.
64.
65. •
66.
1
6 7 . 2 “
3
4
GO TO
" Q .34
E 
1 -
(67) 0 1
68.
6 9.
7 0 . I
71.
®  8.
9.
10.
1 1 .
12,
13. 2
[(13) 0
SIR ICILY CON Ht) Lin lAL
r
/
36. |\ov/ I'd like to ask you about v/ork you may do about tbe house.
SHOW CARD R ' ■ ■
(a) V/oulci you look at this card and loll ine if you have done any 
' of lliese things in the last / Jays, that is since last .....
(day of week)?
GO THROUGH LIST AND CODE 'Yes' OR 'No' TOR LACli ITEM.
FOR EACH ACTIVITY COPED 'Yes'
(bY How many hours did you spend at  (activity) in
the last 7 clays?
STATE NUMBER OF HOURS OPPOSITE ACTIVITY.
(c) And did you do any of these things in tiic 7 days before that? 
GO THROUGH LIST AND CODE 'Yes' OR 'No' FOR EACH ITEM.
FOR EACH ACTIVITY CODED 'Yes'
%d) How many hours did you spend at ....(activity) in that 
7 days?
STATE NUMBER OF HOURS OPPOSITE ACTIVITY
37. Taking these two weeks together, 
was this more or less than usual, 
or was it the usual as.ount of tii.^  
you spend on these kinds of work 
about tfie house?
14 1 5
More than usual 
Usual amount
Less than usual 
Don't know
16
1 8 .
17
2
3
4 
1
0.36dQ . 3 6 c36a
Done i n 
prev iou 
7 days
hours " 
prev iou 
7 Jays
Done in 
1 asl 
7 days
hours
Yes
Paint ing/wal1 paper Îng
Pi aster i ng/plumbing
Joi nery/carpcnt ry
Electrical work
Repair or service car
Garden Ing 
Scw.i ng/kn I tt ing
Cook ing/bak i ng
Clean i ng/housev/ork
Other work about the 
house (STATE TYPE OR 
,'None')
ri
ii!i
■')
L }
■ I
I
li
j
(1
STRICTLY co:;rinniT!AL
oil ov; CARD R l
38. Do you do any of lîicsc things 
for oth.er people nowadays?
Yos
No
D o n ' t  k n o w
19. 2 
3
____
1(19) 0
39. It's bccomi nc| increasingly cofrmon for 
people to do extra work in their spare 
time. Do you do this at all?
40(a) What kind of work do you do?
(b;Co what is it you do exactly?
Does extra work 
No extra v/ork
O B T A I N
FULL
DETAILS
OF
NATURE
AND
TYPE
OF
\ / O R K
41 Do you have a boss for this work 
or ore you self-employed?
Se 1 f “Cinpl oyed 
Has boss
Not paid work mentioned 
without prompting
Other (CODE AND STATE)
Don't know
42, On average, how many hours' a week! hours
do you usually spend at this kind , ,
of work? , .Don't know A
2 0 .  2  —  C O N T I N U E  
3  —  GO T O
(20) 1 
0 J
21 .
22 23
24 25
26. 2
3
4
] C O N T I N U E
GO T O  
“■Q.45
C O N T I N U E
(26) 0 ]
27 28
43. ■ Hov/.rnuch does that bring in a v/cek?
. £ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ P OR £ / ' /
Not paid/paid in kind 
Don't know
GO T O
a. 45 m:
29 30 31 32
CTRicn Y ro;;FiDLf}Ti/-i.
lltcrc any cIcdacL ionr> '
I IVo s
Yns
No
Hon't know
"(b) 1/hat would be deducted? STATE TYPE OF DEDUCTION AND
AMOUNT DEDUCTED.
33.
31 CO TO
,.rQi6 ,
;
1 .
2, ££
Amp'Ml 
_p OR £ _/__ /____ d
_P m  ^  /  /  (I
34 35 35 37"
38 39 40 41 i
4 5 (a) Why did you originail y take on this work?
42.
43.
44.
(b) Any other reason? 45 .
MOW GO TO 0,49
46. Hove you ever thought about taking 
on a second joo?
Thought about 46. 2
Mot tiiought about -3
Don't know 1
0
4 7 . Is there any special reason why you have not taken a second 
j o b ?
STfliCTlY C O n i - l D Î U T l A L
48, Have you ever held ci second job in 
addition to your r.io I n job in tiie^  
past ?
Held second job 
Never hold second job 
Don't kno,v
I F Mic 1 d second !cb
(b) Why did you give up this second job?
ASK ALL
49(a) Coming back to your main Job, is there 
on hourly rate used in making up your 
basic pay?
I F 'hour 1 y r ~t e'
(b) What is your basic rate per hour 
employment?
IF 'Don't know' ASK: About how much?
Hourly rate
Weekly salary
OtheV (CODE AND 
STATE) :
Don't know
you ma 1n
51. 2-
3" GO TO
1 . "0.49
C O  0
52.
— --—
53.
54.
55.
56. ?.'■]
3"
GO TO
" 0.50
.p 9A per hour
57
50, Are voLi on a bonus or piece-rate 
or incentive sciieme in addition 
to your^  basic weekly pay?
On bonus/ifîcent ive/ 
pi ecu-fate
Not on bonus/Încent:ve/ 
piece-rate
Don't know
58
60.
59
3
I J
(bo) 0
CGliT i:i'JE 
WITH d.5
GO TO 
Q. 61 
PAGE 19
51(a) Docs the bonus, incentive or
piece-rate you receive depend on 
your effort alone or is it based 
on the effort of a group of work­
mates?
i f  ' G r o u p '
(b7~ How many people arc there 
in the group?
My effort alone
Group of workmates 
Other answers 
Don't know
10 or less
11 or more 
Don't know
61. 2™-G0 TO
0.53
E — CONTINUE
1 GO TO 
r'Q.52
(61)
(61)
1
4 I GO 7 3
S TR I C T E  Y CONn D E N T ! A L
5 2. So iiriw nxactlv does this : nce.nl i vr srljeme work?
53(a) Dogs your bonus, i nc en t i v e  or piece-- 
rate s y s t e m  m a k e  you v/ork h a r de r  or 
d oe s  it not rea ll y  affect your e f f o r t ?
( b )  W h y  i s  t h a t ?
W o r k  h a r d e r
D o n ' t  k n o w
5 4 .
56.
T h i n k i n g  of the b o n u s / În c e n t i v e /  
p i e c e - r a t e  p a y m e n t  docs the 
m a n a g e m e n t  e x p l a i n  it clearly, 
o n l y  f airly c l e a r l y  or not c l e a r l y  
at ol 1 ?
If y o u  v/orked h a r d e r  to b oost your 
e a r n  i ngs v/ou 1 d yo'j be a sked to w o r k  
m o r e  or less overt I me or w h a t ?
I s  t h e  v ; a y  i n  v/h i c h  y o u r  p a y  i s  
m a d e  u p  f a i r  o r  n o t ?
E x p l a i n  c l e a r l y
E x p l a i n  f a i r l y  
c l  e a r  1 y
N o t  c l e a r l y  a t  
al 1
D o n  ' t  k n o w ,
M o r e  OV"'  r t  i m e  
S a m e  o v e r t i m e  
L e s s  o v e r t i m e  
D o n ' t  k n o w
F a i r
N o n - c o m m i  t  a l  
N o t  f a i r  
. D o n ' t  k n o w
62.
63.
64. 1
3
1
[(gÏ T 0 j
£5.
66,
67.
68.
69.
_ ,.
2
3
4
1
(69) ^ 1
70. 2
3 '
4
1
jC/o) 0
71. 2
3 •
4
1
(71) 0
‘ 1
n
II
u
]?
J
T1
57. If you oil w o r k e d  h o r d e r  in y ou r
depot*tnic.riL to boost your cornincjs, 
do you tiiink the m o n o g c m c n t  w o u  1 d 
l ea ve  the r ote uricl.ongeu or w o u i d  
. tfiey out the rote of pay?
Leave rote unchanged 72. 2
Cut bonus rote 3
O t h e r  ( C Ü Û L  A N D  S T A T E )
1D o n ' t  k n o v /
(72) ^
CARD 4 7 (o) 8 (4)
5 8 (0) Dy how Hiuch docs the bonus/ I ncent ive/p i cue- rate scheme 
increase your basic earnings before deductions?
If- 'Don't know' ASK: Apprx linate! y how much?
£ . D OR £ / / d
Unable to estimate A - GO TO Q.. 59
59(a) Thinking of the workmates who do the 
Same job as you do, do most of them 
make more or less bonus than you do?
>ver ?
il j_4
An hour A A 0 2
A clay B B 0 3
A week C C 0 4
?J_weeks D D 0 5
4 weeks E E 0 6
1 calendar month F F 0 7
3 calendar months G G 0 8
A year H , H 0 9
Other ( C O D E  AMD S T A T E )
E
Don't know J J 0
c
A
0
V/orkmates make more 
V/orf-mnates make same 
V/orI'JTiates moke less
Has no workmates/no 
one does same job 
Don't know
1 5 . 21
3
4 J
CONTINUE
G O  T O  
' Q.60
(b) Why is that?
0(15) 0
STR iCTî ,Y  c n n r  l i ' L i r n A i .
60 (a) Just. suDPOSc you fiad worked twice as hartl iast wee k without v.'orkinq
I on go I" hours than you did, how rnucli extra wouid you tiave earned hnjore 
deduct ions?
£__  ._______p Oi^  £ 1 / 6
?.0 21 2 2 23
Don't !<.now A
(b) And how mucii would this have been after deduct ions?
£ :P OR £ / /
Don't know A
ASK ALL
6 1 . Now I would like to ask you a question about what wouId happen 
If you worked longer hours
(a) If you did work an extra hour next week (in your main jot 
much extra would you earn before deductions?
1) how
_p OR £ / /
Don't know A 
Not I) ing B - GO TO Q..62
(b) And how mush would this be after deductions?
£ ._____ p OR £ / /
6 2 .
Don't know A
NOW GIVE RESPONDENT SELF-COMPLETION 'C (GREEN) AND _
EXPLAIN HOW TO COMPLETE IT
ADD : Please put down your first reactions without thinking
too much about each statement.
63.
AT THE END OF SELF-COMPLETION 'C - TAKE THIS QUESTION SLOWLY 
Now we con'.e to a question ‘we're particularly interested in. 
People have, different ideas about the way deductions affect 
the amount of work they do. _
SHOW CARTOON CARD
POINT TO MR, À: Here you see is one point of vIew. The man
says that high deductions from his pay mean that he 
doesn't work much overtime because it's not worthwi1c.
POINT TO MR. B: But the other man argues that tiie high
deductions mean he has to work more overtime to make 
ends meet.
Now statements 4 and 19 t/ere about this - would you 
look at your answers and explain why you answered as 
you did to tiic.se two statements? TAKE -EXACT ANSWER.
24 25 26 27
il
Î ?
n
li
28 ~29 3Ù 3 1 ’
0
32 33 3 4 y.->
iiÎ1II
1
NOW TAKE BACK SELF-COMPLETION 'C
36
37
38
39
S T R I C T L Y  COLL ! Li. NI  !AL
64, îiavc you y o u r s e l f  p'.": in 1 o n g o r  hours, 
or h a v e  you  pul in s ho rter hours 
because, of in c o me tax, or has it had 
no e f f e c t ?
Loner r iiours 
Shorter Liours 
N o off c c t. /n o c I to i CO 
Don't know
40.  }
CO TO
V
THOSE V/iiO WORK LONGER HOURS 
6 5 (a) Apart form income tax was there any 
other reason v/hy you decided to work 
longer hours?
(b) Could you go into more detail about that?
No other reason 
Was another reason 
Don't know
(40) 
41.
Q. 66 
-GO T(
1- 0 . 6 7
I(41) n 1
NOW GO TO Q..67
THOSE WHO WORK SHORTER HOURS 
66(a) Apart from income tax was there any 
other reason v/hy you deed dod to work 
shorter hours?
(b) Could you go into more detail about that?
No other reason 
Was another rea; 
Don't knew
(c) Have you actually refused an offer 
of overtime because of income tax?
Yes
No
Don't knov/
(d) Well, could you explain how income tax has made you work 
shorter hours?
42.
4 3 .
44.
45.
— —"— —
46. c
3
1
0
4 7 .
48.
4 9 .
5 0.
GO T
5 1. 2-™Q.67
n
j— CONT
(51) 0
52.
53.
54.
55
ST RI CTI V CONTI  m . ' i n i  AL
MlL.Akk
6 7. Lcovin9 the nui/bcr of liours
you v/or!; to one side, lias 
Încomo tax had any effect on 
how much effort you put into 
the work, that is, not hours 
but effort?
THOSi: WHOSE EFFORT IS AFfTCTLD
68. Again leaving the number of
hours to one side have you put 
in more effort or less effort, 
because of income tax?
T H O S E  WHO P U T  I N  I ',ORL E F F O R T
6 9. (a) Apart from income tax was there 
any other .eason v/h y you 
decided to v/ork harder?
Had effect 
No effect 
Don't know
More effort 
Less effort 
Don't know
(b) Could you go into more detail about that?
5 6. 2-CONTIN'JF 
3-
CO' TO Q.7 I
(5 6 .)0 J
5 7. 2-CONTINUE 
3-GO TO 0.70. 
1-GO TO Q.71 .
(57. }0
No other reason 8^, 2
Was anotficr reason 3
Don't know 1
(58.)0
NOW GO TO Q.71.
59.
6 0.
61 . 
62,
— J
THOSE WHO PUT IN LESS EFFORT
7 0 .(a) Apart from income tax was there 
any other reason why you 
decided to v/ork less hard?
No other dea son 63. 2
Was another reason 3
Don't know 1
(b) Could you go into more detail about that?
ASK ALL
7 1 . Has income tax ever 
i.'3 d c you ch a n 9 c your 
1..3 i n job?
Changed job due to tax 
Not'chanoed job due to tax 
Don't know
64.
6 5 .
66. 
6 7.
6 8. 2"CONTINUE 
3-1
GO TO Q./3.
(68.)0
STRl  CTl  Y C O N i ' H i F N T i A L
J M  ,*> t . >« f I v/ L" f « / \  ' f kf 1 Y  Y .'"’ ^
7 2.(0) Dici you cil ange your job 
hcc-tiusc of income Lax 
on I y or wo tlierc also 
s )mc other reason?
No Of lier reason 
V/a s another 1 ca son 
Don t know
6 9 . 2 " 
3.-
•coin 1 K'jc
1 — GO TO 0.73
(6 9 . [ 0  I ,
(b) Coulrî you tell me about that?
7 0 . 
71 .
7 2 .
73.
CARD 5: 7 ®  8 g) ^
ASK ALL
7 3. Has income tax ever 
stopped you from 
changing your main 
job?
THOSE KEPT FROM CHAflGlHG
7 4.(a) Did you stay put in your 
job because ,^7 income tax 
only or was there also some 
other reason?
Kept f rom changi ng
Not kept frofi) 
changi ng
Don't know
No other reason 
Was another reason 
Don't know
9 . 2 -CONTINUE
3"
1-
'GO TO Q.79,
(9.)0
1 0 . 2 -
3 .
■CONTINUE
1 — GO TO Q.7 5 .
(10.}0
(b) Can you tell me about that?
11.
12.
1 3 .
14.
STRi  Cl LY CONr i DCRTiAL
ASj^ALL
7 5 .(0) If you were to corn one extra pound next week, fiow iruch of it would lie 
lut.c-n off in income tax?
OR
MO’./ CHECK THAT THERE HAS BEEN 
ilO CONFUSION:
That means you would be left with 
... (pence/shillings) after income 
tax
Don't know A.” GO TO Q..7 6 .
1
1 5 16
(b) Is this less or more than tlie 
amount of tax token off each 
pound of your total income 
or what?
Leks
More
Same
Don't know
Something you worked out from your 
own pay slip
or something else
Don't know
(d) Can you go into a bit more detail or give me an 
actual example?
TAKE FULL DETAILS
1 7 . 2
4
3
1El)0
(c) You said If you earned one extra pound next week ...
(READ ‘'UT AMOUNT FROM Q.75 (a)) would bo taken off tn 
income tax:
Con you tell me how you^rcached that figure - 
wa s it:
Something you read or !ieard about 18. ?
-CONTI NUI
3
4 -
1 — CO TO Q.76,
(18,)o
I /
Î!
i )
1]
1.1
i)In[]
[]
lin
1.1
19.
20.
sïRt e n . Y  c o v n  e n r i a l
y u. ((i) M  yoü eu i ,',c d ù!, cxtr- peu ne ecxl v;uci-  ^c..:v r f it c o u ' v  ot- i r. 11, ce-inc 
lex, Ce n /uu t hink of a ri y I hi i tuj cl so you rni tjlit lose if you c u r n c d  on 
oxt fc! pou nd ?
L
2,
3.
Yc 5 
Ho
Don't know
21 . 2
J-GO TO Q.??
4/
IF ‘Yes'
(b) k'fu'jt els e  v/ould you lose?
STATE TY.'T OF LOSS AND AMOUNT
I>T1£ Amount
■ r  r,
PJ  ^ I / ' d
O R  T  / / d
t  p
O R  £ / / d
(2^100 I
IZIZ
22 23
CIZ]
28 2 9rzLZxriEi
30 31 32 33
J
3'4
77. Leaving aside things which are dedurted from 
your pay packet, is there anything else at all 
that you might lose if you earned on extra 
pound? STATE TYPE OF LOSS AKÜ AMOUNT
Amount
£____ _ _ _ _ p
Pli £ /■ / d
£  . .. ,p
O R  £  /  /  d
OR £  /  /  d
■Q
' A!
42 43 44 43
53
54 55 56
STRICTLY CONFl nnrnAl.
7fî. A1 though some people fine! it quite easy to undcrs taud the tax 
system, inauy others find it quite difLicull. V/hot do you 
understand hy the tcirn 'earned ir.core relief'? TAKF‘ F-.XACl* AMShTR,
l !
GIVE RESPONDENTS SELF-COMPLET I Dll SHEET 'D' (BLUE) TO FILL IN.
.i
79. NOW CHECK ITEM 'H‘ STANDARD RATE OF ! NCCME TAX. 
IF TICKED IN ' unchongcd/don't know' GO TO Cl.80 
IF TICKED iN 'went up' OR 'went down' CONTINUE.
I see you've ticked that the standard rate of income tax went 
(up/down); by hew much was that?
Don't know A
80. What is the standard rate of income tax in the pound now?
_p or %  ^ _____s d
Don't know A
81. The amount of money you need and the amount of money you get 
are often two different things. In your circumstances how 
much money do you reckon you need to take home in your pocket 
each week r rom work?
_p 0^ f I
59. 60
r
61. 6 2
]
T ■’f
iJ
{ :
1
D
Don't know A 6 3. 64. 6 5.
82. Does your actual take home pay vary by more than £l 
each week or docs it remain fairly steady?
F1uctuotes
Remains steady
Don't know
STRICT! Y COüriOCfn'îAl
In 111 i g Inst section wn v/ould like in tmvf' sop'o dele ! Is ?bout ycur fcrr.ily's 
c i rc.uns tnnccs so tlic-t v/c can compare the ansv/crs of people In different 
s i ; uot ior.:.. Ttiis i nf oi inat I on is v/an led for statistical purposes only and 
will be treated v/ith the strictest confidence.
COMkLkTi: liOUSkHOLb COItPOS !TiON
IF FEOPONOFNT IS ilAPPiFD, CO DP SPOUSE AS PERSON NO. 2 
CODE ADULTS FIRST, THEN CHILDREN.
Ac tuJ1 
hours 
v;or ked
V/o r kStatus
Age
W i d/Re]at ions hi p 
to
Respondent
Î Not 
Uorkingj WorkingOff i ce 
Use
Person
No, day Sep
Respondent
NOW CHECK THAT YOU HAVE INCLUDED All
CHILDREN AND RETIRED HEADERS ill THE HOUSEHOLD.
sttnu CA'’.D c
6^1 l i i c  f ' l ' ounl  t h . i t  .ir” /  p e r s o n  v;or l ’.s s o r e  t i n e s  d ep ends  on he-,.' r u c h  f c n c y  i ;;
com! ng i n t o  t f ic hcu. ' - t  I ' ro'n s o u r c e s .  C o u l d  y ou  sho.v ire t i i c  t i r o u p  on
t i l l s  c o r d  t f i o t  ( j i v c s  the; t o t a l  n n o u n t  o f  r o n e  y n o r r . M l l y  c o d i n g  I n t o  l i i c  
h o u s e  e n c h  i . e e k ,  c o u n t i n g  n i l  v.ogcs e nd  s n l o r i c s  o f l e r  d e d u c t i o n s  oruJ o t i i e r  
. t h i n g s  l i k e  f o r r . I l y  o M o - . a n c c s ,  pens i c i s  end so o n .  I f  onyoi i e i s  pu i d 
r r o n t i i K  con y o u  d i v : d r  i iy f o i j r  whrui C'dd I ng i t  In?
A. CO A
E, over £0 up to £5 D
C. over £i> up to LlO C
0. over £10 up to  C l5 D
E. over £15 up to  £20 E
F. over £20 up to  £30 F
C. over £30 up to  £^0 G
H. over £iiO up to  £50 il
1, over £50 up to CGO i
J, over £60 up to £80 J
Ki over £80 up to £100 K
L. over £100 £
Don't  kfio-// M
Co.
0
0
•0
0
69.
2
5
it
I CARD 6 :  7 ( o )  S J ©
SHOW CARD 0
8U. (e)Hov/ could you t e l l  re  i f  In the lo s t  12 months you or any member of  
your iiouschold hos received any of the a 11 owonces on th is  card? 
PROOF; Any o ther  I terns on the card? COOC BELOW
FOR EACH ALLOWANCE RECEI VED
(b)Would . . .  (a 11o.iance) be reduced or lo s t  i f  you earned one e x tra  
pound each v;eek?
18 .  19 .  2 0 .
'
t c c e  1ved
R e d u c e d /  
l os  t
hj.' t . 
r ed ' . f ced /  
1 0-.  l
Con ' t
0 2 R e n t  r e b a t e A 2 3 1
0 3 R a t e  r e b a t e 0 2 3 1
0 4 M a i n t e n a n c e  a 11 o.vance f o r  s c h o o l  p u p i l s  o v e r  15 y e a r s  o l d /  
f r e e  s c h o o l  d i n n e r s / c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o w a r d s  s c h o o l  u n i f o r m C 2 3 1
0 5 C o n t r i b u t i o n  Co.vards e s s e n t i a l  c l o t i i i n g  f o r  w o r k 0 2 3 1
0 6 Day n u r s e r y  f o r  young c h i l d r e n  a t  r e d u c e d  c o s t E 2 3 1
0 7 S t u d e n t  g r a n t F 2 3 1
0 8 L o c a l  a u t i i o r i t y  s u b s i d i s e d  b o a r d i n g  e d u c a t i o n  f o r  c h i l d G • 2 3 I
0 3 D i r e c t  g r a n t  s c i i o o l  f e e s  s u b s i d y 11 2 3 1
10 L o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  hen e  h e l p 1 2 3 1
i t L e g a l  a i d J 2 3 1
12 F a m i l y  a ! l o wa n c e s K 2 3 1
13 F a m i l y  I ncc . - a  s u p p l e m e n t L 2 3 1
14 S u p p i e m e n t a r y  b e n e f i t  ( n a t i o n a l  a s s i s t a n c e ) n 2 3 1
15 Hone N
01 D o n ' t  knew . ' 0
. J 
.1
li
! i
I
i lt )
I !
u
n
ii
J ;
SI  lU CTL Y COI ir  I Ur.NI lAL
8c, At v.'h'Dt ncje did ycu) co:np]clo you r 
fu]]-iitne schooling?
Ih and under 
1C but under 16
16 but under' 17
17 but under 18
18 and over 
Don ' t hncfw
?1. 2 
3
" 6
D
86. How many rooais do you and your family 1 room 
occupy solely? LXCI.UDE BATHPOOK,
GARAGE AND Ki rCllLNEi Tt, BUT INCLUDE 
KITCHEN BIG ENOUGH TO EAT IN.
87, Do you and your family rent this 
house, own it, or have it rent 
free from somebody?
THOSE WHO RENT
1. (a)How much is the rent for this house/ 
flat?
22. 2
2 toopmS 3
3 rooms A
4 rooms 5
9 or more rooms 6
Don't know 1
(22. ) 0
Rents 23. 3~-CONTINUE
Owns 2--GO TO Q.
Rent free 4"
-GO TO
Don't know 1_ Q.9C
(23.) 0
_P ^  L________/ _ __  /___  _d 24. ZC. 26. 27. 28?
Don't know A -GO 'TO Cl. 90
(b)How long a period does this cover? 1 week .
2 weeks
4 weeks
1 calender month 
3 calender months
Others (CODE AND STATE)
23 . 2 -
3
4
5
6
-CONTINU
(c )Docs the rent include rates?
Don't know
Yes
No
Don't know
|(%3)
_G0 TO 
0.90
0
30. Z- 
3 
1-
_G0 TO 
Q.90
| ( 3 0 . ) 0
S T R I C T ! Y CONFIDENT I AL
TflOSL WHO OWN
8 9. (a)Do you or your fomily own this house Hortgagc
wit'll a morUiaoe or is it uaid uo? . ,
" " ‘ ' Laid up
Don'L know
3 1. 2 -CONTI! I
3 -
K.
GO TO
! Q . 9 0 'Î
(b) (Do you know) how much was the last 
mort gage payment?
£ ,_ P  68 £  I L ?
Don't know A
(c )Ho w  long a period did this cover? I week 
4 weeks
1 calender month 
3 months
Other (CODE AND STATE)
GO TO 0 .9 0
3 6 . 2
Don't know
9 0. Now I would like to ask you about your leisure time.
■ SHOW CARD E
(a)'.'ould you look at this card and tell me if you have done
any of these things in tiie lost 7 days, that is since last ...
of week)? CODE 'Yes' OR 'No' FOR EACH ITEM.
FOR EACH CODED 'Yes'
(b)How many iiours did you spend at ... in the lost 7 days?
STATE OPPOSITE ACTIVITY.
FOR EACH CODED 'Yes' EXCEPT T.V. AND READING
(c)And how much did it cost you ... for that number of hours -
■ 1 mean how much did you pay out of your own pocket altogether? 
STATE OPPOSITE ACTIVITY.
4
5
E 
1
(36.) G
(day
Watching T.V. 
Read I ng
0..9 0 (a)
Done ir 
1ast 7 days 
Yes Nc^
A ' L
0.9
No. or 
hours
H
Money Cost
ii
11
] :I
II
Visiting fr i ends
Entertaining friends
Playing a sport
Watching a sport
Attending meetings of clubs 
unions etc.
Drinking (in pubs etc.) 
Going on trips 
Visiting parks, walks
Going to cinema
Other hobby
(51 ATE TYPE OR 'None' )
:tjl'
3 7 . 38.
OR C
p OR C
OR £
STRICTLY CORK lOrîiTIAl.
9}. Nov/ 1 would like to osk you about your spu.nd i ng plans,
(a)Are you yourself or tlic farsily saving to buy anything 
spec i a 1 dur I ng the pox t 1 rcon tjjs ?
V
.if- ‘ Y e s '
Yes A
No/don’t know B - GO TU Q.92
(b) V/hat is that? STATE BELOW
FOR LAC it ITEM
(c) Now n'uch do you expect will cost? 
STATE OPPOSITE ITEK.
FXRLCrED 
COST '
Q.91(h)
D E S C R I P T I O N
Of- M E M
__ ■_____P
p_R £ / /  d
£___ _____p
OR £ / /  d
£___ , __p
OR  £ / / J
T/U
1^3. 44. 4 3. 46. 47
r T T i ..
48. 4 9 . 30. 31
T/S [zo:
5 3 . 3 4 . 3 3 3 6 . 5 7 .
9 2. (a)Arc you yourself or the f am i 1 y paying ins talrr.en ts just now for any 
goods or ser'-ices bought on II, P, or .redit facilities?
Yes
No
Don‘t know
38.
3 -
Is 
(3 8 . )0
DO NOT INCLUDE HÙRTCAGES 
OR (Tv) RENTAL
4/
I F  ' Y e s '
(b) What is that for? STATE BE LOW
FOR CACN ITEM \
(c) How much was the last payment? STATE OPPOSITE ITEM
(d) And what is the period between payments? STATE OPPOSITE ITEM ‘ '
GO TO 
" Q..93
DESCRIPTION L A S T  
P A Y P E  N T
PERIOD i.LiVEEN 
P A Y M E N T S
62.OR £
OR £
■ B/N
64. 66.OR £
OR £
T/S
mipirY CKirinniTifj.. F c A W /F T  ©  8 I_
53. uu yuu or Lho fniniiy iicre ov/n or iiDve itie use of:
Own
have
or
'SC of
Ne_ij. 11C r own 
nor havc 
use of
Don ' t
know Of f i ce
3
OUT : 1
A car 9. 2 3 1 0
A refrigerator 10. 2 3 1 0 '1
A television with BiJC 2 11. 2 3 1 0
t
A wasii i ng machine 12. 2 3 1 0 ■ 1
A telcphorrc 13. 2 3 1 0
An inside V/.C. 14. 2 3 1 0 "1
Central heating 19. .2 3 1 Q
Cheque book 16. 2 3 1 0 ]
$4(a) Can you tell me if the tax man does anything to make things easier
for people to save?
Yes
No
Don't know
IF 'Yes'
17.
■'.J
[ 1
GO 11 I 
Q.S5
(17) 0 !
•1 I I’
J  I)
(b) Wiiat does he do to make it easier to save?
18.
19.
il1
95. Leaving aside people who 
tax relicf for :
are self-employed, can cmp 1 oyec- claim
•
1!
Yes No
Don ' t 
know Office
’ ll
R E A D OUT  :
H.P. Interest 20. 2 3 1 0 •J
Expense of travelling to work 21, 2 3 1 0 ]i
Mortgage interest 22, 2 3 . 1 0 ll
Life assurance premiums 23. 2 3 1 0 Î !
Baby sitter wti i 1 c the wi fe works 24. 2 3 1 0
Cost of protective clothing or
uniform . 2 5. 2 3 1 0
STRl CTl.Y C OX n DC 1:1 i AL
9 6. Hov/ much can a inarrioci woiron earn before she has to pay income tax;
OR / / d PER V/CEK
OR / / d PER YEAR
Don't know 26 27 28 29
9 7. Out of each "pound of incomo, do rich people pay raore 
or less of it in income tax, or do ail tax payers 
■ pay the same?
Rich pay more 30. 2
A!1 pay same 3
Rich pay less 4
Varies/depends 5
Don't know ‘ 1
(30.)0
EXPLAIN:
Some people have said that taxation makes it so.difficult to make 
ends meet, that they have to find ways of making more money.
Other people >0 y it's not worthwiiile work i ng because taxation is 
so heavy.
G I V E  R E S P O N D E N T  S E L F - C O M P L E T I O N  S H E E T  ' E '  ( Y E L L O W )
V/ould you look at this final sheet and tick in the box that applies 
to you on each line.
STRl CTl.Y cofin nrtrn AL
9 8.(a)(Many people in Britian Lhink that it's not worthwhile work ing overtime 
liecc'iirse taxes are so high. Before riT:k ing any reco.ittknn.ki L i oriS BL.11 L L11 e 
taxation of extra caifiings wo ncoci tcj tnwrw exact details of hours, pay 
one! deductions.) As deductions vary f rom week to v.-cck, it is alir.ost 
impossible to rcmcmbc r exact figures. On a strictly confidential 
basis could you tell me from your latest payslip wi'iat you r deduct ic-ns 
were on your most recent pay day?
JLas^ t payslip produced 
Not produced
31 . 2
3 — ASK RESPOflOLMT TO 
ESTIMATE FOLLOW ING 
DETAILS
RECORD FOLLOWING DETAILS FROM THE PAYSLIP FOR THE LAST PAY. DAY 
Income Tax £___  . p 3 2 33 3 4
National Insurance
National Insurance Graduated 
Contribution (Government Pension 
Scheme)
Any other deductions
Tax. code number
Actual hours worked 
(CONFIRM 'Actual hours')
Gross pay before deductions 
Take home pay after deductions 
Date of most recent pay received / /7i
3 6 37
r  L.
40 41
r r z z r
4 4 4 5
_____
48 ■ 4 9
L
31 5 2
I
53 5 4
C%ZT
57'
I T
5 8-----1 L 
61
_____[
62
(b) Can ! just check that these items cover one 
week?
Yes - a week 
Others (STATE)
6 3 . 2
38
4?
Ob
39
39
4 3
1
4 7
iz z :
3 0
It
'60
! J-
9 9. Do you pay income tax 
every v/cek, some v/eeks 
or never?
Every week 
Seme weeks 
Never
Others (CODE AND STATE) 
Don't know
64. 2
3
4
E
1
p i T o  ___21
100,
STRÎ  CTi  Y C O ' i n  Dr f ;T !  AL
11 inof. posfihle t'o rn'^ r«<urc the r f j r r I S of l'oxf'iiion on ihc i ncenr i vo t.o 
work unless coinplctc ond occuroCe i nf onnot ion is known for rr.ore ihon o 
single week. V/e won IJ like yon r permission lo osk your employer c'ikont 
your deduct, i on s nnd earnings.
i ' A N D  L E T T C R  T O  K L S P O . N D L I I T :
\;ould you sign Lhis I el Le r? 
You can see the letter to 
your cmployer over) eaf .
Signed letter 
Refused
101 (Some people say that this year's budget has improved 
the general climate of opinion and mode it mu re 
worthv/hilc to work. Others disagree.) V/ould '^ou say 
that the budget changes liave improved or worsened 
general attitudes towards work in Britain or what?
Has improved attitudes
No effect
Has worsencd attitudes
66.
102.
Don't kno'w
Would you say that the changes made in this year's 
budget riKide you yourself work harder, less hard, 
or that tiiey iiave had no effect?
Work harder
No effect
Less hard
Don't know
103. (a) V/hich taxes woi' I d you prefer to be cut: i ncome 
tax, or tax on things you buy?
Income tax
Things you buy
Don't know
|(6'S.)0
68. 2
CONTINUE
1-CLOSE INTERVIEV/-
(68.;0
(b) Why ... rather than
69.
7 0 .
C L O S E  I N T E R V I E W
T I M E  I N T E R V I E W E D  F I N I S H E D
71.
7 2.
C
73 7h 75
S Ï R I  CTI. Y COMr I C r U T I  AL
T O  P L  C f i K i -; T T LO B Y I N T L RV I T W E R  AL.OML  
1. Ne i ghbou rliood :
cAfio 8  ; 1 ( o )  8  (0\
Poor work Ing class 
Average - 'o: king class 
Middle class
?.. Briefly evaluate tfie respondent in terms of;
(a) Ene rgy 1cvel:
(b) V/ay home it kept:
(c) Level of prosperity
Energetic, active, bright,
alert 10.2
Ave ra gs 3
Dull, pass i ve, t Î red,
apathetic h
Cl can, t i dy 11.2
Fair 3
Untidy 4
Expensive clothes, carpets, 
new furniture, fittings, 
etc. 12. 2
Average clothes, carpets,
furn I'u re, fittings etc. 3
Old worn out clothes, 
carpets, furniture, 
fittings, etc. 4
li
,1
il
II
II
\ 1 
II I
Was anyone else present 
at the interview?
Mon-one
Pre-school children 
Older children >
Husband/wi fe 
Other relatives 
Other
If someone else present - what part, if any, v/as played 
in the interview?
13. 2 
3
■ u
14.
15.
16.
17.
]iIj1
II
I!1
1!
I)
i ;
STRl en. Y CON ri DrilTI AL
4.  Responden t ' s  a t t i t u d e  at  b e g i n n i n g  o f  i n t e r v i e w ;
Very interested
Interested
Not very interested
Antagoni S t i c  
Nervous, u n c e r t a i n
If antagonistic, nervous please explain;
18. 2
3
4
5. Respondent's attitude at end of interview:
19.
No change 20, 2
More interested, helpful 3
Less interested, helpful 4
Hurrying to get it’over 
Other
6. Are there any particular questions in the questionnaire 
where you feel the responses were not representative of 
what the respondent thinks?
21 .
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
STRl Cï\,Y CONn OnSTlAL
7, Any other connionts lielpful in I ntCM'pret i ng ihi 
1nte rvi cw:
71.
28.
29.
30.
Infill I’f I'l.moiiiii I, lit ih' Ilf ihy.iili.ttj.C; }'u<ft.]ii,, C I
UN ] V12RS1T OF STIRLING S t i r l i n g  S c o t l a n d  j t l l l i ' I i o n i : :  S t i r l i n g  O y a c ) ] ! ? ;
ï>ear Sir or Madam
Universitv of StirTinv, Work Survey
I would like to thank you for your co-operation in the 
University of Stirling, \/ork Survey. I very much appreciate 
your willintpicns to give y o w  time in answering all of our 
questions. I aia sure you agree tJiat it is important for 
us all to have a tetter understanding of how taxation affects 
people's work.
I would like to assure you -tRat the information you have given 
us wil3., under no circumsta.._es , be given or shown to anyone 
not working on the study. The answers you have given will bo 
c ombined, with the ans'wers of hundreds of others from <J.l over 
the country and it will bo completely impossible for anyone to 
identify your answers.
It is my hope that this study will load to a better understand­
ing of the British tax system and of the way that it s-ffect.t 
people. T};e time you have given in making this possible is very 
much appreciated. _ ' ,
Yours faithfully
Q  //
C V Brown
If of lUtid of D<iKTiU:-.cnl: i toft nor Ç i' llrown
Our Bcf:
U N J V E l l S r i ' Y  o r  S ' I ’ I R I - L N G  S n a L l K C  SCOTLAND I T R L r rU O N ! : :  STIRLING , '
ronFIOKMTTAT.
Dear Sir
UNJVSPSTTY OF STTRLINS T/iXATTOM STUDY
V'c are engaged in a national study of the effects of personal taxation on the 
incentive to work in the U.K. Sor:ie peon] e say that er.p].oyces won't wor k late 
because it's not vrorthvhilo after tax, while other people say that employees 
work more overtime to make up the earnings they ivive lost in tax. For this ' 
study we need accurate data of the gi'oss and net incoz.ie and tax deducted for 
the current tax wock and tax ycur of a repèresenrative cross-section of cînpj.oyed'- 
persons. ' j
One or more persons in our sample is an employee of yoiu’ firm and has given his 
or lier periTdssion for you to release the information to us. Overleaf please j 
find the letter of authorisation from your employee. 1
We shall of course treat the information which is wanted for statistical purp­
oses only, with tne strictest confidence. f
We think that greater knowledge of the British tax s;/stcm and of its d'R'*-cts is' 
well worthwhile and hope you vnMl agree, and that you will be willing to pro­
vide us with the information we need. A sta.mped addressed envelope is enclosed' 
for your convenience in replying-
If the records are not kept at this address, we would be gr 
forward thii. correspondence to the appropriate office.
May we thank you in advance for your co-operation.
Yovu'S faithfully 
Froltssor C V Brown
;eful if you would
Weekly wage/salary paid to CLiployoe on / /Y1 oV last
pay day before / /Tl. (include any holiday payments, )
tax week no.  ______
total income gross
net income tax paid
net income tax refund
National insurance flat rate
National insurance graduated pension
Other deductions
net income after all deductions
tax code no, _____
basic hourly rate (if any) 
no. of hoiu’s in basic working week 
total no, of hours actufilly worked 
including overtime (if any) 
gross bonus/incentive/piecerate, 
earnings (if any) 
gross overtime eai-nings (if any)
Total for tax year 
up to date ouuosite
150
IVf'i’f of Kioiioiiiicf, }lciid of Di-pjitminl: l^ roft nor C. I'üroiiTi
O u r  l i e f  :
UNÏVBRSÏ.TY O I‘ STÏRLÏK^G s t i u l i n - g  S c o t l a n d  | t i - l i O ' 1i o n j : : _ s t i i u j k * g  (0756)3171
CûNFïimriAl,
Area Code 
Se?.lal No,
Respondent: 
Code No.
PLE.ASE PUT YOUR EMPLOYER ' S 
NAME AND ADDRESS IN BLOCK 
CAPITALS H E R E  ..... ^
TO
Dear Sir
The University of 8tirlinjc.is conducting a stucD on work, attitudes and 
the effects of taxation on the incentive to work, My nairio has been 
selected at random for this stimule.
Tliey need to know, in.stilctest confidence, about igv deductions and 
pay. Would you please give then the irj Formation asked for overleaf
Yours faithfully
Please sign here
Please write your 
name in BLOCK C/d^ITALS 
here--------------------
Please write your 
sec lion or employee 
number here to help 
your employer identify 
you exactly  ___________
SI'LL-rnpid n ‘i nn ' n'
PLEASE TICK IN ONE BOX ON LAC 11 LINE
IN 1971 THESE MEASURES CAME INTO [ELECT:
WENT UP UNCUANGEO/DON'T KNOW \,'ENE DOWN
A. PURCNASL TAX 58.
B. NATIONAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS 39.
C. SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENE TAX 60,
D. EARNED INCOME RELIEE (under
£4,000 p.n.) 61
E. EARNED INCOME RELIEE (over
£4,000 p.a.) 62
E. WIFE'S EARNED INCOME RELIEF 6 3.
G. PERSONAL ALI.OV/ANCES 64.
U. CHILD ALLOWANCE 6 5.
I. OLD-AGE PENSION 6 6.
J. SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFITS 67-
K. DUIA' ON SEER, SPIRITS 6 8.
L. DUTY ON TOBACCO 6 9.
M STANDARD R.ATE OF INCOME TAX 70.
Area Code
Address Serial No.
Respondent No,
-2
-2
-2
"3
] ' ■  [
-3
ü
-3
-3
-3
-4
I I  J
-4
-4
-4
-4
-4
n - nM ""i f
-4
-4
C O M P L E T  i Oi l
IV 1 llH. i'i t/\L 152
T a x  b a s  m a r i e  me. g i v e  u p  a 
s e  c o u  il j o b  o r  p a i d  s i d e l i n e
f \ I *-
a p p l y /  
n c  i t l ' i c r
T n x  l i a s  m o d o  m e  t o  k e. o  
s e c o n d  j o b  o r  p a i d  s i d e l i n e
T a x  h a s  m a d e  r e  w o r k  m o r e  
o v c  r  t  i me
D o e s n ' t  
a p p l y /  
n e  I t h e r
T a x  h a s  m a d e  m e  w o r k  l e :  
o v e r t  t m er
. T a x  h a s  m a d e  m e  w o r k  l e s s  
h a r d  o n  a  b o n u s  s c h e m e
D o e s n ' t  
a p p l y /  
n e i  t h o r
T a x  h a d  m a d e  me w o r k  h a r d ;  
o n  a  b o n u s  s d i e  me
T a x  l i a s  m a d e  m e  s e e k  
p r o m o t  1 o n
D o e s n ' t  
oppl y/ 
n e i  t i l e r
T a x  h a s  m a d e  m e  n o t  s e e k  
p r o m o t  i o n
T a x  h a s  m a d e  me l o o k  f o r  
a n o t h e r  j o b  w i t h  b e t  l e t  p a y
f
D o e s n ' t  
a p p l y /  
h e  i t h e r
[
T a x  h a s  m a d e  me n o t  l o o i i  f o r  
a n o t h e r  j o b  w i t h  b e t t e r  p a y
T a x  h a s  m a d e  m e  p o s t p o n e  
e a r l y  r e t i r e m e n t
D o e s n ' t  
a p p l y /  
n e t  t h e r
T a x -  h a s  m a d e  m e  s e e k  
e a r l y  r e t i r e m e n t
A r e a  C o d e
A d d r e s s  S e r i a l  N o .
R c s p o n d e . - . t  N o .
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
M:i.F-coiii-i,rTi(.ii 'c
" IT i )
Doesn'f
agree agree apply/ disaoree disagre
0 loi a lilt le neither o little a lot
13' My r.taridord of living has risen 
in 'lie. last 5 years
- 2 ] -= r
16, I could ,'0 rk harder at rny job ,
than 1 do v/ithont making myself j |
i 1 1
17. If I work harder 1 am offei'cd 
less over litre
18. I feel under pressure from my 
nearest workiroCcs to work 
faster
19. High deductions from try pay 
mean that 1 have to work, 
overt irne to make ends meet
46.
4 7 .
48.
r n  -3 r '
-2
- 4
-3
2 0. 1 have to work overtime because ,---^
It's difficult to say 'no' to -2
my boss *-- 1 4— -
2 1. i feel under pressure from my 
nearest workmates to work 
sI ower
-4
22. I have to do odd jobs at home   ^
in order to save on decorations ^jj _y 1 “3 I "4
and repairs etc. j_{ |__ J L J
2 3. My neighbours are better off j Lp | | -3
than 1 am ' I_ _ I 1_ _ J
.4
24. I wish ! had more leisure time 
after work -4
time here
2 6. The overall level of taxation 
was lowered in tiie April budget
2 7. If I work less hard I am 
offered more overtime
2 8. ! can control how much work I 
do each day
O-
= 0
57[~1-2 j I -3 n  '4
I I I it L » .«J il I-I j
-6
!.. r
□ - . 5  □ - !
■'6
. - J " ’ L
n  -5 r n  &I i
2 5. I chose tfiis job because I knew --- - -- ,   -^--
I would not have to work over- 5 4. -2 I-3^  -4 j -!
L« * I ——"I.' —* * I- ■ i 3 . ....
□
□
GrujjCrU'U'i rriRM 'c‘
U)
Î r- I ; r 1 nf c 1 n V p r',-'r. r, Î t; 1)01 it" work. lUfwiso- Dut’a 11 ck i o the box that 
comas closest lo how you feci about the stalcmcnt. For cxumplc : >•
Doesn't
a g r e e  a g r e e  a p p l y /  c l i s e g r e e  c J i s n g i ’ e e
0 j o t  a l i t t l e  n e i  t h e r  _ a l i t t l e ;  a l o t :
 ^ 1 like i.y work I___I IkYJ 1_ J I__ J 1__ J
Use the box marked neither if you arc not sure wlictlier you agree or not or if
the statement does not apply to you. Please put down your first reactions
without thinking too much about each statement.
Doesn't
agree agree apply/ disctgrec disagree
a lot a little neitiier a little a lot
1. I chose this job because I knew 
that I could get overt ir.,e. here
2. 1 am liable to lose my friends 
at work if I work faster
3. ! do not really want promotion
h. High deductions from my pay
mean that I don't work touch 
overtime because it's not 
worthwhile
5. My work group is in favour of a 
pf ! ccewo r k i nccu t i ve, s cheme
6. 1 enjoy doing odd jobs about my 
house
7. I have to work overtime because 
I need the r.ionoy
JO. I I -2
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
-2
-2
1- Î
-4 
-4
-4 
I -4
1 -4
1
8. I worry sometimes about redundancy37. | j -2 |" j “3 ■ [' | -4
9. I feel better off since my last |— | .,2 [ ] -4
□ -
FT'
10. If I see the work being badly 
organised 1 keep quiet about it
11. I soon get bored if I have a lot
of free time after work
12. Management is considerate to the 
cmp]oyees
13. if v/o all worked harder in our 
department wc cculd work 
ourselves out of a job
14. The friends I mix v/i th in my
leisure titre are worse off tiian 
I am
40. j J -2 I J -3 I ~| -4 
o Q .  Q - 3
□ - 
n-
~4
-4
-5
Area Cod. Addres s 
Serial f.o.
□ - 
□ - 
I
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(v;
Tiilrik of l'.r'. rajority of the people tluat 
you work with r . o . - i or the people you meet 
if! connection \;itfi your work. How v/e 1 ! 
docs each of the following words describe 
th.csc people? In the space beside each 
word below, circlet
Y^ if it describes the people you work
w i t h
^ if it does MOT describe them
? if you cannot decide
1 P E O P L E ON Y O U R  P R E S E N T  J O B
. YES NEtTHEF NO
S11 mu luting V V N
Boring Y ? N
S ] ovi Y ' K
Ambitious V ? N
Stupid Y ? N
R e s  p o n s  i b)e Y ? N
E a s t Y ? N
t ntc. 1 1 i gent Y ? N
E a s y  t o  m a k e  e n e m i e s Y ? N
Talk t o o  much Y ? N
Smar t V '? N
Lazy Y ? N
Unpleasant Y ? N
No privacy Y ? N
Act i ve Y ? N
Narrow interests Y ? N
Loya ] Y ? N
Hard to meet Y ? N
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
CARD 10 
1 0 .
11.
12 .
13.
14.
15.
16\
17.
18.
19.
7 (P 8 @1 9.
SELf_-r_oMPi.rnoj4 'a ' 
( T v ) " ............ .
Thi nk of the liind of v> upc rv i s i on tlmt you get 
on you. jc.b, how v/e I i does each of ll'.e 
follov/ing i.ords describe this supervision?
In the xToce beside cocii word below, circle.'
if it describes the supervision you 
got on your job
if it does HOT describe it
if y0 u cnnnot dec Ide
suplrvisiom on present job
YES NEITHER NO
Asks'rry advice Y 9 N 51.
Hard to please Y î N 52.
1mpoli te Y ? N 53.
Praises good work — , Y - ? N 54.
Tactf u1 Y ? M 55.
1nf1 uent i al Y ? H 56.
Up-to-date Y ? n 57.
Doesn't supervise enough Y ? N 58.
Quick tempered Y ? N ■ 59.
Tells me where 1 stand Y ? N 6 0 .
Annoying . Y ? N 6 1 .
Stubborn . Y . ? N 6 2 .
Knows job wc1i Y ? N 63.
Bad Y ? N 64.
Intel 1 i gcn.t Y ? U 6 5 .
Leaves me on my own Y ? N 6 6 :
Around when needed Y ? N 6 7 .
Lazy Y ? N 68,
Please go on to the. next page
S E L r y C O M l ' ! . ! : ] '  I O N  ' A '  
" ( i l ' i l
T h i n k  o f  t h e  o p p o r  t u n  i t  i c s  f o r  p r o i v o u i o n  t h a t  
y o u  h a v e  n o w .  h o w  v/o. 1 1 d o n s  e a c h  o f  f i v e  
f o l l o v / i r u j  w o r d s  d e s c r i b e  l i i c s c ?  i n  t h e  s p n c c  
b e s i d e  e n c i i  \ / o r k  c i r c l e :
Y f o r  ' Y e s '  i f  i t  d e s c r i b e s  y o u r  0[ j p o r t u n  i t  i e  
f o r  p r o r . i O t i o n
N f o r  ' N o '  i f  i t  d o e s  N O T  d e s c r i b e  t h e m
i f  y o u  c a n n o t  t l c c i d c
O k P O R T U r l l T l f S  FOR P R OM OT I ON
Y E S N E I T H E R NO
G o o d  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  
p r o m o t  i o n Y , ? N
O p p o r t u n  i t y  s o m e w h a t  
1 i r n i  t o d Y > H
P r o m o t i o n  o n  a b i l i t y Y ? K
D e a d - e n d  j o b Y ? M
G o o d  c h a n c e  f o r  p r o m o t i o n Y ? N
U n f a i r  p r o m o t i o n  p o l i c y Y ? N
I n f r e q u e n t  p r o m o t i o n s Y ? N
R e g u l a r  p r o m o t i o n s Y ? K
F a i r l y  g o o d  c h a n c e  f o r  
p r o m o t  i o n Y ? N
4o.
4].
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
G o  o n  t o  t h e  n e x t  p a g e
Thiitk of tlie p.-.'Y you get new. Mow we 1 1 dons each of the 
foncwlnc; \/orc’:. describe your present pay? !n the space 
beside each word, circîo;
Y if it describes your pay 
N if it docs NOT describe it 
? If you cannot decida
PRESENT PAY
YEo NEITHER NO '
1n c o m e  a de q u a t e  for normal 
e x p en s es Y ■j- N 29.
S a t i s f a c t o r y  p rofit s h a r i n g Y ? N 30.
B a r e l y  live on :n c o m e Y ? N 31.
Bad Y • ? N 32.
Incorr.e p rovides lux ur i es Y ? N 33.
1n s c c u r e Y ? N 34.
Less than 1 d e s e r v e Y ? N 35.
H i g h l y  paid , Y ? N ' 36.
U nder pald Y ? N ' 37.
Now please turn to the next page
S T R I C T L Y  c . o s r I
( Î )
Tliinl: of your present woi';. What is it like frost 0>f the^  
tif./e? In LiiO space besice each wort! given below, circ.loi
for 'Yes' if it. describes your work 
N for 'No' if it does NOT describe it 
? if you cannot decide
WORK ON F'KCSENT JOB
Go on to the next pt/ge ....
CARD 3 7. @  o. @
YES NEITHER NO
Fas cl not i ng Y ? N 9.
Routine Y ? N 10.
Sat Î sfying Y ? N 11.
Borina Y ? N 12.
Good Y ? N 13.
Croat i ve Y ? N 14.
Respected ■ Y ? N 15.
Hot Y ? N 16.
Pleasant Y ? N 17.
Useful Y ? N 18.
T i resume Y ? 19.
Healthy Y ? N 20.
ChalIcng ing Y ? N 21.
On your feet Y N 22.
F rustrat i ng Y ? N • 23.
S impie Y ? N 24.
Fndi css Y ? N 25.
Gives sense of accompl i sk.mont Y ? N 2 6 .
Area Code 
Address Serial No. [ i_Zj
I I
Respondent No. 1__
CARO J:
V/üteffing T.V.
IVjfKÜng
Visiting friends 
Enter to in Ing friends 
Ploying n sport 
\7atching o sport
Attending mecuings of cinbs, unions, etc. 
Drinking (in.pubs etc.)
Going on trips 
Visiting perks, v/alks 
Going to ci noma 
Other hobbv
iti gh deduct i ons f roin r.iy pcy n.cc, 
, that I have to \/crk overt i me to 
make ends meet.
; g!i dccSuc tiens from rny [jay moan 
much overtime 
not worthv/hilc.
that I don’t 
because it's
Mr. A
1 always work overtime when the 
opportunity arises
Pal n t i ng/v.'nri paper i ng
P1 asfc r i ng/piurnbi ng
I sometimes work overtime wiien tfic 
opportunity arises
Joi ncry/carpcntry 
Electrical work
1 never work overtime when the 
opportunity arises
Repair or service car
Gardening
There are no opportunities for over 
time'in my job
Scwi ng./knl 11 i ng
Cook Ing/bnki ng
Cl ean i ng/iiouscwork
Otfier work about the tio
CARD C •CARD D
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I. 
J. 
K. 
L.
£0
over £0 up to £5 
over £5 up to £10 
over £10 up to £15 
over £15 up to £20 
over £20 up to £30 
over £30 up to £40 
over £40 up to £50 
over £50 up to £60 
over £60 up to £80 
over f.80 up to £100 
over £100
Rent rebate
Rate rebate't
Ha i ntenonvu allowance for school pupils 
over 15 years old/frcc schbol dinners/ 
contribution towards school unifor.m
Contribution towards essential clothing 
for wurk
Day nursery for young children at 
reduced cost
Student grant
Lc)cal authority subsidised hoarding 
education for child
Direct grant school foes subsidy
Local authority home help
Legal aid
Family allowances
Family 1 ncor,,e supp 1 ement
Suppl etr.en la ry ber,c f i t (natis-cijl 
ass i s tance)
l> ,-p i;rS i'U »! c f  }k i> iio i,. !c i,  ) ! i c ;l (■ /D^y’^ ih . '.c n :; /'.v/uj n C V
XJ N IVliïlS IT  y OP STIRLING sTiia.iK’C s c o t l a m ’ d  | t j ; l ] : p ] ) O n b : STiia.JM’C ( o ' c c )  3 :71
Iteav Sir or Haciemi
university of Stirling Vorl: Survey
IJliir. letter .^'ill introduce M vho is
vorting for r.e on a national study of attitudes tov/ards 
vork. I -i/oulcl rery much appreciate it if you vouJ d tuisvrer 
the questions she will ask on itiy hehalf.
Your address is one of about 10,000 that have been picked at 
random fjcom the electoral rcgi stars. If our study is to be 
truly representative of attitudc.-s througr.out the cotmtry, it 
is important that \;c obtain the views of people whose address cm 
have been picked and I would be mc-t grateful for y o w  co­
operation.
1 can assure you that yoiu' acisvers will be treated as iîTRÏCTÎjY 
COHFIItbllTIAL. None of your answers will be given or si:own to 
anyone not working on this project. It will never be possible 
for anyone to identify any of your answers in any way,
lliank you for your co-operation. '
Yours faithfully 
C V BrowTi
IGü
f '  I I f -  'X' t •r'ti*'"/- , I p ^  I /" t.
,>Ui' .' 1 I ! i.' I 1' u V -  ‘
Address r.eriol no.
Respondent no,
(if ony)
1ntcrv iewer
Supervisor
Dote
Ser t  n i l.'o.
IS71.
CARD
/• C D  !
16: 7. 0  8. Çg )
Constî tuent y 
Al en Code
I ntcrv i cv.'cr 
Code No.
9 10 li 12 13
14 15 16 17
ASK OF PERSON MHO REFUSED ONLY IF ilE/SHE IS SELECTED ELIGIBLE RESPONDENT
SHQV/ CARD A
Would you just tell me v/hich of the stotcmcni 
on this cord applies to you?
Alwoys v/ork overtime wlien 
the opportunity nrises
S omo. t i file s v/o r k ovc r t i ric v/h e ri 
the opportunity arises
Never v/ork overtime when the 
opportunity arises
No opportunities for ovcr- 
11 me
Any oth.cr answey ST7,TE
8.
Don ' t knov/
8' Show CARTOON CARD
People have different ideas about the v/ay deduct-ions affect 
the amount of v/ork they do. here you see is one point of 
view (POINT TO NR.A). The man soys that high deductions 
from his pay mean that he doesn't work much overt imc because 
it's not v.or 1 hv/ii i 1 e . (f^ OINT TO MR. B ). tkit the othci; man 
argues that tl/e high deductions mean iie has to v/ork more ovei 
time to make ends meet. Which would you agree with?
Agree v/ith Mr. A
Agree v/i th Hr. B
• lie I ther/doesn ' t anpl y
19 . 2
3
4
TO OF COÎiPLFTFD BY IIITFRVIFWFR ALONF
BUASON roB n r r u s A i
l.(a) Reason given for refusal .
GET AS MUCH DETAIL AS ROSS'BLF FSMLCIALLY IF RlSPONDENT Ci, A IMS LACK OF 
TIME
(b) 1 n I e. r y i ewer's interpret: at Ion of rea son f o r_ r of
20 ,
2J
22.
23.
DETAILS OF PERSON WHO RFFUSFD
2. Sex : Hal e 
Femal c
24.
3. Estimated age : Under 15 
15 - 24 
25 - 44 
45 64
65 or over
2 5.
4. Briefly evaluate the, person who refused in ternis of;
(o). incTilX :
( b )  W a y  h o n ic  i s k e p t
( c )  L e v e l  o f  p r o s p e r  t t y :
Energetic, active', bright, alert 26. 2
Average 3
Duj1, passive, tired, apathetic 4
Don't know - 1
Clean, tidy 2 7 . 2
F a i r  3
Untidy 4
Don't know ' 1
Expensive cloLlres, carpets, new 
furnjturc, fittings, etc. 28, 2
Average clot lies, carpets,
furniture, fittings etc. 3
Old worn out clothes, carpets
furniture, fittings etc. 4
Don't know ]
5. (a) Is I he person who refused the selected 
cliqible person?
IF 'No'
(b) Estima led rcl at ionsh, 1 p to eligible 
person:
Person who refused is «
Yes
Don't know
husbond 
Wife 
F at her 
Mother
Brothcr/5 i stei 
Other
Don't Know
30.
DETAILS OF FAMILY/HOUSE 
6,(a) Children in household? Dçfirîtcly, yes 
Probably, yes
31
Don't know
Probably, no 
Definitely, no
(b) Estimated no. of adults in household 1 adult
2 adults
3 adults
h or more adults 
Don't know
32.
7,(a) Type of house
(b). Council or not
Detached 33. 2
Semi"detached 3
Terraced 4
Flat 5
Other 6
Definitely council 3 4. 2
Probably council 3
Don't know 4
Probably not.
council 5
Dc f i n Î t e1 y not
council , 6
(c) Nc i glibourhood Poor working class 3 5. 2
Average working 
cl ass
Middle class
■3
4
rum>yn:\/i:iî3 INSTRUCTIONS
DOÜUMUUTS TO US USUD OH TUTS SUilVSY
Addronn Liutu 
Contact Shectu 
Quonlionoai res
Prompt Cai-da (one cet, plus one se us rate card) 
Ajipointciont Cards 
Letters of Inti'cniuct.ion 
i'cns
}'UR1’03L Of- VUE rüJRVÏOr
This surs'cy \;hich ve are conducting for the University of 
Stirling is to investigate the offoct of direct taxation on the 
incentive to v/ork - to see liov much people knov/ about tlic tax 
system and v.diat effect income tax lias on the Jioura they v/ork, tho 
effort they put in and so on.
As v/ith most of our surveys, although we are able to tell you the 
reason frr the survey. YOU ITuST NOT HliL'fAL ITS PU'IPOSE TO THE 
RESPONDENT.
GENERAL SUEEAHY OP YOUR TASK
Basically your task v/iTl be as follows:-
(1) You have been given a list of addresses. You iraist not 
interview any^diero else.
(2) At each address you contact t. responaiblo adult and 
collect details about the employment, of people living at 
that address,
(5) You th.en go through a selection procedure to establish v/hich 
person, if any, you should interviev/.
(4) You then interviev/ the selected person if.he/she is
present, or make an appointment to call back and see him/her,
THE CONTACT i ROCEDirRE
(1) Your Address Lists give for each address;
an Address Serial No,
a list of the people shown in the '
Electoral Register as living at the address
a "Starting Ho."
an "Interval Ho,"
(You can ignore the columns headed living hero/v/orking/receivoB 
. pviy v/eekly).
(?) Boforo at tcmrtrx' roni.U';! At an Address recotxl 
on iî;c address,
consti.iuoncy, Area Codo, Address Serial Ho. and 
yoii'r ovrn r.Ar;,e and code no.
Then tum to- the hirk pj^ the_CqrM^ ^^
Record ttio Starting No. and Jnlerval No. for that 
oddress, and fill in the curnor.er; and Christian namea 
of the r-rople listed on yonr Address List.
(5) Contact a responsible adult and use the Introduction 
given on tlie front of your Cont'-ct Shdet. Note tliat 
you nay you are from the University of Stirling, 
not BERB,
(4) "Turn to the back of the Conte:ct Sheet and collect
the f ol lowing in f 0 m at ion about tlie people you have listed 
for that address;
(a .i .) Go dov-ai the list of pecnile, asking for each :
*Boco,... .still live isere?' F(,r people still living 
at the address put a tick in oolurm 1 next to their 
name, and cross out the names of c.ny peo^ylo vho 
no longer live at that address.
(a,2.) Go down the list of people whose names you have 
not crossed out, asking for each 1 'Does....normally 
v;ork a total of 8 hours or more over a week? '. Put a 
tick in column 2 against the names of those who do normally 
work a total of 8 hours or n;ors over a week; cross out 
their names if they do not; and put 'D.K, ' if your 
informant does not know.
(a.5 .) Go dovsv the list of , people whose names you have 
not crossed out (including tlioss with 'D.K.')
.asking for each, 'has,..been to work sometime in the past 
7 days?' If 'Yes', tick; if 'No' cross out, and if 
•don't Icnow ' put 'D.K.'.
(a,4 .) Go down the remaining names, asking 'Is...,, 
an employee (that is not self-ca%;loyed )? ' Tick, 
cross out or put 'D.K,' against each name,
(a.5,) lastly go down the remaining names, asking
'Does,,.receive his/her pay weekly?'. Tick, cross out or
put 'D.K.', against each name.
J
I!
f'i
Note that you should go down the names each time rather than 
asking all the questions of one person and then going on to 
the next. This is because the information required becomes 
more personal towards the end of the scries of questions 
and tills personal inforimtion is best left until last.
i i
(5) Next check whether there is mvono else abed 10 or over 
living at t'no address. If so, enter tiieir surnames
chrn fitian /laMOM on tho Contact and aok Quoati.orin A.2. to A.J3<
mul fo].]0o' thv name procedure ao you did for the other }/joplu.
It io TÎ'lfOhTAîrp to rr!::;e:;'.bor vhen llf'.tin;; pioj'ilo at an addreea that 
your list a):ould IdCnUuh ALL AiVJ],TS AGKD 13 OH OVE.H LIYlhT, AT Trio 
A])DHl:SS, not just the people in the household to v.'hich you have be 
led by the tuunaae on your Addraaa hi at.
n
(6) Having obtained a complete lict of adults living at the addreriOj 
ignore any naroa wliicli you liave crossed out, and nurber the 
rei:,ain In g na Lie T: in alphabetical order a tart Jug vith 1,
(7 ) Next chock the Starting îîur.ber for the address. If you have u°od
the Starting h'urr.bcr when nunibering people in alphabetical order, then 
the person 1 i a ted ayrdnst the Starting Kunber i 3 01 i gibj. b. for inter /low 
Cc,g, if the Starting huir/oer is ) and you nave nu::,cored people up to 4» 
then the pei'son to v;};o:a you gave the number ’5' is eligible- for 
interview). ] f you have not ua^ 'd the Si;a]'ting î-iur.ber when numbering
people, then do not take an inter/iep at that addrera (c ,g , if 
the Starting Humber is ) and you have only been )eft with 2 people 
that you numbered).
(8) If you have someone listed aga-’nst the Starting Number,, continue
by add-inr the In' e:rval ?:emb.er ttie Starting Number, and see
' whether there i e ■ ■v.yrne lir-.tcd against this ne\'' numb or, I f the re
is. then this sec one rerson is eli.gible for in te zvxew,
If you find a second person, eligible for i.ntere'\^ iew; add the Interval 
Humber again and see whether there is anyone at the number you 
fti'i'ive at*
Continue adding the Intein-'al Number until you arrive at the point 
• where there is no one listed ^.gainst the now number,
(9) Thus when you have completed the back of yopr Contact Shoot one of 
three possible situations will have emerged a
(i) You take no interview at that address, (The
section 'Ii'uaibsr end Hesulto of Calls' tells you 
how to record this),
(il) You find one person who is' ebgible for interview,
in which case you should ask to speak to and attempt 
to interview, that person. If nccessai.y make mi 
appointment to call back, filling in and Ics-ving 
an Appointment Card,
(iii) You find more than one person who ia eligible for
interview. (The Section 'Kultiplo Interviews ’ gives 
the procedure for such addresses).
! Il
NUlNrd'H A];i) RiCbT.TS OF CALLS:
V/hon recording the recuit of each call use. one of the. following 
set phrases, if possible:
To obLain interview
Interview obtained 
2 Interviews obtained
Fui'thcr appointment for (date/ticic)
• Î 
; 1
:f ermation 11
---------------------------------------------- ji
;]
Unless you got co-operation or a refusal, you stiould make aO/ifitl'. 
^iree^calir at each address in order to try to get the household 
inforaation which enables you to decide v/hich person, if any, is 
eligible for interview. These should of course be on different 
clays at different times. j I
On the front of your contact sheet you should record under section T|
A ('Result of calls to collect House'nold infer,tic;;'), the tins = j
and date of cad; of tl;ese calls, your code number and the result 
of each call* '
!]
(bucceosful and) interview obtained
(Successful and) appointment for . . . (dato/tine) ||
(Suv sossful but) no interview required
(Successful but) 2 interviews required ?]
Premises empty _
Ib'eniisGS demolished
No reply ^
No responsible adult available
. 11
Occupants/selected person known to be avmy until , . . , ;• {
Household information incomplote , :
Refused to give household information  ^ . |]
Refused intoiviev with selected rerson .
i!
II
E !
Having selected a person for interview, you should make at least 
three further calls in order to ti’y to obtain an interview with 5,
that person.
Record the details of tiiese calls under Section B on the front of 
the contact sheet, using one of the following p);rases to indicate 
the results : '.
171
Haspoivlunt not eligible at Clieck Questio: 
No rcpiy
Ke fus e cl in i, o rv i c w
Kin/J'IPÎÆ IHTKRvrvy/g
At ft small proportion of addresses it vill be necessary to intcrvi cv; 
nox'O than one person. In such cases the people solc;cted must bo 
interviewed, siniultaneously, otherwise the first person intcrvierred 
would be likely to x'evca.1 infoi'matiot; to the second which could well 
influence the second person’s answers.
At addrasos whore two people are selected fo3’ interview, explain to 
your contact tliat you would like to co::io back th another intervi.ewor 
to interview both people. Do not make a. definite time and date to call 
again, but ascertain alternat]ve times when they are both likely to be 
at lioaic together. If they iire on the telephone, got their telephone ' 
number*
Them contact your Area Office who will make arrangements for another 
interviewer to go back vith you.
It is possible, although unlikely, tliat more them i-wo people are 
celocted for i ziterview at one addr"so. V/h.at arrazsgements we make if 
this does occur vill depend ujion the paj'Licular ci rc urns tances, .no 
contact your Area Office as soon as you c-an a n d  wn will see I'lov we can 
best handle the situation.
It will, of course, help your Area Office to make arrangements for 
multiple interviews if you all keep the: Office informed of the days on 
which you yourself are likely to be free.
(iv) In.çi j iuti ons
By institution vc> r'.oan hot'O.n, public bon;us, b'oax'ding 
iion.'U's ox* hostolfg hoapitr.ls, old people’:; bomoo, nursi;p-j 
hox-.oo or prison:>J ochoola, col logos wid oIIm.t similar eai- 
ublifdr.icntF..
In moat cases, if tlicre is an institution on your- Address 
List, you will )iave boon given t)ie name and address of tliO 
institution and a copy of t)io jwrt of the Electoral Hcgi:;tor 
vdiicii siiows all the doctors listed for the institution. In 
ft fo’.,' cases you laay find a s;adl institution has boon listed 
on your address list in the norir.al way,
At an institution you should obta,i)i a coinrilcte list of all 
aduH s aged 13 or. over living tliorc, and, as with homes that 
are divided into flats or fl.atlcts, you do not need to got 
the working details of everyone. You just got tlie full lint 
and select a person(o) using tho starting nuinber and interval 
nirnber. Then you interview this person if lie answers' yes'" to 
all the ch%k questions vdwn you actually contact him*
Pleaso note that your list of adults sliould include aill in- 
nates and also owners / managers / caretalcers etc, living at 
the institution.
Noimially at an institution one of the people in charge will 
have a complete list of the people living tijorc. Theroforo, 
to make your task easier, you should first ootablish wl;oth.er 
such ft list exists and if so ask permission to in:,pact it.
If no such list exists or you <ire unable to see it, you s'noul;.. 
use your copy of hue list of electors as a basis from which 
to begin, crossing out and adding naiaes to this list.
THE ”14 DAY" RULE
In all that has been said so far we have talked about people "living at 
the address". In some circun'.stancos, particularly \:iti; institutions like 
boarding houses and hotels, but also wit}; people v/};o are away frn;:i );o." e , 
it will not be clear to the Hespondcnt v/.ho should be counted as 'living 
at the address'. Tho I’ulo .hero is tiia.t arp,'onG counts at a particular 
address
(i) if they normally live there and are present when you make
your call
(ii) if tl.ey normally live there, rij-o av/ay at present, but are
expected to rotrwn w.i thin , 1,' days,
(iii) if they do not normally live tiicre but arc kivLn-: there
Affbhrf ly and r re exoocted 11# go on l.iv:ny Ihere for ih"-
next It davs.
Il
krhe th;.:; o::k j J >
In the normal run of cnr.rr. you will fin.i I h a I Uio .ackh'oun you hove boon
given is occiuncul by one }'<c>uscliold, Howover, there aro four r.ai n oxcopt-
ions :
( i)  Tonr.;non1 o ( h o o t l a n d  o n l y )
For t-e.nenen-ts your kidrosu list will give r. description of tho 
part of the tenor.ent we arc intorostxid in (e, g , under 
'ih.L’CTOivb ’ it will be identified at houses j/?). You should
go only to Die accommodation ind ic.ited, Th.e first of tl,e two
figiueo indictiie.s tb.e floor and the second figure the nut.ijci of 
tlu; 'house ' star ti ug numbering from the left and continuing 
clochwi se, Thus 3/2 means thi;.\l floor, second 'house* on 
left going clockwi sc.
You should go to the 'house= indicated and treat it in tho
nornv'l way, except that no names are given, so you will have to
ask tho person you contact to give you t};o names of all pCiop^e
aged 13 or over living at tuat 'house *, 11
(ii) Two hpUGoholds sharing a dwelling
: I
Nowadays you find young married couples living with their
pax'onts. If tho young couples take .cals wit)i their parents
and pool the household expenses, they are considered one liouc..- ;}
hold. If, on the other hand, tiiey budget and cater oopai'ately ;|
they form separate households.
! |
Even if they form separate house}.olds, when completing your -1
contact slioot you sliould list everyone at Die address i.e. 
liotli 'nouseliolds. In such a case you will probably be able !'
to get all Die details about both iiousclaolds from the person j.
you contact.
i'l
(iii) A liouse subdivided into flats/flatlets ^
Vmere Die flats l.ave been given a so para to number or letter [ |
in the Electoral Register, your Address List will direct you ii
to a particiDrir flat and you Dien list on your Contact Siic-ot 
only the occuivants of that flat (e.g. Flat 1, 16 King Street, : Tj
or 43A Queen Street;. ' [j
however, wlicre a house is subdivided into flats but Die 1
Electoral Register does not show sepai'ate niLmbers or letters * *
for each flat, your' Address List will direct you to ti'sc house 
and will list all the doctors from evei'y flat. In sued; cases '
we are interested in Die wiiole address oven if w}ion you got k
tliere you find D;e flats arc separately numbered or lettered *
However, Die procedure at sucli an address is sligiitly easier
for you. Here you obtain full information on who lives there
but you do not n.eed to obtain ovcr;/ones ‘ vorkin.g details, |
Using your contact sheet you cross out cUiyone not living Diere '
and add in t;;e names of anyone not listed wiio is aged Ip
01' over f'-nd 1 ; vos ti.ore. Ti'.ei;, liavir.g num.be rod everyone in ’
alpîiaboticcl crcer, you celect for in-..ervi ew the person on the '
starting nur.}?r. Trie add ' he into rva 1 r.umler and if D;cro io
anyone ago.ir.st trus nur.ibor you solcct Diem for intorvi e\.', Hcwevei',
who } ou xci.ually ta ko' .ta intervicv,' oï' not doper, is upon the
]'0ison 's c - n 0T's to Die clioc.-: questions on the front of Die
qu^stionnnir-o w’s-an you actu-.Dly contact him.
'The 'nuesii onnaire ' is really a oct of documenta v/hich you will require 
during tho intc:.'v;i cv/, |
(i) First is Dic main (white) questionnai re giving the qucstiona v/liich
you are to ask of the respondent. |
(ii) Then thox-o are five self--completion questionnaires printed on
coloured paper, v/hicr; you will be giving to the respondent -g.
at various points in the interview* j
(iii) Next is a letter which the responcont is asked to sign, giving
penrission for his employer to reveal certain details aboux i'.is ;
pay.
(iv) And lastly, there is a letter, which you leave at the end of the ?
intervic./ and which Dianks tiie respondent for his co-opeinitiofi. j
The questionnaire, although perhaps longer thiui tho majority which you '
use, is fairly straightforward but we v/ould drav/ your attoî;tion to |
the following pointsÎ
Front page
(i) The- fil at thing to notice about the front pag;c of the questionnaire I {
is that there is no place for you to record the name and ad.vlï'oss 
of the person you interview. This is intended to reassure tho 
respondent that the ans'wci'ohe fp.vcs will remain anonymous. | j
Obviously, with no ncjnc and address, should tho various documents 
relating to a I'cspondont boo me dot/ichod. at any stage we have to 
. have some way of knowing which documents go togethoj'. V/e need |
three pieces of information to do tb.ic i the n ad dress
serial nr.rhor which arc given on your add reap lists, and the '
respond or t number, v/hich is the numtbor wliich you gave to the I
rcspor.dcr.t when nurbcrir.g people cn your contact sheet. IT IS 
THSÎknOHE IhfORTAHT THAT THE AuhA CODE, ADDIh/oS SERIAL ' ■
AND EESFCNDENT NUMBER ART RECORDED ON NVFRY- DOCUMENT.
(ii) Please note that Die way your -record your ovoi code, number ia 
slightly different frcm normal. There are four boxes in which 
to record your four figure code number.
(iii) There is a box for you to record the number of calls ;:;adc at t]io 
address, The number we would like you to record is ilot- th.o tosal 
number of calls made, but is the number of extra calls you had 
to make to obtain an interview with the respondent ofj^r you had 
selected him/her as the person you wanted to interview. This 
is not as complex as it may sound because on the front of yc-ur 
contact sheet you will have recorded separately in section 'B'
(Result of calls to obtain interview) .any extra calls you had to 
make to intervicv/ the person you selected. Thus, in tho box 
on the front of the questionnaire, give the number of calls wiiich 
you have recorded under Section 'S' on the front of your contact 
sheet. ] f you //ere able to scdoct a person and interview hiim./h.er 
slraigl'it aw/iy, then record *0' ir. the box on the qxias ticnnaire.
(iv) The I/it ro’ucti cc o;; the qucs ti onnii re is fuller than that given 
on your Cent act Spcet. One ri.art of the Introduction api.ear.; in 
brackets and we leave it to your discretion as to v,’n-eth.er or 
not you /;o ii;to as much detail as is given in tkso brar-keted part 
Cl the Introductio.c. • 'Vhni you do about tiks will probably v/.ry
< ■
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from rospontîonl to resiioiider. 1 if you f e d  i!io poruon you arc 
tail !:i ng xo i a rdud.anx and I'.oeria to be given a fuller expj anuU on 
of tbu survey t!;cn use i!.e v;!;ole of Du; lalroduot 5on,-
Obviovidy, if Die peroon you talk to r-.t D,c contact of a go ia 
odcclod for interview, you need not noceaaarily repeat that 
you are froiii D ig Univoraity of St'rliug,
(v) before you begin the intervicv; aak Die 'cb.eçk aiuu^ti on a * to 
make absolutely sure that the peuwoii you are aboux io interviovi 
ia, in fact, eligible for intervicv;. This ir, important bccauae 
in many canes the person you select for intervicv/ will not be 
the person from '.vhor.i you collected details at the contact stage 
and so you could b.avo been /civon some incoj’i'cct jnformation.
Do not take an intoi'viov; if it emerges that Die person is not 
eligible after all, o.nd r.iake it clear on your contact clicot that 
this has occurj'od.
(vi) Be sure to record the startDiy time before beginning the interview.
There arc a number of open-ended questions in this quosti oiinni rc. V/o should 
like to empiiasi.se hovr iriportant it is on Diis surv y to RivGORl) ilXACThY 
'.VllAT THE RdSRORDhRT f.WS. (Even missing "Ut a v/oi-d could make a great cloa.l 
of difference to the way we classify tho answer Die respondent gave.)
AND TO V:\JT '."'TIL YOU ?mdh RE HAS SAID ALL HE AT NTS TO SAY BFfORE GOING 
CN TO THE N.'lxT lUESTION,
Non e ta ry q u c s tion s.
At questions which require a monetary answer we have made provision for 
you to record either an answer in decimal currency or an answer in old 
fsd money. Please be careful to record answers in the appropriate places 
depending uiion whether the respondent answers in £p or £sd terms,
•
Q.6a Please note that although some of tho people you interview may
be part-time woi'kors, at Q.6, we are interested in any full ti ire 
job which they may have b.ad with another employer in the last 
■ 5 years,
Q.9-0.13
Any type of paid work done by the respondent’s wifo/molhor/niother- 
in-law should be included, even if she only worked a couple of 
hours each v/eek or, if she took in some kind of work at homo.
Sjql f-complet ion *A '
(P a e  3 o!’ nues t i o!in a i  r )
There are five pages to .self-completion ’A ’ each of which covers 
a different aspect of Die respondent’s job.
Use tiie ox];larintion given on Die questionnaire, help tlie respondent 
with the first 'item' ("fascinating"), and then toll him : "Do don't 
want you to think too ruic); about each item - put dov;n your first 
impression"
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Qa26a The day of the v/eek v/hich you should ask about is the day of the 
v/ock in which you are interviewing (e.g. If you are interviewing 
on a ihesday: "that is since last Tuesday")
folf-comuleti on '
(?a/'0 ïl)
Check that the respondent has put one tick against each item.
Q ,41 This is rjiother question where the list of answers which you can 
code anticii'.atos a respondent saying that the extra work he does 
is not paid work, BUT YOU MUST NOT ASK HIM VrdUrilnR OR NOT IT IS 
PAID V.ORK.
QfjKb ''Ve have not provided you ’with a piece to code 'Don't know' as Die 
rcoposlent ray know the typo of driucticn but not the amount, or 
may knew how c.uch is deducted but not know what it is for. If 
he dcos not know any of tliO dotai la, simply write in 'D.K, ' in 
the a!’pro])riatc place.
It is iw,portant that you do point : 't that re don't want him 
to think too much because we discovc-rod from D\o pilot th.at 
Gomo people can take quite a time, to complete this section.
If you see tliC respondent pondering on a particular item for 
too long, res'.ind him: "If you don't have a first impression 
circle 'neither'."
1
If you arc sitting Jioar to the res non :1 ci;t it can also help 
to speed things up if you turn the pages for him and/or direct 
his atte:;tion to tho aspect of his work covered on the lage lie 
turns to (e.g. as ]ic turns to jk'igo (ii), say "now your present
pay").
Please ensure that tiio respondent docs answer for each item, 
either by "watching him as he goes through or checking v/hen he has 
finished,
Q,l_2, Although this question tells tho respondent jiot to count lunch 
breaks Ih.orc are some people v/lioso wages are quoted in sudi. a 
v/ay as to lead tlicm to regard themselves as being paid for lundi 
breaks and honce they always think of their basic working v/ook 
as including lunch breaks# Should it bo app<*ront tiiat this has 
occurred please make a note to Diis effect oh the questionnaire.
Q^IG. Koto that the ansv/er you code denends noon tho reason the rcspondt.-at 
gives for having tine'off BUT THIS DOKS^NCT MEAN THAT YOU SHOUhD 
ASK PGR THE REASON OR SUGGEST A REASON TO HIM.
If ho snys ho has taken time off and adds that this ’waa becauoe 
of illncGG you code position '3'; if he says he liad to take time 
off bccuuwe h.lo employer i:'.ade him work short time, you code 
postion '4‘; but if ho simply says lie has taken tine off or 
gives anoth.or reason apart from illness or shoi't time, you code 
postion '3'«
■Q,21 In order to obxain the reason fci tko amount of overtime that
respondents do in comparison v/i D. their worlucates y/e have Rad to
use two slightly different questions:if tho‘respondent works more ,,
or less overtime than liis workm/ites ask part (bj '‘why is that?' i j
thcîi ]):u’t (j); if the respondent ’works the same amount of ovcx’time
as his v.'orki'iates ask purfc (d) 'I wonder w'ny it is triat you all
happen to work the same amount of overtime? ' and then ask part |'j
.(^ )> Id
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Q.30 This ir. the first CjVieslion in e seri.es ehont lo;r)s, pie<-e--rato 
, jnocntive- sch-mos. If the respen.ient is on t)iis kind of
schesie, after QDjO refer to t)ic scheme in the terms t.hat ha 
nscs ratl'ior thc.n repenting "bonus, piece-rnto or incentive 
scheme" at each question.
Sc] f-coispl p ti on 'O '
.Qf.ge 1.7 )
Check that the respondent has put one tick .against each item*
Q , ^  At this question you have a separate "cartoon" ca.rd to sliov/, 
which is intended to help respondents to ravierstand the two 
possible points of view, but please TAKE Thin QUEfTICN SJ.O'.VLY 
no that the Tcspendent era; fol low tho reasoning as you go 
through. Tlicn Al.LO.V HIM Pl.KllTy OP TIMS to give you his answer.
Q,75a After the respondent has given you his answer chock tliat there
has been no confusion by deducting his answer from £1 and sayi.ng .
"that means you would be left with .........(pence/shillings)
after income tax."
Allow him to change his answer if he realises he has made a mistalre,
Q.?3c You should I'end out the list of answers given at this question i.e.
say "Cun you tell me how you ,-vached tliat figiu-o *- was it something 
you read or heard about, something you woikcd out from your own. 
pay slip, or something else?"
Q*76,Q*77
If the respondent does not know any detail writo in 'D.K.' in the 
appropriate place.
Self-comnletion <pt
( p g E g T
Chock that the respondent haa put one tick against each item. 
Household conrostion
Bo sure to check that the respondent has given you details of 
everyone in the household, whether or not they arc working and 
no matter how young they arc.
Q«83 7f the respondent finds this difficult because there are r.onthly
peid people in tho household, please help him with his calculations,
Insert tho phrase "Jio you know" when you arc not speaking to tho 
head of the household,
QySh 7hc e c tivi tl OS listed horc.ar’o no t al ways i ntual ly oxclusivov For
exaL.ple, a rocpo:v.enx could->.e '‘cntex'taining friends" and "di'inking 
in a iub", if he takes friend:: out for a d/dnk. In such a case 
v/e do not mind v.'ni c!i activity y-ou code, as lung as you only codo
on a GO that Die nuiDier of lioura and cost arc not double counted.
Se 1 r c on n 1 o 11 on ' '. M
SRpI;')  ■
Chock that the roc non':'ont I'oa put one tick against each itcn.
You should code 'last payslip produced' only :! f Die respondent 
produces tho 1 as t pays!ip he roccived (not just the most recent 
one he can find), 1 1
i f
V/lion ho gives you the hours ho v/orked confirm that }ie actually [
worked 'hat nuuhcr of hours, since if tho respondent worked
overt:moj say at double-tine, his firm may double up the number ||
of liours he acxually worked in overtime to calculare hov; much ' |
he sliould bo paid. I
 ^ . 7Time i n to rvi ovr - ■ |
finished
Be sure to record this at the end of the in.tci'vie?/
Thank you letter
Remember to give the respondent tho "thank you" letter which 
appears at the end of your sot of documents.
rage 33-37
This section devils wi th your assessment of the respondent and 
his circumstances and MUST NOT BE COMPLETED IN FRONT OF THE 
. RESPONDENT,
Respondents v/j th tv/o jobs
:j
ij
At point 6, make a note of any questions where you feel the anew., c [I
was not representative of what tho respondent thinks and oxpla.in
1/hy you feel this is so. For example, you rriy feel he has ; ?
deliberately misled you at some point or that despite repetition | |
ho has not fully understood the question* '
II
Majiy of tlio questions refer to the respondent * s'woi'k ' or 'job*. (Po” |j
example, Die first question asks him how long it tal:es him to get frum 
home to work). This poses no problem for the vast irnjori ty of people 
you wi11 interview, since they will only have one job; or at most they ' | '
will }iave a main job whic); they work at most of tho time and a secondary 
job v.'hich they do in odd hours at the weekend, in the evening, etc., and 
when you ask them about their work they v/ill talk about their main 
employment.
Ii
il
Rowovcr, al Diough i are, it is possible for someone to have two jobs which j j.
he regards as of equal importance. If this sliould occur it will become | :
apparent vary early in the interview - if jt docs not come up at the
first question it will emerge at Q.5 when you ask for details of his
work. In such cases you will have to make it clear whic)i job we mean j
when WI- tslk about his 'job' or job', and tho fol lowi ng rules *
should be ;.pplied to decide wiiich job to count as his main jobt
Pi rstly if only one of his jobs fulfils the cond :i tions given in the |
•check qur;stions* on D m  first page it is,‘ of course, tho one which fulfils
these conditions wlri ch wo want to ta Ire an his main job. ,
If both of Ins jobs fulfil the condi ij ons given in tho 'check questions 
then take the job at which ho normally spend:) üiost h.ours in a week.
Finally if the two rules above still fo not i col ate hie 'r.ain job' nek 
hi.Wi to talk ahont the job which ho worked at last time ho went to work.
Having eatalilinhed the 'main job' v.diich y^u v/ill be asking about for 
iiiost questions, tho other job }ield by the respondent should be covor.'.d 
et Q .33 to Q.dpc
Spcici al Ci rcurns tancea
Having conducted a number of pilot intej’viev/s for this survey, we have 
boon able to warn you of, and toll you how to handle, a few special 
circumstances wlii.ch may arise during an interview. As wi th any survey 
peoples' ci rcumntancor. very ac much that wo cannot anticipate, end give 
you guidance on, every possible set of circumstances. Therefore', IF 
AT ANY POINT IN THE INTNhVIa.V YOU ARE IN NCUBT ABOUT A RARTiCULAh ANhwfH 
PLBASo MAKE A NOTE OF THE CJHCUMSTANCFS ON TiUl QUMSTIONNAIRB so that 
wo can make a decision when wo examine the intervicv/.
DOCUMENTS K)R EACli ADDNEOS
■ Vfnen sending back your work IT IS IKtOlîTANT THAT ALL DOCUMENTS 
RELATING TO' A PARTICULAR ADDRESS ARE KEPT TOGETHER. Eith most 
addresses tliis simply means putting fne ' tag' back through the 
white questionnaire, self completion sheets ar.d employ or's letter, 
and putting the contact sheet on tho front*
If ÏVO INTERVIEMS are conducted at any address ENSURE THAT THE TfO 
INTMuYIETS AIN: SECURELY ATTACHED TO ILICH OTHER AND TO THEIR CONTACT 
SINTT. The eaoieat way is probably to put one of tho 'tpgs' right 
througli the two interviews.
h
LEI'TERS 0? IirrRCDUCTION
You should fill in your o\m name on youjc 'Letters of Introduction'. 
These letters replace your BMH3 identification cards, and should be 
used wliere you feel the respondent requii'os verification of who you 
are or what the survey is for#
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